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iAbstract
The paradox of China’s failure to industrialize despite its thriving commercialization
before the 19th century has been debated intensively, especially in terms of whether
market efficiency is sufficient for industrialization in the pre-modern period. This
thesis sheds light on this question using archival data on grain prices covering Qing
China’s most prosperous episode (1740-1820) to identify the determinants of market
evolution as well as the true extent of market integration. My results suggest that
China’s market efficiency on the eve of Western industrialization has been grossly
overstated, and further imply that China’s market was heavily influenced by its
bureaucratic structure. My analysis is based on a historical dataset of monthly grain
prices (rice, wheat) in 211 prefectures across China and I match these with new data
on the physical geography of the postal and river network and physiographic
distribution. My analysis first confirms the close relationship between market
integration and geographic proximity but shows that geographical influence is
dominated by provincial boundaries. I then employ novel panel time series methods
to account for the impact of local and global shocks and to investigate the evolving
process of market integration over time. This analysis indicates that China
experienced continuous market disintegration with fragmentation driven by political
structure. These results support my hypothesis that Qing China’s political system
was not conducive to the development of the market mechanism since its primary
concern was market regulation rather than revenue.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Since the late 1970s, China witnessed unprecedented economic growth, which
allowed it to re-emerge as a leading global economy. China’s recent rise after a
century or more of backwardness has been upheld as a “suitable” model of gradual
reform, which would help developing countries escape poverty and sustain economic
growth. Explaining China’s economic “miracle” has spurred a huge literature.
However, China’s new found prominence in the world economy is not the first time
it has been a global leader. For much of its history, China has been the world’s
largest and most powerful economy. China’s last dynasty-Qing Dynasty (1644-1911)
was the world’s largest national economy before 1800. The Qing experienced a
tripling of population with few signs of diminishing per capita income. Despite the
past prosperity, from the early 19th century onward China was overtaken by Western
Europe, rapidly falling behind in productivity, living standards, and technology.
Many scholars have long sought to explain the origin of China’s decline.
How to combine China’s sudden decline in the 19th century with its sudden
rise in the 20th within one unified framework pose a formidable challenge to
economists and economic historians. Most existing literature attributed China’s
recent success to contemporary policies of market-oriented reforms and openness.
However, this literature ignores the impact of China’s past on its shifting trajectory
2of economic development. Brandt et al. (2014) systematically discuss the link
between China’s past and present, arguing that China’s development continues to be
shaped by its institutional “legacies”. Keller and Shiue (2007b) find that China’s
market integration in the 1720s is highly correlated with per capita income in the
1990s. Appropriate explanation of China’s economic success has to be built on a
longer view of its economic dynamics. This thesis makes a contribution to such a
task through combining unique historical grain price data with advanced empirical
methods to investigate the determinants of market efficiency in Qing China in the
18th century, which provides new empirical evidence for future discussion that how
China was shaped by it past.
1.2 Motivations
China’s civilization and economy was built on agriculture, which sustained China’s
highly centralized empire from the Qin Dynasty (B.C.E 221) to the early 20th century.
During the Qing Dynasty, the 18th century witnessed political unity, freedom from
external influences and relative commercial prosperity. But from around the late 18th
century there unfolded the ‘Great Divergence’. China suffered the chaos of foreign
domination and civil strife for almost a century whilst Western Europe industrialised
to create global economic leaders. Incomes and productivity diverged sharply.
Earlier explanations of Western economic success emphasised Western
exceptionalism, such as religion and culture, political institutions or the role of
colonialism. The recent revisionist scholars contested these arguments and argued
the origin of the Great Divergence rested in resource endowments, the impact of
3Western imperialism and historical path dependency associated with the presence of
specific institutions. All the hypotheses about the origin of the Great Divergence to
varying degrees share the view that institutions play an essential role in the shaping
of modern economies.
There is a growing literature arguing that institutions dominated geography
over the long-run (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005;
Dell, 2008; Fang and Zhao, 2011). The elegance of these empirical papers lies in
their ability to show that institutions are an important channel through which the role
of geography (e.g. large-scale plantations, mortality rate for colonizer) matters for
income differences today, which reflects the relationship between history and current
economic development.1 Since the collapse of the Chinese Han dynasty and the
Roman Empire, China and Europe have evolved distinct social structures to sustain
cooperation, which subsequently led to different cultural and institutional evolution.
In this process, Europe relied more on formal institutions while China relied more on
informal institutions (Greifand and Tabellini, 2010; Rosenthal and Wong, 2011).
Consequently, Europe evolved formal property right institutions for contract
enforcement while China’s merchants mostly enforced the contract through informal
institutions like informal networks involving clans or place of origin.
The Industrial Revolution was the turning point in the process of the Great
Divergence as it was the first time in human history that positive per capita growth
rates were sustained over a long period. The sustained per capita growth of the
1 However, Sachs (2003) insists that not all the impacts of geography on the long-term economic
growth go through institutions, e.g. malaria transmission. Glaeser at el. (2004) argues that human
capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, and some of the instrumental
variable techniques used in this literature are unsuitable for that purpose. Glaeser at el. (2004) even
suggests that poor countries escape poverty through good policies often pursued by dictators.
4Industrial Revolution allowed humans for the first time to escape the Malthusian trap.
The argument behind the Great Divergence debate could be narrowed to the
following specific questions. Why did Western Europe industrialize first?
Alternatively, why did China not industrialize first? Social and economic historians
have tried to tackle this issue by identifying potential sufficient conditions for
industrialization. Since Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, market integration has
been one of the popular explanations of economic growth. One candidate condition
for industrialization has been the degree of market integration of an agricultural
economy on the eve of industrialization, which provided sufficient incentives to
invest into industrialization.
A well-functioning market is supposed to be supported with a set of
institutions (e.g. non-distortionary pricing systems, common law, and property rights)
that would lead to more efficient resource re-allocation and provide far greater
incentives to make investment (North and Weingast, 1989; North, 1981; North and
Thomas, 1973). Following this argument, well-functioning markets could only take
root in Europe since European commerce trade was regulated by state-supported
property rights institutions. The conventional wisdom holds that markets in Western
Europe were more integrated than China, which led to the industrialization in Europe.
By contrast, Pomeranz (2000) and others argued that the most advanced regions of
China and Europe had institutional frameworks and demographic patterns that were
equally favorable to growth. This view is supported by Shiue and Keller’s (2007)
finding that China and Europe had comparable market efficiency on the eve of
industrialization. Following from this finding, Shiue and Keller conclude that market
performance is not sufficient for industrialization.
5This thesis uses historical grain price data to investigate whether China
possessed a well-functioning market in the 18th century, and whether geography or
institutions affected the market evolution. Grains, as the staples, were the most
important commodities traded in an agricultural economy like Qing China. Studer
(2008) asserts that grains are the most suitable goods to assess market integration in
the pre-modern era as they provide a representative picture of trading capacities. In
this thesis, I collected monthly rice and wheat prices for 211 prefectures across North
and South China in the period between 1740 and 1820 to investigate market
efficiency in these regions. In order to further disentangle the relative importance of
the mode of transport in determining the extent of spatial market integration, I
digitised the networks of grain rivers documented for grain trade in various archival
records. Furthermore, I digitised the extensive imperial postal-route network, which
according to Fan (1993) represented the primary land trading routes in Qing China.
1.3 Contributions
1.3.1 Grain Price Data, Waterway Network and Postal Route
Network
The first contribution of this thesis is the grain prices I collated as well as detailed
geographical variables I constructed for this research. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first study using such detailed historical information of the transport
network and topographical distribution for the analysis of market integration.
6The grain data is collated from sources documenting the nationwide grain
price system in the Qing Dynasty. This elaborate grain price reporting system
became a formal system at the start of the reign of Emperor Qianlong (1736-1795).
The grain price data was based on monthly reports detailing the prevailing high and
low prices for up to 20 commodities (not all grain were reported in every region) at
the prefecture level, of which I collect monthly rice price of 131 prefectures in South
China and monthly wheat price of 80 prefectures in North China in the years from
1740 to 1820. The reliability and comparability of this data have been confirmed by
historians and economic historians (Chuan and Kraus, 1975; Wang, 1978, 1986,
1992; Marks, 1991). The geographical coverage of these data amounts to around
two-thirds of China’s administrative units and more than 80% of China’s population
in the mid-18th century.
Based on geographical information system (GIS) data from China Historical
Geographic Information System (CHGIS) for 1820, I created two geographical
datasets as trade cost proxy for (i) the postal route network at the county level, (ii)
the grain trade waterway network, which are aggregated and matched to the grain
price data at the prefecture level. In pre-modern China, postal routes acted as an
“administrative traffic system”, and were used as transportation highways for the
movement of goods and people during the Qing Dynasty (Fan, 1993). In 1907 the
Qing Dynasty produced the China Postal Almanac, which contains maps of the
primary postal routes, railroads and telegraph lines in each province. These postal
routes were for the most part the same as those used for many centuries. The postal
route distance measure I derive from the postal network gives a better proxy for trade
distance than the widely used direct distance because in practice the true trade route
7follows the topographical distribution of the land (e.g. valleys or navigable rivers),
especially for heavy commodities such as grains. In the same period, waterway
transport was far more economical and convenient than land transport. To construct
a variable that captures the impact of the waterway network on market integration, I
identify and digitize all the rivers that have been recorded for grain trade in
gazetteers and archives reported in Deng (1994, 1995) as well as inland waterways
reported in Wiens (1955), which form the river layer for the river data-set in CHGIS.
The third geographic dataset I have applied in this thesis is the boundaries of nine
“physiographic macroregions” introduced by William Skinner (1977a), who divide
China into nine regions according to the mountain ranges, drainage basins of major
rivers and other travel-constraining geomorphological features. Physiographic border
can act as natural barriers to trade.
1.3.2 Geography, Institutions and Market Evolution
This thesis contributes to the argument contrasting the effects of institutions and
geography on the long-run development, and provides results to support the
“institutions hypothesis”. Applying Engle-Granger cointegration and conventional
cross-section method, my results indicate that Qing China’s provincial border
produced larger impact than waterway network and physiographic distribution on
shaping the market evolution. Although I provide robust evidence to identify that
Southern markets were more integrated than Northern markets, the role of river
transport for the subtle differences between China’s Southern and Northern regions
is significant but not dominant. Applying novel panel time series methods and
8conventional cross-section method, I provide robust evidence for continuous market
disintegration and fragmentation of China’s grain market while the pattern and
driving force of market fragmentation was determined by the provincial border
rather than the physiographic determinants. All these results highlight two
perspectives: i) Qing’s bureaucratic intervention and influence, rather than
geographical factors, determined Qing China’s grain market performance; ii) the role
of transport cost for the market integration has been overstated for pre-modern
China. The strong provincial border effects coincided with the primary concern for
food security of the Qing state. Under the integrated provincial bureaucratic
hierarchy, Qing China’s provincial governors were delegated political power as the
head of province, and bore the responsibility of maximizing local grain storage,
which encouraged and enable them to embargo the grain export.
My results contribute to the discussion of the Great Divergence. Combined
the results from analysis on spatial and time dimension, I provide robust evidence
that China’s market disintegrated over time and was fragmented along its provincial
borders, which strongly challenges previous hypotheses that China had an unified
integrated market on the eve of industrialization. With these findings, firstly, we
have to re-consider the role of market integration for further industrialization. And,
we may go back to Smithian trade-led arguments to explain China’s decline.
Contrary to Shiue and Keller’s (2007) conclusion that market efficiency is not
sufficient for industrialization, China may have failed to industrialize due to its lack
of well-functioning market or institutions supporting well-functioning market.
Secondly, we may re-emphasize the importance of “good” institutions, especially
property right institutions, for the long-run economic development, which was
9discussed in the seminal works of North and Thomas (1973), North and Weingast
(1989) and North (1981, 1990). China’s commercial prosperity in the Qing Dynasty
relied on the informal rules in the form of family bylaws, lineage rules and guild
regulations that overcame the commitment problem. My findings suggest that,
despite informal institutions under the centralized regime was favourable to trade
within the clan network, they were not favourable to inter-regional market
integration therefore cannot lead to modern economic growth.
This thesis provides robust evidence of market decline in China during the
18th century, which trigger another essential question that Why China’s market
declined during its prosperous period. Based on a simple regression between
population growth and market integration change at the prefectural level, I cannot
find any significant statistical correlation to support that hypothesis that China’s
grain market decline was driven by its demographic change. In the short run analysis
of the determinants of trade cost, I cannot find evidence to support the hypothesis
that the deterioration of transport capacity of rivers determined the increasing trade
cost. In addition, only 30% of trade cost can be explained by the provincial border
while 50% of trade cost has to be attributed to the unknown distance-unrelated cost.
Although there is no direct evidence, it is quite likely that these unknown distance-
unrelated costs came from institutions. The Qing State paternalist interventions in
the grain market intervention to maintain food security was its primary policy target.
Under the stable centralized polity with large scope of geography, Qing State had no
incentive to establish formal property right institutions to promote economic growth
since its primary concern was social stability. The insecurity of property impeded the
incentives for investment as well as the demand for financial loans, which eventually
10
prevented the development of modern financial sector as well as the modern market
mechanism in Qing China.
1.3.3 Structure of this Thesis
This thesis is divided into four core chapters. Chapter 2 explores the background of
the Qing Dynasty and its political institutions, the Great Divergence debate and the
development of Qing grain market. Chapter 3 describes the data on grain price,
postal route network, grain waterway network as well as Skinner macroregions. In
Chapter 4, I apply Engel-Granger cointegration method to identify and quantify the
determinants of market integration spatially, based on the comparison between
Southern rice prices and Northern Wheat prices. In Chapter 5, I apply one novel
panel cointegration method (i.e. mean group estimator) to provide robust evidence
that China experienced a process of market disintegration and fragmentation.
11
Chapter 2
Great Divergence, Qing Dynasty and
its Grain Trade
2.1 Introduction
China’s civilization was built on agriculture, the prosperity of which depends on the
natural and geographical endowment (Wen, 2005). China has been for most periods
a centralized empire since the Qin Dynasty (B.C. 221). Since the Tang Dynasty (618
– 907) China has had a market economy with a high degree of labour division and
private-owned land, fairly free movement of labour, and relatively well-functioning
factor and product markets (Lin, 1995). During the 18th century, the Qing Dynasty
attained a high degree political stability and economic prosperity. Qing China saw
increasing agricultural development, commercialization and urbanization driven by
population growth, which spurred the expansion of interregional grain trade.
However, food security was the primary concern of Qing’s emperors. The Qing’s
officials intervened in the grain trade through the national-wide granary system,
which had ambitious goals of grain storage to relieve periodic food shortages and
price stabilization to ensure the livelihood of the people.
Despite the prosperity of China in the past, from the 19th century onward
Western Europe rapidly overtook China with gains in productivity, living standard,
and technology, which we identify with the Industrial Revolution. The process is
often known as the “Great Divergence” or the “Rise of the West”. The corollary of
the West’s new found economic and political power was the “fall of the China” and
12
the rest of the world in relative terms. The timing of the divergence is hotly debated.
Historians such as Pomeranz (2000), Parthasarathi (1998) and Frank (1998) have
claimed that the Great Divergence between Europe and Asia occurred only after the
start of the 19th century. Many scholars have long sought to explain the origin of
Western economic success. The argument behind the Great Divergence debate could
be narrowed to the following specific question: why was China unable to
industrialize if China and Europe were comparable as recently as the 18th century.
Can we identify a unified framework behind the “rise of the West” as well as the
“fall of the China”, which would help us to identify the proper economic mode
producing the modern economic institutions and sustainable economic growth?
Earlier explanations of Western economic success emphasised Western
exceptionalism, such as religion and culture, political institutions or the role of
colonialism. Revisionist scholars contest these arguments, such as those associated
with the California School including Andre Gunder Frank, James Z. Lee, Bozhong
Li, R. Bin Wong and most well-known, Kenneth Pomeranz. They argue the origin of
Great Divergence in terms of resource endowments, the impact of Western
imperialism and historical path dependency associated with the presence of specific
institutions.
One particular form of Western exceptionalism emphasises how European
allocative institutions are both necessary and sufficient conditions for effective
resource re-allocation and modern growth. Countries such as Britain and Netherlands
developed well-functioning markets supported with a set of institutions (non-
distortionary pricing system, common law, and property right institutions) (North,
1981). Western Europe’s more integrated markets compared with China explained
13
the West’s industrialization. Pomeranz (2000) seriously challenged this view arguing
that market efficiency and living standards were comparable with Europe on the eve
of the Industrial Revolution. That Europe- in particular England- entered into
sustained modern growth, according to Pomeranze, arose from the accident of
plentiful energy (coal) near urban areas and the bounty of land-based resources (food
and fibre) of the New World. Based on a study of rice prices in China and wheat
prices in Europe, Shiue and Keller (2007) found some support for Pomeranz’s
conjectures. But their results imply integrated market were insufficient for
industrialization. If so, why was China’s thriving commerce unable to lay the
foundation for industrialization?
A growing literature argues that “property right institutions” are a primary
determinant of economic performance. Since China and Europe have evolved
distinct social structures to sustain cooperation, I might find our answer in the
Chinese use of informal contract arrangements compared with the Europeans
reliance more on formal property right institutions to enforce trade contracts. Shiue
and Keller’s (2007) results imply that informal contracting institutions are
substitutable for formal property right institutions at least in terms of market
integration. However, my study questions whether Qing China’s markets were “well-
functioning”. In Chapter 4 and 5 I show that Qing China’s market integration has
been exaggerated, and contrarily I suggest it experienced a process of disintegration
and fragmentation because of the Chinese political structure.
This Chapter is organized as below. Section 2.2 introduces the golden period
of Qing Dynasty before the Great Divergence. Section 2.3 discusses a variety of
hypotheses to explain the Great Divergence. Section 2.4 suggests that the highly
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centralized regime in China held back institutional change favourable to the modern
economic growth. Section 2.5 introduces the national-wide granary system, describes
the prosperity of grain trade as well as the difference between rice and wheat markets.
Section 2.6 discusses grain market integration as one acceptable measurement of
market performance for Qing China. Conclusions are given in the final section.
2.2 Qing Dynasty and the Great Divergence
2.2.1 18
th
century: China’s Golden Age
The Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) founded by the Manchus from northeast China, took
over from the ethnic Han Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). Qing China became the largest
consolidated Chinese empire. Between 1650 and 1850, China’s population grew
from less than 150 million to more than 400 million (Perkins, 1969), without any
apparent drop in the average living standards before the mid-19th century (Baten et
al., 2010). China’s economy as late as the 1820s was the largest economy in the
world; GDP accounted for 32.4% of the world total (Maddison, 1998).
The Qing period before the first Opium War (1839-40) is usually divided into
three sub-periods. The Early Qing was a period of military conquest and political
consolidation that concluded in the 1680s. The second High Qing period, which saw
social stability and expansion of interregional trade, is characterised as a golden age.
The end of the High Qing was marked by the late 18th century large-scale uprising,
the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804). The Late-Qing sub-period is one of rising
monetary and economic instabilities. China’s humiliating defeat by the British in the
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first Opium War ushered in a period of economic and political turmoil, including the
outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) and the second Opium War (1856-
1860), which finally culminated in the collapse of the Qing state in the early 20th
century. The High Qing 18th century was a prosperous period, especially the years of
the emperor Qianlong (1736-1795). There were innovations in farm management
and production technologies that enabled long-term growth in agricultural
productivity, rural income and peasants’ living standard (Hung, 2008; Li, 1998).
Long distance trade flourished during the period (Wang, 1992). Increasing
commercialization, urbanization and mobility was driven by population growth and
political stability, which helped produce a society that was more differentiated, more
integrated, more competitive and more complex than in the past (Naquin and
Rawski, 1987).
Such economic development and prosperity trigger the question: why was
China in the 18th century unable to take advantage of its thriving commercialization
to modernize its economy through an Industrial Revolution? This is a broad question
with at least three inter-related issues related to how an autocratic, managerial and
interventionist state handled a) economic policies and economic development (Sng,
2014), b) institutions for the protection of property rights (Landes, 2006; North and
Weingast, 1989), and c) the regulation of merchants (Dunstan, 2006). This thesis
will explore all three channels through analysing empirically the determinants and
extent of the grain market integration between 1740 and 1820, and discuss the role of
the interaction between merchants and centralized political structures for the
evolution of markets in pre-modern China.
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A fundamental aspect of the Qing state is its unified political system. With
the emperor at the centre of the unity state in Beijing, the central state relied on local
officials at the provincial and sub-provincial level to implement its policies through a
hierarchy of four administrative layers: the emperor, the governor-generals and
governors (provincial level), the prefects (prefectural level), and the magistrates
(county level). In this order, governors were the middlemen between local and
central government, and between military and civilian authority (Guy, 2010). Shiue
(2004) uses a principal-agent framework to explain that the principal (i.e. emperor
and his central state in Beijing) lacked sufficient information to monitor the agent
(i.e. local administrators). As a consequence, local governments may allocate public
resources at their discretion and priority. Ma (2011) uses a similar principal-agent
model but with three major actors: the emperor, the local officials and the people.
Although an absolutist regime may move towards a path leading to low-taxation,
high stability and extensive growth, Ma argues its centralized and hierarchical
political structure would produce information asymmetry and incentive
misalignment among the three actors. Consequently, the regime’s fiscal and financial
capacity was limited, which weakened capacity for institutional changes conducive
to modern growth. These arguments imply that the understanding of China’s
institutional evolution may offer a deeper insight about why Qing China’s
commercial prosperity could not be transformed into modern economic growth (e.g.,
an industrial revolution) than other explanations, such as culture and geography.
Despite Qing China’s prosperity, a widespread view is that the Song Dynasty
– and the later period Southern Song Dynasty – was the most advanced dynasty with
the best potential for an industrial take off (Lin. 1995). Elvin (1973) conceived the
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Song achievements as a medieval economic revolution. Others have challenged such
claims, such as Li (2000a), who argued that the cited high crop yields in the
Southern Song period were based on biased and selective evidence. The cultivation
of the rice, the diffusion of new agricultural tools and best practices, and the
intensification of agriculture might have appeared in the Song Dynasty, but the
adoption of the innovations were only diffused during the Ming and Qing dynasties
(Ma, 2004).
2.2.2 Great Divergence
China and Europe were comparable in agriculture productivity, population dynamics,
handicraft industry, and levels of income and consumption in the 18th century, but
they experience divergent developmental paths in the 19th century. The Great
Divergence is the process by which the Western Europe overcame pre-modern
growth constraints to enable a sustained improvement in per capita standard of living.
It is a contentious issue in economic history.
The Great Divergence attracts attention because it inspires one general but
important question: what triggers the emergence of modern economic growth. In the
1990s the Eurocentric view of modern economic development was challenged by the
California school revisionists, which included Andre Gunder Frank, James Z. Lee,
Bozhong Li, R. Bin Wong and most well-known, Kenneth Pomeranz. Pomeranz and
others argued that China’s most advanced region (the Lower Yangtze Region) and
the most advanced regions of Europe (England) had institutional frameworks and
demographic patterns that were equally favorable to growth. Similar trajectories of
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economic evolution, including comparable farming productivity, produced average
standards of living that were roughly common; China might even have been ahead of
Europe (Allen, 2009; Li, 2000a, Pomeranz, 2000). One key claim in Pomeranz (2000)
is that it is difficult to identify any internal, socio-economic causes of or dispositions
towards growth in the Britain, which did not equally apply to China.
Contrary to Pomeranz (2000), Brenner and Isett (2002) argue that between
1500 and 1750 the Lower Yangtze Region and England may have already had
divergent developmental paths. While the peasant-based economy in the Lower
Yangtze Region was descending into a Malthusian crisis, the capitalist economy of
England had entered into self-sustaining growth. Broadberry and Gupta (2006) have
shown that living standards in China were far lower than those of north-western
Europe. Several studies have shown that by the start of the 19th century there was
already a large gap between England and China in real wages and other measures of
the standard of living, though the standard of living was comparable to southern
Europe (Allen 2011 et al.; Baten 2010 et al.).
2.3 Main Hypotheses of the Great Divergence
Many different hypotheses intertwined to interpret the Great Divergence, but no
single factor would have been enough on its own. All the hypotheses agree that
(political and market) institutions are in one way or another essential for
development, but their views differ on the specific mechanisms being linked.
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2.3.1 Non-institution Hypotheses
Culture
Cultural factors are a popular explanation used to explain the divergence between
China and Europe. The best known is Max Weber’s association of Christianity with
European economic prosperity in his famous work The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism. It argued that religious factors were crucial for spurring
European economic growth. Weber’s view centered on the subtle link between the
teaching of Calvin and the Puritans, which encouraged savings, investments, and the
relentless pursuit of profit with the unintentional consequences of capitalist behavior
(Bai and Kung, 2013). Elvin (1973) mentions that an intellectual paradigm shift from
Taoism to Confucianism in China moved the focus from natural science and
mathematics fostered under Taoism to studies of morality and social philosophy
under Confucianism, which changed the intellectual climate for scientific research.
The role of the Protestant Christian churches in Europe was custodian of knowledge
and school for technicians (Landes, 2006). On the other hand, the Confucianist
orthodoxy upheld in China impelled the officials and gentry leaders to exercise
paternalist, benevolent leadership and attention to their subjects’ well-being (Hung,
2008).
Different religions predetermine different evolution of social cooperation, in
Weber’s and other culturalist’s schema, which leads to different institutional
evolution. China’s predominated Confucianism considers moral obligations among
kin as the basis of social order but Europe’s Christianity discouraged practices that
sustain kinship groups, such as adoption, polygamy, concubinage, marriage among
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distant kin, and marriage without the woman’s consent (Greif and Tabellini, 2010).
Cultural distinctions eventually determined modes of economic growth through
shaping institutions.
Geography, Natural Resource and Colonialism
Advocates of “geography hypothesis” argue that time-invariant geographic factors
such as ecology, climate, natural endowments, and the disease environment, are the
primary drivers of long-run economic development. This view has been emphasized
by a number of empirical studies that highlight the correlations between geographic
characteristics and economic development, such as the climate (Kamarck, 1976), the
disease environment (Sachs et al., 2001; Sachs and Malaney, 2002), natural
openness (Rappaport and Sachs, 2003), factor and resource endowments (Engerman
and Sokoloff, 2000; Sachs and Warner, 2001). This literature mostly focuses on the
countries in the America, Africa and the tropical zones.
Some historians looked to geographical explanations for the Great
Divergence. Diamond (1997) suggests that environmental factors of particular
geographies played a crucial role in the European take-off. Diamond argues that
Europe was uniquely endowed with domesticable plants and animals such that the
population was also more immune to diseases. These factors led to higher
productivity and, crucially, higher population density, which eventually led to the
development of institutions (e.g. cities, bureaucracies), and contributed to economic
growth. Europeans’ higher resistance to bacteria and virus also accelerated its
colonialism since the germs they carried killed large number of native populations,
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particularly in the Americas and Australia. However, Clark’s (2008) explanation is
the opposite: the better-off segment of the population became steadily more
competent and productive over successive generations because disease picked off
Britain's poorer residents. Despite their unconformity, both of their hypotheses agree
that geography pre-determined the long-run economic consequence through
institutions.
Diamond (1997) also used the geographical characteristics to explain why
China evolved into a centralized social organization but Europe was fragmented.
First, China’s geographical connectedness made it too easily unified under
stultifying dictatorships, whereas Europe had just the right amount of geographical
fragmentation to keep power divided.2 Second, Chinese civilization over the past
2000 years was built increasingly on the irrigated agriculture. The establishment of a
central social organization and hierarchy, founded upon the construction and
maintenance of irrigation. European civilization, on the other hand, was founded
upon the domestication of rainfall-dependent crops – wheat and barley, which will
grow anywhere, as long as it rains for part of the year. This allowed farming
communities, villages, towns and eventually cities to emerge autonomously in
Europe. There was never any need for a central authority to control irrigation across
the continent. Distinct political system shaped by geography determines dissimilar
institutional evolution thereby lead to different economic mode.
2 China is enclosed by a ring of insurmountable geographic obstacles – the ocean to the east, desert to
the north, mountains to the south and sparsely populated desert and steppe regions beyond an
enormous, man-made wall to the west. On the other hand, Europe was geographically segmented,
,with four mountain ranges, five peninsulas, dozens of rivers, islands, and proximity to the coast of
north Africa (Diamond, 1997).
22
In Pomeranz (2000), access to natural resources pre-determined the Great
Divergence. China was locked into a development path of ecologically efficient but
highly labor-intensive agriculture and proto-industry, which offered limited room to
shift labour into manufacturing for per capita growth. Pomeranz argues that Britain
was able to break this limitation and evolve along an energy-intensive ecological
trajectory because of the lucky geographical accident of its ready access to coal.
However, Brenner and Isett (2002) and Huang (2002) argue that Pomeranz is too
optimistic about China’s resource constraints and over-estimates China’s economic
prosperity. Pomeranz (2000) considers the Middle Yangtze households’ allocating
female labour to domestic proto-industry in the 19th century was a sign of growing
prosperity, while for Brenner and Isett (2002) and Huang (2002) it was an
unavoidable response to downward pressures on living standards resulting from the
decreasing returns to labour in agriculture. Huang (2002) criticized Pomeranz for
failing to grasp the distinction between land productivity and labour productivity and
between labour intensification per unit of land and capitalization per unit of labour,
which he says lead Pomeranz to glide over China’s agricultural stagnation after the
18th century.
Pomeranz also argues Britain obtained huge natural resource windfall from
the discovery of the New World. Centuries of European colonialism following the
1492 landing of Christopher Columbus in America enabled Europe to pull in raw
materials, bullion and labour resources, which had the effect of holding back the rest
of the world. Blaut (1993) argues the rise of Europe for the 15th century stemmed
directly from the wealth. Europeans acquired from colonizing on America, first in
acquiring vast quantities of gold and silver, and later from the slave plantations and
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other colonial enterprises. This immense wealth inflow gave the Western European
merchant community the power to seize political control over sizeable territories
through buying off the landlord class, which in England eventually lead to the
“Glorious Revolution” of 1688 that ushered in a raft of institutions innovations
central to Britain’s rise. However, although colonialism may explain the rise of
Europe, it cannot explain why China’s merchants have no interest on maritime trade
even though China’s maritime navigation technology was much advanced.3
2.3.2 Institution Hypotheses
Instead of culture, weather, geography or right policies, Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012) argue that man-made political and economic institutions underlie economic
success. Different patterns of institutions are deeply rooted in the past and they tend
to persist with enduring influence on later socioeconomic organisation.
Technology
One key to the Industrial Revolution is interpreting the technological advance in the
Europe. Mokyr (1990) articulated the view that the industrial revolution was the
culmination of a millennium of technological creativity.4 The historical evidence
suggests that the watershed between the Malthusian and Post-Malthusian Regimes is
3 Between 1405 and 1433, the Ming government sponsored seven naval expeditions. Zheng He was
placed as the admiral in control of the huge fleet, and he commanded these seven expeditionary
voyages to Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and East Africa.
4 The debate about the causality between innovation and industrial revolution is still ongoing but
ambiguous (Zhao, 2009).
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the acceleration in the pace of technological progress (Galor and Weil, 2000). Before
1820s, the income differential between today’s rich countries and poor countries
existed but comparatively small. After 1820s, the rich countries have grown faster,
and the divergence has increased. The immediate cause of this divergence was that
the rich countries have invented and adopted technologies to raise labour
productivity enormously (Allen, 2012; Clark and Feenstra, 2003). Prior to 1760 the
average rate of efficiency 5 advance through technological change in the world
through millennia was almost zero, whereas efficiency growth rates in England
1760-1860 was sustained as 0.5% per year for over 100 years (Clark, 2010). China’s
pre-modern achievements in science and technology were remarkable as documented
in the monumental works of Joseph Needham and his collaborators (Lin, 1995). One
famous questions asked by Needham in 1940s, which is well known as “The
Needham Question”, which asks why was China overtaken by the West despite its
earlier successes in science and technology. This question foreshadowed the Great
Divergence debate by several decades.
Landes (2006) attributes the absence of technical progress in China to the
lack of free market and institutionalized property rights. The Chinese state was
always stepping in to interfere with private enterprise by a desire to reserve labour to
agriculture for stabilizing the agricultural output or to control important resources for
fiscal expansion, such as salt and iron. Shiue and Keller (2007) argue that China
failed to industrialization may due to its lack of institutions supporting technical
progress rather than market institutions. However, the Malthusian model also implies
that countries with superior technology will have denser populations. How to explain
5 Clark (2010) constructs the economic efficiency index as the geometric weighted average of the real
rental of capital, the real price of labor and the real rental of land.
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China’s high population density even though its technology was backward? Kremer
(1993)’s endogenous growth model even suggests that high population spurs on
technological progress. 6 China’s high population combined with low industrial
technology implies that pre-industrial China’s technology investment only focused
on the innovation in agriculture to sustain its dramatic population. Needham (1969,
p211) believed that because Chinese bureaucratic system emphasized agricultural
production and discriminated against merchants and artisans, it failed to combine its
craftsmen’s technology with scholar’s mathematical and logical inference method.
The pre-modern China’s sophisticated agricultural only allowed high population
growth but failed to raise the living standard above subsistence (Lucas, 1999).
Elvin’s (1973) “high-level equilibrium trap” further explains why China’s
large population cannot motivate modern industrial technology to escape Malthusian
trap: China’s rapid population growth and limited amount of cultivated land implies
that China’s labour became increasingly cheap and capital increasingly expensive,
which consequently reduces the demand of labour-saving technology. However,
China was able to maintain high output through increase labour inputs from its
expanding population. Yao (2003) used a dynamic general equilibrium model to
show that Elvin’s hypothesis requires two specific assumptions: all the surplus
labour will be absorbed into agriculture, and the industry allows for increasing return
to scale. Lin (1995, 2008) challenges Elvin’s hypothesis. He focuses on the supply
side. His arguments are that China’s imperial civil service examination and the
criteria of bureaucratic promotion distracted the attention of intellectuals from
investing in the form of the human capital necessary for modern scientific research.
6 Kermer (1993)’s theoretical conclusion bases on the assumption that each person’s chance of
inventing something is independent of population,
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By way of contrast, institutions supporting technological innovation were
encouraged in Europe for the most part. The development of "open science" in the
16th century helped with the spread of economically useful ideas (Mokyr, 1990)
while the development of European institutions to protect property rights in
knowledge created a market for new ideas and inventions, which supported modern
industrial growth (North and Thomas, 1973). The military competition within
Europe also pushed the gunpowder technology, which eventually allowed them to
extend the conquests and create colonial empires in the world (Hoffman, 2012).
Property Right Institutions
There is widespread consensus among economists and political scientists that
“property right institutions” are a primary determinant of economic performance.
These institutions protect individuals from theft or expropriation of assets,
innovations and ideas by the government or elites, which otherwise would
undermine investment and negatively impact on the long-run economic development.
The seminal works of North and Thomas (1973), North and Weingast (1989) and
North (1981, 1990) emphasize the importance of private property institutions for
long-term economic development. Recent empirical work has brought out the many
ways institutions affect social and economic outcomes (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002,
2004, 2005; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Dell, 2008; and Fang and Zhao, 2011). Adam
Smith and many economists since had the view the proper function of the state was
to establish clear and secure property rights, which would best promote economic
growth, and not otherwise intervene in economic growth.
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Since China and Europe have evolved distinct social structures to sustain
cooperation, they rely on different combination of formal and informal enforcement
institutions (Dincecco and Onorato, 2013; Greif and Tabellini, 2010; Rosenthal and
Wong, 2011). Under the unified political monarchy, China had little inner political
competition, few transit taxes, relatively free private sector, and was rich for a long
time in the past (Ma, 2012). In contrast, Europe with multiple polities bear the costs
of war time, and even in peacetime these regions suffered distortions to trade.
Although political integrated China gave a quasi-free-trade zone the size of Europe,
Europe’s fragmented polity was more supportive for the development of formal
property right institutions. Informal contract arrangements were more typically used
by Chinese, whereas Europeans relied more on formal property protection
institutions to enforce contracts.
Western propertied and wealthy elites had direct access to political power
through political representation in parliaments (van Zanden, et al., 2012; Ma, 2011).
From the collapse of Roman Empire, political fragmentation in Europe resulted in
unceasing instability and warfare among the local lords, which at the same time led
to power intensification at the local level. The political power was further
decentralized by the wrestling of power between the king and church, which gave the
feudal lords chances to acquire independent coercive power and allowed the
development of autonomous towns (Tan, 2013). The fragmented polity and high
reliance on commercial tax for military expenditure in medieval Europe favoured the
merchants’ political bargaining power to protect their commercial properties. The
substantial increased wealth from the Atlantic Ocean and trade with the New World
also strengthened merchant groups in Western Europe by constraining the power of
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the monarchy (Acemoglu et al., 2005). Strong representation of commercial or
property interest in city-states or federation of city-states combined with the warfare
mobilization led to the rise of capital-intensive path, which accelerated the
development of property right protection.
Contrasted with Europe, China’s political centralization and stability led to
the rise of coercion-intensive path, which subdued the interest of the commercial
elites (Tan, 2013). China’s wealthy elites had limited power to bargain politically
with the emperor although they had access to large markets. The reproduction of the
entrepreneurial elite was constrained by the state’s paternalist disposition in
managing urban class conflict (Hung, 2008). Compared with Europe, China’s tax
collection relied more on the local officials selected by bureaucratic competition
rather than the local elite social member. Instead of commercial tax in Europe,
China’s fiscal system was centred on the taxation of private-own land. On the other
hand, the centralized imperial state had monopolised production and trade of staple
commodities such as salt, iron and tea, which were immense sources for fiscal
revenues. China’s emperors were restrained mainly by two concerns: the Confucian
moral obligation of caring for the people and the fear of peasant rebellions (Tan,
2013). Their primary concern with commerce was market regulation rather than
market revenue, and they don’t have a need to establish the formal property right
institutions.
According to Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), contracting institutions like
informal contract enforcement regulated private transactions between citizens while
property rights institutions regulated the relationship between ordinary private
citizens and the political power holders. Property rights institutions were more
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important contracting institutions on for long-run economic growth since only they
could provide significant checks against state expropriation. This comparison may
explain why pre-modern China’s informal contract enforcement could sustain its
commercial cooperation and prosperity but was unable subsequently to trigger
institutional change that favoured the long-run economic growth.
2.4 Market Performance and Institutions
2.4.1 Market Performance
Adam Smith articulated the importance of the state-protection of property rights for
successful market-based economic development.
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not
enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves
secure in the procession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not
supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be
regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to
pay.
Market efficiency determines the long-run economic performance (Isham and
Kaufmann, 1999; Rodrik et al., 2004). Following the Smithian arguments, when
markets expand, increased labour specialization will follow, which will increase the
efficiency of resource re-allocation and cause output to rise. The historical process of
European economic growth is marked by ever-expanding exchange relations, which
shed light on the nature and evolution of modern institutions (Greif, 1993). The
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contribution of European states is to supply the formal framework that reduces
certain types of risks that merchants encounter in the trade activities. One influential
view to explain why Western Europe industrialized first holds that its exceptionally
well-functioning markets provided the incentives to invest into the industry.
A well-functioning market is supposed to be supported with a set of
institution (e.g. non-distortionary pricing systems, common law, and property rights)
that would lead to more efficient resource re-allocation and provide far greater
incentives to make investment (North and Weingast, 1989; North, 1981; North and
Thomas, 1973). Consequently, market integration is an indicator for assessment of
the quality of institutions. All the Great Divergence hypotheses agree that
institutions are the final determinants of economic growth, and what varied were
which mechanisms dominantly shape the institutions. Although it is difficult to
disentangle empirically these varied different mechanisms, their combined impact
would be reflected by market performance.
In contrast to the traditional view that the Qing state was hostile to mercantile
activities and commercial growth because of Confucianism, Qing Dynasty was one
of the most pro-commercial regimes in imperial Chinese history (Perkins, 1967;
Rowe, 1993). In the 18th century, China’s domestic commercial taxes were
deliberately kept minimal, and China’s merchants regulated their own local markets
largely. While European commerce trade was regulated by state-supported property
rights regimes, China’s commercial expansion in Ming and Qing dynasty were
governed by informal rules in the form of family bylaws, lineage rules and guild
regulations that overcame the commitment problem (Ma, 2004; Wong, 2004). An
important difference in commercial practices may have lessened the need for the
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formal contract enforcement in Imperial China. In long distance trade, the Chinese
merchants bought goods from a local broker, shipped those goods in person, and sold
the goods in another area to a local broker acting as middleman for local retail shops
(Wong, 2004). Chinese merchants travelled with their goods over the entire journey.
European merchants, by way of contrast, often entrusted their goods to others and
waited for payment, and thus needed to enforce contracts at a distance. Chinese
merchants therefore had less need for formal mechanisms to enforce their contracts
at arm’s length. But they had the additional cost of accompanying their goods over
long distance.
The empirical finding of Shiue and Keller (2007) suggests that the
performance of markets in China and Western Europe was overall comparable on the
eve of the Industrial Revolution. This leads them to conclude that market
performance is not sufficient for industrialization. Since China did not evolve the
formal property right institutions, Shiue and Keller’s results also imply that the
formal property right institutions are not necessary for market performance. In
another word, informal contract enforcement is substitutable for formal property
right institutions at least in terms of market efficiency.
2.4.2 Did China’s market matter?
Despite that the findings of past empirical literature show that Qing China’s markets
were “integrated” and “effective”, it is too early to conclude that Qing China
possessed “proper” markets needed by the modern economic growth because its
institutions did not satisfy the requirements of “well-functioning market”. With
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respect to Shiue and Keller’s (2007) definition of market function, effective markets
would provide sufficient investment for manufacturing and other non-farming
activities, and thereby lead to industrialization. This definition implies two specific
pre-conditions: 1) investors have the incentives to invest; 2) investors are able to
collect sufficient investment. Both of these two conditions are violated by China’s
institutions.
China’s persistent highly centralized polity combined with its developed
informal enforcement institutions determined that formal property right institutions
could not take root in China. While the Qing China established legal code was
elaborate and comprehensiveness, China’s law was not sufficient to enforce formal
property protection in trade. Under the unified political monarchy, there were no
independent power structures such as city-states or autonomous corporate bodies.
The priority of the Qing code was to stabilize the social order rather than protecting
private interests. The Qing state failed to develop the legal infrastructure to sustain
formal contracting while the extended households and lineages had little demand for
them (Rosenthal and Wong, 2011). The decision rules were designed only for the
bureaucrats to meter out punishments proportionate to the extent of criminal
violations (Ma, 2006). Under this legal environment, the incentives for merchants to
invest were depressed since they were exposed to the risk of official intervention and
expropriation.
In the 18th century, Qing China’s financial development was not developed,
which determined that it would be quite costly to collect sufficient investment from
the credit market. By contrast, in Europe, the sharp increase in government
borrowing to sustain state military expenditure and a substantial increase in the
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perceived “credible commitment” accelerated the development of financial markets.
Coffman et al. (2013) suggests that many of the supposed benefits of political
institutions during the industrialization were more properly the result of financial
innovation.7 China’s formal credit markets were less developed than European ones.
Due to the political integration and lower frequency of war, China’s demand for
credit was lower for both political and economic reasons than European demand
despite comparable levels of economic development. The strong incentive for credit
from China’s central state only occurred when the regimes were tottering, but under
such dire circumstances few would have been willing to lend. As a consequence,
there was no need for central state to progress the credit-market infrastructure. On
the side of merchants, since capital volume was not large per trip8, credit demand
was met by informal network within clan or business forms.
With the absence of property rights protection as well as developed financial
markets, China’s merchants shifted their investment into the official titles to protect
their properties through bureaucratic hierarchy, or into the land to avoid the risk.
Insecure property rights and the lack of formal political protection produced that land
was the only suitable wealthholding for long-term investment (Brandt et al.,
2014).The absence of well-functioning market could also explain why China lacked
investment in technology innovation in manufacturing, and why China’s merchants
were unable to expand the oceanic commerce. Regardless of the effects of internal
peace and the developed informal merchant network on commercial prosperity,
China’s centralized polity constrained the scale of transition and commercial
7 Coffman et al. (2013) argue that many institutions became weaker and the state became more
extractive and rent-seeking to fund growing military spending after the Glorious Revolution.
8 In the 18th century, most of China’s commodities were with low value per volume or weight (Wong,
2004).
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development. A long-term view of economic growth suggests that informal
institutions are not substitutable for formal property right institutions. China’s
political integration was not transformed into a corresponding market integration,
which will be shown in my empirical analysis of grain trade market efficiency in
Chapter 4 and 5.
2.5 Qing China’s Grain Trade
Agriculture was the largest sector in preindustrial economies such as Qing China.
Food grains were unsurprisingly the most important commodities in domestic trade.
Grain output is estimated to account for 39%-45% of Qing China’s gross domestic
product (Peng, 2006). In the 18th century, many rice cultivators were producing for
the market and the marketing system effectively responded to the pressures of supply
and demand over a vast territory (Eastman, 1988). Mark (1991) estimates that some
20%-28% of the rice produced entered the market in Guangdong Province. Basing
on the dramatic historical evidence reflecting the grain trade prosperity, many
historians and economic historians suggest that Qing China had a very large-scale
integrated domestic grain market.
2.5.1 Food Security and State-Interventions
A famine is a widespread scarcity of food, which is usually accompanied or followed
by regional malnutrition, starvation, epidemic and increased mortality, and was a
chief concern of authorities. In pre-modern China, the failure to feed the population,
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civil officials, and military supporters is a visible sign of a dynasty’s inadequacy and
leads to political unrest. China’s official granary system for famine relief started
since the Han Dynasty (BCE202- CE220), which has been maintained and developed
by each dynasty until its peak in the final dynasty- Qing Dynasty. The Qing state had
varied measures at its disposal to deal with the food security: direct control of supply,
indirect controls over marketing, reduced-price sales, policing of supplies, and direct
relief (Li and Dray-Novey, 1999). Since the 17th century, the Qing State set up and
maintained a national-wide reserve granary system, which became the material
cornerstone of all its food security policies. The granaries were managed by local
officials and primarily served local residents but the storage target was set by the
central state.
There were three types of civilian granaries, the ever-normal granary
(changping cang, 68% of total grain storage), the charity granary (yicang, 10% of
total grain storage), and the community (shecang, 14% of total grain storage)
granary.9 Granaries primarily served to provide food relief in the event of harvest
shortages and secondly to help smooth intra-annual price fluctuations through release
of grain at various times in the grain growing and harvest cycle. 10 The ever-normal
granaries were manage by the local government and served for local residents
primarily. The charity and community granaries were relatively minor in size
compared to the ever-normal granaries (Shiue, 2004; Wang, 1992). Of these three
types of granaries, the ever-normal were the largest and most important, and with
9 These storage share figures were estimated by Liu (1980) for the grain storage in Guangxi Province
in 1800.
10 One additional function of the granaries is to lend the grain to the farmers as seed.
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documentation on them more complete (Marks and Chen, 1995; Liu, 1980). 11
Regularly, the local officials would follow the market price to buy the grain in the
autumn (autumn harvest would decrease the market price), and sell them at the
market price in spring (spring grain shortage would increase the price). Reduced-
price sale would be implemented in case of extreme famine.
Although it is striking to compare the Qing state grain stock in the 18th
century with the other countries, its total volume of granary storage was not large
compared with the total grain consumption. In Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces,
the official capacity of the granaries were 3.5 and 1.8 million shi (1 shi = about 84 kg)
of paddy respectively, or about 7% and 8% of the estimated annual production
(Marks, 1991). However, the actual stocks varied and never reached the official
quotas. In some extremely situation, the local authorities had to purchase the grain
from the grain surplus regions to maintain sufficient reserves in the granaries. Shiue
(2004) estimates that in the 1750s the annual averaged civilian stocks were roughly
about 3% of the consumption of an adult per year, meanwhile about 8% of national
grain consumption was supplied via trade grain (Shiue and Keller, 2007). Liu (1980)
estimates the civilian storage per capita was about 6.25% of adult consumption per
year in Sichuan Province, but the national storage was only sufficient to support the
whole population for 16.5 days. These rough estimated figures show that the volume
of grain trade was much larger than the volume of grain stock. According to the
annual provincial grain stock reports in Will and Wong (1991), the 18th-19th century
11 In the period 1694-1877, the Qing state has authorized 97 times of irregular grain sale for local
famine, of which 63 times used the grain from the local ever-normal granaries while the rest used the
grain moved (or bought) from the other regions (Liu, 1980).
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witnessed the decline of both the grain stocks and per capita grain stock, which
paralleled the overall decline of the Qing Dynasty (in Figure 2.1).
2.5.2 Grain Market Development
Between 1750 and 1913, China’s population increased from 200-250 million to 430
million while the land acreage increased by 43% (Perkins, 1969). Unsurprisingly, a
large aggregate demand for food ensured, which spurred the progress of agricultural
productivity. Agricultural development was also stimulated by government policies
that encourage improvements in seeds and irrigation and promoted cash crops
(Naquin and Rawski, 1987). Pragmatic changes in cropping12 were important for
raising agricultural output such that there was sufficient grain to support this huge
population size.
12 “The southward migration of northern dryland crops such as wheat, the extension of rice cultivation
to newly irrigated lands, the gradual increase in double cropping of rice in the south, and particularly
the double cropping of winter wheat or barley with summer millet or rice all slowly but significantly
increased output” (Naquin and Rawski, 1987, p23). On the other hand, the planting of American food
(e.g. sweet potato and maize) dramatically expanded the marginal land output, which also caused land
expansion on hilly land.
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Figure 2.1 Grain Stocks and Per Capital Grain Stocks in Qing Dynasty
(1741-1856)
(a) Annual Grain Stocks (b) Annual Per Capita Grain Stocks
Source: Will and Wong (1991), Crook(1999)13
Since the 18th century, the condition of grain surplus was differed
substantially across areas (see Figure 2.2). Due to the serious regional food shortage
(especially in the Lower Yangtze region), Chinese emperors and his officials faced
huge challenge of food security, especially in terms of maintaining stability, which
forced the state to implement sufficient flexible policies to partially free the grain
market from the state monopoly management during the Qianlong era (1735- 1799).
Being different from his previous emperors, Qianlong was very cautious about state
intervention in trade. In one debate of state grain policy in 1748, his perspective is
that “with the affairs of the market-place, for the most part one should let the people
carry out the circulation for themselves. If once the government begins to manage it,
what was originally intended to be beneficial to the people will, with unsatisfactory
13 The annual per capital grain stocks came from Crook (1999). Since there is no annual population
data in the given period, it is possible that Crook uses the provided population in some specific years
(e.g. 1776, 1820) to estimate the yearly population for yearly per capita grain stocks estimation.
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implementation, turn out full of hindrances” (Naquin and Rawski, 1987, p26). To
smooth price shocks and food-supply fluctuations across different regions, Qing
central government permitted and encouraged the private merchants (i.e. local petty
traders, brokers, wholesale dealers, and itinerant merchants) to trade grain, especially
for the long-distance grain arbitrage. The market itself could be used to ensure that
grain would be moved from grain surplus areas to deficit areas with high prices.
Figure 2.2 Grain Supply and Grain Demand Areas
Source: Wang (1992)
The increasing volume of grain demand motivated the prosperity of long-
distance grain trade, especially between Upper and Middle Yangtze region (e.g.,
grain surplus areas) and Lower Yangtze region (e.g., grain deficit areas) by water
transport (mainly on the Yangtze River). The annual trade grain volume in China
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was about 2.6 million tons during the 18-19th centuries – about 30 million shi14 that
were largely moved on waterways (Fang Xing et al., 2000). To stabilize the grain
prices and provide security in food crises, the Qing State established state-granaries
in most of the counties to hold grain buffer stocks. During the years 1764-66 a
survey of state, community and charity granaries reported 40.6 million shi of
unhusked grain in storage, of which 30 million were held by the state (Chuan and
Kraus, 1975, p.33). Since one-third of the stored grain needed to be turned over –
sold – to prevent spoilage, the state had about 10-14 million shi available for price
stabilisation, which is equivalent to 5-7 million shi of milled rice or wheat (Chuan
and Kraus, 1975, p.35). As a consequence the Qing state was a major participant in
the grain markets. Borne on the research of rice market in the early 18th century in
Chuan and Kraus (1975), Eastman (1988) concludes that a large number of rice
cultivators were producing for the market, and the marketing system succeeded in
collecting large amounts of grain and in responding to the pressure of supply and
demand over a vast territory.
Grain was not the only commodity in the long-distance trade. Although the
fraction of trade grain varied both across regions and over time, the merchants
frequently carried some other goods (e.g. cotton and cotton fabrics, silk and silk
fabrics, tea and salt) exchanged by grain on the return trip. With the boom of grain
trade, the grain import regions (e.g Lower Yangtze region) increasingly concentrated
on producing high value-added products such as silk and cotton textiles, while the
grain export regions (e.g. Upper and Middle Yangtze region) were transformed into
14The shi was a measure of volume for grain (1 shi = 103.6 liters), which was equivalent to 175-195
pounds (79.4-88.5 kg) of milled rice; many calculations assume a mid-range value of 185 pounds.
Confusingly, retail purchases were in volume measures while trade was recorded in weight; the shi
was often used interchangeably with dan, a measure of weight. See Chuan and Kraus (1975).
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peripheral zones to support the development of the more economically advanced
regions by exporting foodstuffs and other raw materials (e.g. timber, silk cocoon and
raw cotton). In general, one empire-wide market promoted the regional
specialization in this process.
2.5.3 Trade-support Institutions
The Qing had established the preconditions for grain trade prosperity by imposing
law and order, investing into public institutions and encouraging private institutions
to support the grain trade. Not only was Qing State one major participant in the grain
trade over long-distance, it also maintained the national transport routes with
bureaucratic and finance support. As a response to the developing monopolization
and collusion in the grain market, Qing China instituted one brokerage system in
which brokers with government-licenses supervised payments between buyers and
sellers, oversaw delivery, inspected the quality and quantity, and served as a
guarantor on the exchange (Susan Mann, 1987). By turning to this extra-bureaucratic
group, the Qing state had replaced direct state supervision and established a system
appropriate. Historians agree the state had relatively weak control over brokers and
the brokerage system (Lufrano, 2013).
Private trade institutions in Qing China were permitted by the government a
broad range of discretionary powers, which were established and developed by
guilds and self-governing organizations. Although Qing China’s guilds primarily
protect local merchants (Rowe, 1984), they provided lodging and services for
merchants, standard of calculating profits and losses, bargaining techniques training,
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and information as well as an institutional framework for contract enforcement.
Often, the weight and measurements for transaction, and the regulation of local
market (e.g. the dates for market to be open, the dates for deliveries) were unified
and imposed by guilds. Thus, grain trade has been regulated and encouraged by
guilds. In Mid Qing, native banks entered into the market, which conducted local
money exchange, accepted deposits, issued private banknotes, and lent money to
merchants in the local market (Zhou, 2000). After the establishment of local private
banks, some merchants entered the banking system as a means of capitalizing their
commercial properties (Rowe, 1984).
2.5.4 Grain Trade Transportation
“China’s transportation system was inconvenient, inefficient and costly….The term
“road”, when applied to the paths and tracks that constituted the land-transport
network, was usually a misnomer (Eastman, 1988, p103)”. It would be expected that
market institutions and transportation would have been less efficient in the 18th than
in the 20th century. Astonishingly, Chuan and Kraus (1975) find the seasonal
variations in rice prices in the Yangtze delta region in the years 1713 to 1719 were
smaller than they were in the years 1913 and 1919. It is worth to note that Yangtze
delta region was the most developed area during the whole Qing Dynasty, which also
includes Shanghai City. 15 It implies that, in the 18th century, the transportation
system was efficient enough that transporting the commodities like rice was
profitable.
15 Shanghai was the most developed city in the early 20th century, which was favoured by modern
banking because it is easy access to warehouse facilities, steam and rail transport.
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Since the 11th century, the expansion of trade networks in China was
accompanied by improved access to waterway transport (Liu, 2012). Domestic grain
trade over long distance relied on waterways that connected numerous prefectures. In
Pre-modern China, with technology limited, transport was far more economical and
convenient by water than by land. Land transport was between 1.5 to 5.5 times as
expensive as waterway transport, depending on the ease of navigation of the
waterway (Shiue and Keller, 2007). Watson (1972) estimates that junks may have
had a 9-10 fold cost advantage over the main forms of land transportation (i.e.
human and animal carriage). Even in the early 20th century Buck (1937) found
Chinese junks 2-5 times cheaper than man or animal power land transport. There are
three main waterway trade routes (see Figure 2.3): the Yangzi River and its major
tributaries, the Grand Canal and the Coast (Wang, 1992; Fan, 1993). Laurence Evans
(1984, p278) estimates that the total national water trade routes contained about
30,000 miles of waterway navigable year-round by junk. In the Hunan Province
during the Qing Dynasty, the 18th century commerce largely followed the province’s
river system (Wong and Perdue, 1992). On the other hand, the Qing government
needed the Yangtze River and Canal to transport the particular needed “tribute grain”
levied from the selected provinces in northern and central China annually to Beijing
(i.e. national capital). The functions of grain tribute were provisioning the court,
officials and bannermen as well as support the capital population.
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Figure 2.3 Three Main Trade Rivers
Source: Wang (1992)
The government officials transporting rice- primarily tribute grain to the
Capital Beijing and food for soldiers- were involved in the long-distance grain
transaction so that the maintenance of transport routes was devoted from state
revenues as public projects. The Qing State created three large new provincial-level
bureaucracies to take responsibility for the complex interprovincial grain traffic and
waterway maintenance involving the Yellow River and the Grand Canal that linked
it to the Yangtze River, of which Yellow River was devoted some 10% of national
total revenues (Naquin and Rawski, 1987). This national transport network also
served military purposes (e.g. army movement), which implies the importance for
the Qing State to sustain the efficiency of its transport system. The imperial state had
assumed responsibility to maintain this transport network, but it did not devote
persistent attention to both the land and water routes excepting some “roads where
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Customs’ dues are collected” (Eastman, 1988). Rarely did the government undertake
to repair the roads. Most water routes suffered the neglect16 as the local magistrates
which were assumed to maintain the waterway received no funds from the central
government. In particular after 1820s, the Opium War (1839-42) and the Taiping
Rebellion (1851-64) further deteriorated the Qing state’s fiscal and administrative
disarray, weakened its support for river control.
Although the 18th century witnessed how the water-system extended China’s
commerce prosperity, it also witnessed its decay under the multi-faceted ecological
pressure (Rowe, 2011). Long period encroachment on lakeshores and riverbanks of
the middle Yangtze watershed, stimulated by the growing demand of commercial
rice, had rendered the downstream of Yangtze River (i.e. Yangtze region) a source of
flooding. Hillside land suffered topsoil runoff and progressively declining fertility.
In the end of 18th century, the failure of Yellow River maintenance led to silting up
of the Grand Canal and increased the difficulty of shipping grain to the capital and
North China.
2.5.5 Grain Trade: State or Merchant?
In the May edict of 1748, the emperor enunciated that “letting the people
carry out the [grain] circulation for themselves” and stated that the best way to
control prices was to “govern by non-governance” (Dunstan, 2006, p126). Some
anti-interventionist policies were implemented by the central government since the
16 Few river and lake routes benefited from regular dredging, removal of dangerous rocks, cleared
towpaths, or channel markings.
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mid-18th century: grain price ceilings were removed, and both public and private
institutions such as the government-licensed brokerage system and self-governing
guilds were officially supported for their participation in the grain trade (Dunstan,
2006; Mann, 1987; Shiue and Keller, 2007). How much could be trusted that high
prices could draw sufficient supplies by merchants to reduce local prices to levels at
which the majority of famine victims could afford the grain they needed? During the
mid of 18th century, there was an intensive ever-normal granaries debate argument
among the central state and these provincial chiefs about that whether state
precautionary stockpiling was as superior to merchant management. Throughout the
ever-normal granaries debate, most of the provincial chiefs showed little trust: the
state would always have to supplement the market by maintaining stockpiles of grain
to sell, lend, or give to poor consumers as necessary (Dunstan, 2006).
Since the role of state on grain trade intervention was paramount, Qing’s
statesmen theorists expressed serious reservation about the extent to which the state
should intervene into the market (Dunstan, 1996). Influenced by the benevolent rule
and paternalist protection rooted in the Confucianist conviction, the Qing state was
lenient toward tenant peasants to protect their livelihood, but viewed merchants as
being “rich but not benevolent” (Hung, 2008). Despite that redistributing grain
surplus was primarily the task of merchants, the Qing state took severe actions
against merchants hoarding grain on the assumption that grain speculation harmed
public interest. The Qing state often rewarded merchants’ contributions to secure the
grain storage through low commercial taxes or low-interest government loans. On
the other hand, some high ranking officials suggested that merchant hoards were
accumulated in years provided valuable storage against future famine. However,
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during the food crisis, the government often enforced local grain merchants to sell
their stocks at discounted prices. Actually, the reasons for the emperor to reduce the
role of the state in grain management went beyond arguing for the efficiency of
unrestrained market forces and further related to the distrust of public bureaucracy,
the desire of local officials to lessen their responsibility for food security and the
pressing fiscal demands generated by various military campaigns (Dunstan, 2006).
Under the hierarchical structure of unified political system, the Qing state’s
tax remissions and central disaster aid policies was prone to moral hazard problem
on the granary management. The evidence that granary storage levels were
systematically lower in provinces that received more frequent central state disaster
relief suggests that the Qing central state lacked sufficient information to monitor its
local officials which allows local governments to allocate resource over their self-
insurance (Shiue, 2004). In a broad sense, Qing state policy favoured free circulation
of grain surplus. However, preference for free circulation was far from being the
same as a laissez-faire approach for grain trade. In the sense of the Qing state, free
circulation means that no self-interested parties should be permitted to impede grain
trade no matter whether by hoarding grain or imposing trade embargoes to maximize
the official reserve. Qing state’s “free circulation” required every grain trade
participant should be selfless, which violates the stone of market mechanism, and
strengths the necessity of bureaucratic intervention.
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2.5.6 Southern Rice and Northern Wheat
In terms of geography China could be divided into two regions: South China and
North China. “South China” and “North China” are traditionally defined as the
regions separated by the Qinling Mountain and Huai River. North China is
dominated by northern plains and dryland cropping, while South China favours wet-
rice cultivation since it locates in the south of Huai River and the Qinling Mountain.
Because of different tillage practices, agricultural implements and grain storage, rice
and wheat are the main staple grain commodities for South and North China
respectively (see Figure 2.4(a)). Rice and wheat differ in terms of cultivation,
harvesting, transport cost and value added to trade cost ratio. Rice cultivation in
Ming-Qing, including the soil preparing, harvesting, pumping water and collecting
and transporting fertilizer, totally need 15 workday per mu (1mu=0.165acre), while
wheat only required 3 days per mu (Allen, 2009; Li, 1998). Wheat has higher storage
and transport cost than rice, so that rice was favoured for long-distance trade (Deng,
1995). The frequent large fluctuation in the size of harvest in North China reduces its
grain yields and population density. On the contrary, the wet-rice cultivation system
in South China is able to sustain high yields and support high population density.
Output of both agricultural commodities is sensitive to the climate (e.g.
humidity, temperature). In a country of continental size such as China the soil and
weather characteristics differed widely across regions, prescribing which crops could
be grown in a particular region, the mix of crops, and the timing of harvests (See
Figure 2.4 (b)). One survey in early 20th century counted 574 different rotation
systems, and the earlier period was probably no different (Naquin and Rawski, 1987).
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Figure 2.4 Agricultural Areas in China
(a) (b)
Source: Buck (1937)
2.6 Grain Prices and Market Integration
Since many economic historians regard the development of modern market
institutions in the early modern period as one pre-condition for the industrial
revolution and modern economic growth, they have extended their interest into
market efficiency estimation. Fortunately, since the late Middle Ages, many
European cities began to collect the price data for cereals as well as some other
sensitive goods. In the 1930s, the foundation of the International Scientific
Committee on Price History boosted and sponsored the publication of prices data
with very high scientific standard. The grain price data availability combined with
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the interest in markets has spawned a huge literature on the grain market integration
(Federico, 2011).
In Europe, as price data for cereals are much more abundant than for any
other product, grain market is quite often implicitly assumed to be representative of
the whole market. Was the grain market representative? In terms of definition, the
relationship between grain market integration and market integration is ambiguous.
Regions can be “economically integrated” in the sense that there are no border
restrictions restricting the flow of goods, but not be integrated in terms of any
specific market (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001). Federico (2010, 2011) questions the
representativeness of grain market by three reasons: first, grain is the basic staple so
that its market was more developed than others; second, the information cost for
grain agents was low as cereals are more homogenous qualitatively than the
manufacture goods; third, as cereals are bulky, grain market has always been
intervened heavily by the authorities. However, Studer (2008, 2009) claim that grain
is the most suitable good for assessing the course of commodity market integration
as grain had a high bulk to value ratio so that the extent of grain markets reflected
the transport capacities and cost.
Most of the empirical results show that the markets performed very well in
Pre-modern Europe. Using the data of grain prices and yields for the years 1208 to
1500, Clark (2002) claims that England had an “elaborate market economy at least
500 years before it had sustained economic growth”. Persson (1999) uses the
cointegration test to find that the reduction of transport cost was associated with an
emerging integrated European wheat market in the 18th century. Federico (2007)
examines market integration in Italy in the 19th century, and finds that waves of the
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market integration were mainly caused by improvements in market efficiency and a
reduction in transport costs. Ejrnas and Persson (2000) show that French wheat
markets were well integrated by the middle of the 19th century. Using the
asymmetric-threshold error-correction-mechanism model, Jacks (2005) investigates
the course of intra- and international market integration in the 19th century of
Atlantic economy, and his results indicate that Atlantic economy experienced
dramatic improvements in market integration prior to the mid-19th century. In the
19th century of Europe, the level of domestic and international integration was
determined for most of the period by war and political events (Federico, 2010).
According to Studer (2009), the process of market integration in Europe was neither
a concomitant nor an effect of the Industrial Revolution, but “indeed a plausible
determinant for the rise of Europe”.
Because of the grain price record of the authorities during the Qing Dynasty
(1644-1911) in China, there is a sizeable history literature on China’s grain market
efficiency as well. It is hypothesized that there were well-established networks of
long-distance grain trade in China, and the grain prices closely correspond to
regional integrated markets (Chuan and Kraus, 1975; Perdue, 1992; Wu, 1985; Fan,
1993; Wang, 1989; Wong and Perdue, 1992). However, these beliefs above based
more on narrative anecdote with data analysis of few price series. After the gradual
opening of archive grain price data, an increasing empirical literature (Li, 2000b;
Shiue, 2002; Shiue, 2004; Shiue and Keller, 2007; Keller and Shiue, 2007a, 2007b;
Yan and Liu, 2011) suggest that Qing China’s market efficiency has been
underestimated, and water-transport played a dominated role in the grain market
efficiency. Using conventional pairwise cointegration and novel heterogeneous panel
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unit root testing approaches, this thesis empirically argues about China’s market
efficiency on the eve of Western industrialization and challenge the traditional
wisdom that China’s market was well integrated.
Was the grain market representative for measuring the efficiency of markets
in pre-modern China? In Qing China, although the state engaged and interrupted the
grain trade, it was not able to dominate the grain market since its financial limitation.
First, the official shipments of grain trade were only about 16.7% of China’s total
trade/shipments (Fang Xing et al., 2000). Further, the decision of the Qing officials
to engage in interregional grain trade was also influenced by market information:
“Qing government officials both imitated merchant trade practices and followed
trade routes long established by merchants” (Shiue and Keller, 2007, web appendix,
p3). On the other hand, grain was not the only commodity in long-distance trade in
China. Merchants frequently carried other goods to be exchanged for grain for the
return trip. Since the primary purpose of the Qing State’s grain market policy was to
stabilize the grain price rather than to develop the market, it is ambiguous whether
these grain market interventions had increased grain market efficiency or not: state
grain trade for tribute and military purposes increased long-distance trade grain
volumes as well as public transport infrastructure investment, but the state granary
system encouraged local authorities to restrict inter-regional trade to maximize local
grain stockpiling in case of extreme natural disasters. These arguments will be
further developed in Chapter 4 later.
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2.7 Conclusions
This chapter introduced the background to the empirical research in this thesis. In the
18th century, Qing China was at the height of its prosperity, politically stable and
commercially thriving, with highly developed granary organizations and domestic
inter-regional grain trade. However, this prosperity did not enable China retain its
world economic status, and it was progressively eclipsed by Western Europe, which
caught up and overtook it as a consequence of the long process of industrialization.
The traditional wisdom holds the view that the market supporting institutions (such
as formal property right institutions) sustained the ability of the market to reallocate
resource, which eventually leads to the industrialization. Formal property right
institutions could not take root in Imperial China since the political representation of
merchant interests were repressed by the state, along with the prevalence of informal
contract enforcement institutions. However, Shiue and Keller’s (2007) finding
suggests that the performance of markets in China and Western Europe were overall
comparable on the eve of the Industrial Revolution. They conclude that “… [T]he
constraints imposed by the state on economic incentives, which were in turn
safeguarded by the development of “good” institutions in Europe, were apparently
not binding in China”. On the contrary, in Chapter 4 and 5 my results suggest that
Qing China’s market integration has been over-estimated, and experienced a process
of disintegration and fragmentation following the Chinese political structure. Qing
China may not have a well-functioning market like Western Europe during its
history golden era. My results imply that we may need to reconsider the role of
“good institutions” on the process of industrialization, and China failed to
industrialize may due to its lack of well-functioning market.
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Chapter 3
Data and Preliminary Analysis
3.1 Introduction
This thesis uses existing data on grain prices as well as detailed geographical
information collected as part of the research, which I introduce in turn in the
following. The grain data is collated from sources documenting the nationwide grain
price system in the Qing Dynasty. This elaborate grain price reporting system was
progressively implemented from the early years of the Qing, and became a formal
system at the start of the reign of Emperor Qianlong (1736-1795). The system was
based on monthly reports detailing the prevailing high and low prices for up to 20
commodities (not all grain were reported in every region) at the county level, which
the provincial governor would aggregate to the prefecture level and convey in
memorials to the emperor in Beijing monthly. These Qing price documents survive
in archives in both Beijing and Taibei. I use a subset of these price data for rice and
wheat compiled by the late Professor Wang Yejian [Yeh-Chien] and collaborators.17
Historians and economic historians have confirmed that the price data from
this system is reliable and comparable across time and regions, providing a suitable
basis for the analysis of market integration and other quantitative research in
economic history (Lu and Peng, 2006; Chuan and Kraus, 1975; Wang, 1978). The
period covered in this thesis (1740-1820) is known as the golden era of the Qing
17 The Qing Dynasty Grain Price Database (Qing dai liangjia ziliao ku) is hosted at the Institute of
Modern History, Academia Sinica, in Taiwan.
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China 18 , characterised by political stability and the absence of significant civil
conflict or detrimental climate change (i.e. cooling). At the same time, the Qing
economy was closed to external market forces and did not experience substantial
innovation in either transport or agricultural technology. These characteristics of this
period provide a convincing argument that the market integration process
investigated in this thesis is driven by the domestic market determinants rather than
the external political, technological or climatic shocks. An attractive feature is the
scope of grain price data I am able to draw on: the geographical coverage of these
data amounts to around two-thirds of China’s administrative units and more than 80%
of China’s population in the mid-18th century.
Based on geographical information system (GIS) data from China Historical
Geographic Information System (CHGIS) covering maps and other
geomorphological information for 1820, I created two datasets for (i) the postal route
network at the county level, (ii) the grain trade waterway network, which are
aggregated and matched to the grain price data at the prefecture level. In pre-modern
China, postal routes (which were land routes exclusively) acted as an “administrative
traffic system”, and were used as transportation highways for the movement of
goods and people during the Qing Dynasty (Fan, 1993). The postal route distance
measure I derive from the postal network gives a better proxy for trade distance than
the widely used direct distance (as the crow flies) in the existing literature. In the
same period, waterway transport was far more economical and convenient than land
transport, especially in mountainous Southern China. The river and canal system
therefore provided the skeleton of the national transport network (Skinner, 1977b).
18 The peak period of this golden era was between 1760 and 1780.
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Mountains and other geomorphological features can act as natural barrier to trade,
and the third dataset I applied is the boundaries of nine “physiographic macroregions”
introduced by William Skinner (1977a), who divide China into nine regions
according to the mountain ranges, drainage basins of major rivers and other travel-
constraining geomorphological features. Taken together the information on postal
route network, waterway network combined with geomorphological data provide a
unique and novel proxy for various determinants of transport costs in which I will
apply in the analysis of market integration. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
first study using such detailed historical information of the transport network and
topographical distribution for the analysis of market integration in the mid-Qing.
This Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 contains a brief overview of
the Qing grain price system, data quality and coverage, and descriptive analysis and
testing. Section 3.3 introduces the geographical data I digitized and applied including
postal route network, grain waterway network and the Skinner macroregions. Section
3.4 begins by introducing the law of one price as the basic framework for using price
convergence to measure market integration, and then distinguish the concept of
market integration and market efficiency. Next, I employ some simple statistical
tests to describe the general patterns of price variability in terms of spatial, time and
seasonal variation.
3.2 Grain Price Data
The price data employed in this thesis comprises an unbalanced panel of monthly
grain prices for 211 prefectures in China between 1740 and 1820, which is compiled
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from the Qing archive holdings of grain price memorials (reports), a rich source for
the study of market integration in early modern China.
3.2.1 Price Report System
This grain price reporting system originated during the reign of the Kangxi emperor
(1662-1723), expanded during the Yongzheng emperor’s reign (1723-1735), and was
formally adopted since the reign of the Qianlong emperor (1736-1795) until the
collapse of the Qing Dynasty. Monthly price reporting – along with information on
weather and agricultural conditions – originated at the lowest administrative level,
the county (xian).19 Roughly every 10 days the county magistrate would compile a
list of the highest and lowest prices for the grains that were traded in the retail
markets of the county. These prices were then aggregated at the prefecture-level by
prefects– each prefecture on average comprised 6 counties – before the provincial
governor would summarize the conditions in the province along with the price
reports in a memorial to the emperor.
3.2.2 Data Quality
Several technical issues have long concerned scholars working with these data, in
particular the comparability of the units used for price and weight and the veracity of
the reports. Units of account in China during this period varied widely. Grain prices
19 This summary draws on the studies of Chuan and Kraus (1975), Wang (1978, 1986, 1992) and
Marks (1991).
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were reported in silver taels (liang) per granary bushel (cang shi). 20 Yet the
purchases in retail markets were made in copper currency (qian), the exchange rate
of which differed from place to place, as did the measure of weight (retail purchases
were usually in volume measures whereas bulk shipments were reported in weight
measures). According to Chuan and Kraus (1975) and Wang (1978) the evidence
compellingly supports the view that officials were competent in converting the many
local units into the imperial standard units. Indeed, the bureaucracy from the emperor
downwards used these reports to monitor grain supply and prices across the country,
and they were hardly ignorant of the problems of comparability if money and weight
units were inconsistent between distant locations. The memorials “accurately
represented contemporary free market prices”, despite spatial and temporal variation,
and there was “a consistent effort to convert [local] market measures, as well as
monies of account, into standard, official units” (Chuan and Kraus, 1975: 10, 14).
At times the accuracy of the reports might be questionable, and we
sometimes see the same price repeated for several months, but the consensus in the
literature is that over the long run there was a high degree of veracity. The officials
at all levels of the administration were interested in accurate measurement as they
needed to buy grain on the market to replenish stocks in the local granaries as well as
for their office and retinue, and were moreover subject to frequent scrutiny (Lu and
Peng, 2006; Wang, 1978). The Qing emperors keenly analysed and queried the
provincial reports, admonishing governors to improve accuracy or to explain any
anomalies. In addition, there were irregular reports from other officials residing in
the province or on tour that provided a cross check, so that fabrication of data for any
20 The median weight of one shi was 185 pounds or 83.9 kg and the treasury (kuping) tael was 575.8
grains of silver 1000 fine (Chuan and Kraus, 1975: 98, 13).
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length of time was extremely risky and on detection would be punished severely.
The reported grain prices were market prices. The available evidence supports a
view of a sophisticated and hierarchical system of markets linking peasant producers
to urban consumers, of peasant producers selling grain in a “free” market competing
with other sellers, and where purchasers of grain had competitors as well (Brandt,
1989).
There were however some defects in this system. First, higher level officials
might not have checked all the original grain reports from local officials, which
enabled officials in charge of granaries to fabricate grain prices to embezzle the
difference between the market price and the price recorded as paid by the granaries.
Second, the province finance commissioner or the prefecture officers may have filled
in prices if they could not obtain information in time. Though it is impossible to
claim that there was no fabrication, guesstimates and intentional misreporting of
grain prices, under the effective central bureaucratic control in the 18th century, the
grain prices are generally deemed as highly reliable.
3.2.3 Period of Investigation
The choice of period analysed in this thesis (1740-1820) guarantees that the
determinants and dynamic change in market integration I report was driven by
China’s internal pre-modern factors rather than external political, transportation
technology innovation or climatic shocks.
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As discussed in Section 2.2.1, the reign of the Qianlong emperor (1735-1796)
has been widely described as Qing’s “Golden Age” with its consolidated centralized
authority, rapid population and commercial growth and a series of successful
military expansions.
This stability of the Chinese economy and polity remained until the 1820s
when outflows of silver to pay for opium became substantial, thus inducing deflation
(Marks, 1998).21 The reign of the emperor Jiaqing (1796-1820) is typically regarded
as a turning point from prosperity to decline (Rowe, 2011). With economic
stagnation and regression domestic rebellions became more frequent, as well as
foreign incursions after the mid-19th century (e.g. the first and second Opium Wars).
Living standards stagnated or fell compared with industrializing Europe, a process
from which China only began to recover in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
(Baten et.al., 2010; Ma 2008; Morgan, 2004; Rawski, 1989). In the 18th century,
China’s economy had been almost entirely isolated from international trade as well
as any external political influence due to its “closed door” policy.
During the “Golden Age”, Qing China witnessed only limited innovation in
transport technology, and wooden river boats (“junks”) never lost their dominance in
commerce in general and grain transport in particular before the introduction of the
steamship after the 1850s (Wiens, 1955). The failure of regular maintenance on the
Yellow River and the Grand Canal since the late Qianlong reign led to significant
accumulation of silt and thus rising difficulties in shipping grain tribute rice by river
in the course of the reign of emperor Daoguang (1821-1850) (Dodgen, 1991;
Editorial Committee of Irrigation History of the Yellow River, 1982).
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Climate change also frequently affected the development of per-modern
societies by altering agricultural productivity. Warm but temperate climate may
increase agricultural production, while episodes of significant cooling can directly
impede agricultural production or even lead to crop failure (Zhang et al., 2007).
Most of the 18th century in Qing Dynasty China escaped the ‘Little Ice Age’
episodes of the second millennium22 and its weather was characterized as wet and
warm, which was conducive to intensified agricultural production. China started and
developed double cropping for rice since the 6th century but the double cropping
system had collapsed between 1620-1720 due to cooling temperatures (Yin et al.,
2003). China’s agricultural yields in 1840-1890 (another cold phase) were reduced
by 10-25% comparing with 1730-1770 (a warm phase) despite an increase total
arable area of at least 10% between these warm and cold phases (Gong et al., 1996).
3.2.4 Data Description
Basic Description
The data I use comprise monthly prices for rice23 and wheat over a period of 81
years, from 1740 to 1820. As both monthly highest price and lowest price for each
prefecture are available, I follow the literature (Marks, 1991; Keller and Shiue,
2007a, 2007b; Shiue, 2002; Shiue and Keller, 2007; Yan and Liu, 2011) in adopting
22 Climatologists have identified a number of episodes of significant cooling periods in China (the so
called ‘Little Ice Age’ periods) over the second millennium: 1100s~1150s, 1300s~1390s,
1450s~1510s, 1560s~1690s and 1790s~1890s (Wang et al., 1998).
23 In the Price Report System, rice has been disaggregated into 1st grade rice (superior), 2nd grade rice
(medium), 3rd grade rice (common), early-ripening rice, late-ripening rice, husked rice, polished early-
ripening rice and polished late-ripening rice. In this study, we choose polished early-ripening rice for
Zhejiang Province and 2nd grade rice for the other provinces in southern China.
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their average as the monthly prefecture price. The geographical coverage spans 131
prefectural rice markets in 11 provinces of South China and 80 prefectural wheat
markets in 6 provinces of North China.24 The geographical coverage amounts to
around two-thirds of China’s administrative units and more than 80% of China’s
population in the mid-18th century. The Southern (Northern) provinces were
selected on the basis that they all produced rice (wheat) as a staple grain crop in this
period. The prefectures covered most of the areas in South China and North China,
including the more commercialized urban areas as well as more remote areas. Table
3.1 summarizes the number of available observations by province. Observations
varied by province because of the different number of prefectures and different
patterns of missing observations for various years.25 Figure 3.1 shows the sample
area within the provincial borders in 1820. 26 Table 3.2 provides basic data
descriptive statistics by province, which shows considerable cross-province
heterogeneity in average prices although it bears reminding that maximum and
minimum prices may be the outliers. In South China, the average prices in the upper
stream Yangtze River (grain surplus areas, e.g. Hunan Province and Hubei Province)
are much lower than in the downstream Yangtze River (commercialized but grain
deficit area, e.g. Jiangsu Province and Zhejiang Province).
24 The names of prefecture are given in Appendix A.2
25 My grain price dataset is not a balanced panel because I retain prefectures even where there may be
a significant number of missing observations.
26 Qing’s provincial boundaries were fixed and identical after 1750s until its collapse. More details
can be check in Section 4.2.2.
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Figure 3.1 Map of China with sample provinces
GIS Data Source: “GHGIS, Version 4” (Harvard Yenching Institue, 2007)
Table 3.1 Geography Area of Data (1740-1820)
South China (rice) North China (wheat)
Province
No. of
Prefectures Obs.
Province
No. of
Prefectures Obs.
Anhui 13 10,583 Gansu 12 9,977
Jiangsu 10 8,296 Henan 13 10,111
Jiangxi 14 8,146 Shannxi 12 9,924
Fujian 12 9,842 Shandong 10 8,097
Guangdong 13 10,678 Shanxi 18 15,234
Guizhou 13 10,463 Zhili 15 9,490
Guangxi 12 10,339
Hubei 10 7,872
Hunan 13 10,985
Sichuan 11 75,51
Zhejiang 10 8492
Total 131 103,247 Total 80 62,833
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Table 3.2 Basic Descriptive Statistics by Province (1740-1820)
South China (rice) North China (wheat)
Province Mean Max. Min. Province Mean Max. Min.
Anhui 167.83 439 78.5 Gansu 109.76 448 41
Jiangsu 196.33 430 107 Henan 121.05 390 52
Jiangxi 140.89 276.5 86 Shannxi 144.53 829.5 41
Fujian 177.21 350 79.5 Shandong 165.46 524 77.5
Guangdong 152.56 297.5 65.5 Shanxi 195.03 398 84
Guizhou 96.16 247.5 58.5 Zhili 202.76 725 91
Guangxi 115.74 188 53.5
Hubei 153.89 374 76.5
Hunan 134.07 325 69.5
Sichuan 151.43 565.5 49
Zhejiang 180.08 351.5 96
Figure 3.2 plots the monthly price series for selected prefectures compared
with the regional (region henceforth referring to China’s Southern or Northern
provinces) monthly average price. As missing values are retained in the panel data,
the time lines are not continuous. For illustrative purposes I here select a grain deficit
and a grain surplus prefecture for each of the rice and wheat markets, respectively.
As expected, the grain price is higher (lower) in the grain deficit (surplus)
prefectures in both regions. A second common feature is that both rice prices and
wheat prices trended upward over the sample period. In Figure 3.2a for rice, in most
years during the 18th century the prices in both prefectures had similar fluctuations,
though the spikes in deficit prefectures were larger, while after the start of the 19th
century the similarity between price movements became weaker. I find a similar
trend for wheat in Figure 3.2b. In general, one could suggest that there was a (trade)
link between surplus and deficit areas that drove prices to co-move during the 18th
century, though this appeared to effect diminished in the early 19th century. The
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number of annual observation of rice and wheat prices is reported in Figure 3.3.
There are more observations for rice than wheat price since there are more
prefectures in rice sample. Figure 3.3 also shows that the share of missing
observations was very high in the early 1800s, possibly due to local political
disturbances. Fairly constant prices over several months represents a well-known
problem of this data, especially after 1800.27 In this thesis, all observatins involving
the missing values are dropped from the pairwise cointegration and panel
cointegration regression.28 There is no doubt that the empirical results for the end of
18th century may in part be driven by missing values and the apparent constancy of
prices rather than the market efficiency.
Figure 3.2 Selected Monthly Prices
(a)
(Price Unit: silver taels per bushel ×100)
27 For details about the share of constant price can be checked in Appendix A.3.
28 There are two reasons that I don’t interpolate the missing values. First, in some period the gap of
missings is quite large, which is difficult to be interpolated by the normal ARMA model. Second, to
interpolate is needed to impost more assumption, which may add more noise into the price
information I already have.
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(b)
(Price Unit: silver taels per bushel ×100)
Figure 3.3 Annual Observation Count
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Unit Root Tests
Before formal cointegration analysis in later chapters, I test the order of integration
for each price series. If these price variables do not have a unit root, their
combination must be stationary so that it is meaningless to test the cointegration.
Similar to the prefectures in Figure 3.2, some price series show an upward
trend. I therefore adopt unit tests with a drift and discuss whether the evolution of
these prices is governed by a random walk. To allow for more general autoregressive
[AR(p)] processes, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller regression setup (Dickey and
Fuller, 1979) takes the general form given in (3.1), where lag length p is selected so
as to address serial correlation and this choice is based on the Schwarz Bayesian
Information Criterion. The p-values on the estimate of c3 are corrected following
Mackinnon (1991). The null hypothesis is that there is a unit root in the individual
price series.
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(3.1)
H0: 3c =0
H1: 3c <0
The results suggest that 50% of time series in South China and 30% of time
series in North China reject the null hypothesis (i.e. they do not have a unit root) by
regression (3.1). In the second step, I test the unit root without a drift in regression
(3.2). All the time series cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit root at the 5%
significance (Detailed results are in Table A.1.1, A.1.2 and A1.3 in Appendix A.1).
69
The distinction between regression (3.1) and (3.2) suggests that those time series can
reject the null hypothesis of unit root with drift in the first step but cannot reject the
null hypothesis of unit root without drift in the second step may be trend stationary.
In the third step of regression (3.3), I explore the KPSS test that is due to
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) to test the trend stationarity (Detailed results are in Table
A.1.4 and A.1.5 in Appendix A.1).
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(3.2)
H0: 2c =0
H1: 2c <0
Of these time series which cannot reject the hypothesis without drift in the
second step, there are 18 prefectures in South China (13.7%) and 12 prefectures in
North China (15%) cannot reject the hypothesis of trend stationarity using KPSS test.
The ADF test and the KPSS test provide the ambiguous implication for this sub-
sample. In this thesis, I extend my empirical analysis based on the ADF test results
which suggest that some price series follow the random walk with drift and some
without drift. In Chapter 4, the results of cointegration and further analysis with the
sub-sample (exclude the possible trend stationary series) provide the similar pattern
as given by the full sample.
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log(Pt)=E0t+Pt+ut (3.3)
Pt=Pt-1 +Ht, Ht~ WN (0, )
Ho: =0
H1: >0
3.3 Geography Data
In this thesis, I use the China Historical Geographic Information System (CHGIS) as
the spatial database to construct my geographical variables. This database includes
the boundaries of the administrative hierarchy down to the county level covering
various points in time from 221BCE to 1911 CE. For 1820, the most relevant point
time in my sample, counties and rivers are given as points and lines, while
prefectures, provinces and Skinner macroregions are given as polygons for the
territory administered. 29 In the following section I present the geographical data I
constructed for the empirical analysis in later chapters covering the postal network,
the grain waterway and the Skinner macroregions.
29 More details about CHGIS can be checked in Bol (2007).
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3.3.1 The Postal Route Network in the Qing Dynasty
China’s Postal Route
In the pre-modern period, postal routes played a key role in the proliferation of a
successful administration in China, whereby postal routes represented an
‘administrative traffic system’ to provide communication between the provincial
capitals and the imperial court in Beijing. According to Fan (1993), “the postal
routes were constructed of granite and were built wide enough to accommodate two
carts travelling in opposite directions”. The postal highway system during the Qing
Dynasty mainly served for official travel, postal dispatch, and military actions (e.g.
troop and military grain movement) with its maintenance allocated directly by the
central government, although during the entire Qing (1644-1911), large-scale
construction and maintenance of the postal routes was rare. In peaceful period, the
private use of the postal routes by long-distance merchants became more and more
prevalent. Information about these trade routes is provided in several route books
and merchant manuals written during the Ming and Qing dynasties. Comparing these
trade routes with postal routes, Fan (1993, p36) concludes that “these trade routes
were merely transformed from existing administrative routes… [and] the commercial
traffic network hardly extended beyond the pre-existing administrative traffic
network”.
In 1907 the Qing Dynasty administration produced the China Postal Almanac,
which contains maps of the primary postal routes, railroads and telegraph lines in
each province. These maps were produced by Statistical Department of the
Inspectorate General of Customs in Shanghai, which was under the control of the
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British-run Chinese Imperial Customs, which suggests that their quality follows the
standard of contemporary Western cartography. According to Cai (2005), this Postal
Almanac was the first set of detailed postal route maps in China. As the postal route
system remained largely unchanged since the establishment of the Ming Dynasty in
1368 (Fan, 1993), the 1907 postal network can be used to measure 18th century trade
routes. Tsai (2013) further confirms that the creation of the Great Qing Imperial Post
Office in 1896 mostly based on the historical infrastructural post network.
In most empirical research on market integration and trade cost, the direct
distance between two locations is used to measure distance. This measurement
imposes the assumption that the real trade route follows the shortest bilateral direct
distance. Quite apparently, this is not true in reality, especially in the pre-modern era
using primitive transportation technology. Thus in practice the true trade route
follows the topographical distribution of the land (e.g. valleys or navigable rivers),
especially for heavy commodities such as grains. In this case, postal distance is a
better measurement than direct distance to capture the trade cost.
Data Construction
To capture the impact of trade cost on the transportable route, I digitize the postal
route network from these archival maps to construct my variable of “effective” trade
route distance within and between prefectures. The postal route computations are
based on the historical point and polygon GIS layers for provinces, prefectures and
counties in China in 1820 provided by the CHGIS project.
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Figure 3.4 shows the digitization process of one Fujian Province as an
illustration. In the original archival map in Figure 3.4(a), two administrative units
(e.g. prefectures, counties or towns) are connected by a straight line if both of them
have access to the same postal route. In Figure 3.4(b), every prefecture (county)
point represents the centre point of the polygon of each prefecture (county). I digitize
this postal network at the county level, which means I digitize all the postal lines
from Figure 3.4(a) to 3.4(b) between any two prefectures or county points, and
ignore postal routes going through town points (lower administrative unit than
county). In Figure 3.4(b), I draw the green linear lines between any pair (i.e.
prefecture to prefecture, county to county or prefecture to county) of the postal
network. I digitize these provincial maps one by one adopting the same geo-spatial
coordinate system and then connect all the province postal networks together to
create a single national postal network. I use the longitude and latitude of the
prefecture points to calculate the shortest postal route distance between each
prefecture-point pair as a proxy for their bilateral trade route distances. Presented in
Figure 3.5, the national postal network thus provides a unique basis for spatial
analysis of China’s historical transport infrastructure and its impact on trade in the
18th century. If two prefectures are further apart, it is more likely for their postal
route distance to be larger than their linear distance as it is more likely for the
transportable route needing to bypass mountains, rivers and valleys. Figure 3.6
compares the bilateral postal route distance and linear distance measures, which
shows that postal distance is generally longer than linear distance and this gap
increases with line distance. The pattern coincides with our prediction that the bias of
direct distance from the real trade distance would be larger if two prefectures are
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farer apart. In the rest of this thesis, I use the term ‘distance’ to refer to the postal
route distance unique to this thesis
Figure 3.4 Postal Route Archive Map and its Digitization GIS Map
(Example of Fujian Province)
(a) Original Archive (b) Digitized Map
Archive Map Source: China Postal Almanac (1907)
GIS Data Source: “GHGIS, Version 4” (Harvard Yenching Institue, 2007)
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Figure 3.5 Postal Network in China (1907)
Archive Map Source: China Postal Almanac (1907)
GIS Data Source: “GHGIS, Version 4” (Harvard Yenching Institue, 2007)
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Figure 3.6 Postal Distance and Linear Distance
3.3.2 The “Grain Rivers” Water-way Network
In the pre-modern period, China’s domestic interregional trade over long distance
primarily relied on natural waterways since waterway transport was far more
economical and convenient. Writing during the 13th century Macro Polo observed, in
the official reports of his time, that the annual count of junks ascending the Yangtze
River through a particular Customs House approached 200,000 (Wiens, 1955),
which points to be the significance of river shipping in China’s economic history.
Three main grain trade routes in the Qing Dynasty were based on the three
main waterway systems: the Yangzi River, the Grand Canal and the coastal trade
system (Fan, 1993; Wang, 1992). In South China, the increasing grain trade volume
was mainly carried by the long distance grain trade on the Yangtze River between
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upstream grain surplus and downstream deficit areas. The annual ‘import’ of rice to
the Yangtze Delta area was in the range of 15-20 million shi, of which 5-6 million
was trans-shipped (Wang, 1992: p.38). The lower Yangzi was estimated to require at
least 5.5 to 9 million shi to support its own population (Chuan and Kraus, 1975:
p.64-65). Connecting South China with North China, the Grand Canal transported a
minimum of about 3.4 million shi a year of tribute grain from the Yangtze River area
to the capital, and an unspecified amount also flowed southwards (Chuan and Kraus,
1975: p.36; Wang 1992: p.36, p.38).
The volume of grain traded is a function of on the ease of navigation of the
waterway (Shiue and Keller, 2007). To construct a variable which captures the
impact of the waterway network on market efficiency, I identify all the rivers that
have been recorded for grain trade in gazetteers and archives reported by Deng (1994,
1995) as well as inland waterways reported in Wiens (1955, Figure 1, p25230).
Represented on a map of China in 1820 in Figure 3.7, this grain trade waterway
network for Qing Dynasty China comprises 95 rivers.31 To the best of my knowledge
this is the first empirical study to use detailed data on the waterway network in the
analysis of market integration in China.
30 This figure is given in Appendix A.4.
31 These rivers’ names are given in Appendix A.5.
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Figure 3.7 Grain Trade Waterway Network in China
Blue Line: Grain Rivers
GIS Data Source: “GHGIS, Version 4” (Harvard Yenching Institue, 2007)
3.3.3 Skinner Macroregions
Mountain ranges and canyon systems represent natural barriers for trade. The
anthropologist William Skinner (1977a) introduced a set of ‘physiographic
macroregions’, dividing China into nine regions (presented in Figure 3.8) according
to the drainage basins of major rivers and other ‘travel-constraining’
geomorphological features: Southeast Coast, Lingnan, Lower Yangtze, Middle
Yangtze, Upper Yangtze, Yun-Gui, North China, Northwest China and Manchuria.
Most of the regional boundaries adopted by Skinner follow watersheds and the crests
of mountain ranges: the high-density “core” city of each macroregion is located in
the river-valley lowlands and surrounded by concentric gradients of declining
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population densities until reaching the periphery. The river basin is taken as an
essential macroregional determinant in Skinner’s macroregions since urbanization,
crop inventories and productive techniques in pre-modern agrarian China were
specifically adapted to a plains-and–valley ecology and due to the great importance
of water transport (Skinner, 1977b).
Because of these geomorphological barriers to inter-regional communication
and trade, Skinner argues that the majority of trade was shipped within macroregion
rather than sent out to other macroregions of the empire. In China’s history, he
further argues, major natural diaasters or imperial critical decision-making were
always limited in scope to macroregion: disastrous floods were frequent in the
lowland cores of North China and the Middle Yangtze region; disastrous droughts
and invasions from Inner Asia affected Northwest China and North China more
severely; the selection of Kaifeng as the Capital City of Northern Song Dynasty
(960-1127) accelerated the development of North China; the selection of Hangzhou
as the Capital City of Southern Song Dynasty (1127-1279) primarily affected the
development of the Lower Yangtze region; the monopoly of overseas trade granted
Guangzhou in 1757 accelerated development in the Lingnan region but doomed the
economy of the Southeast Coast. These nine macroregions are distinct in terms of
environment, economic resources and interdependence with other regions throughout
history, which implies these various regions had their own development cycles and
processes of urbanization.
Skinner divided China into nine Macroregions, of which Southease was
divided into four sub-macroregion: Ou-ling Basins, Min Basin, Zhang-Quan, Han
Basin; Middle Yangtze Region was divided into four sub-macroregions: Middle
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Yangtze Proper, Gan Basin, Yuan Basin, Upper Han Basin; and Northwest region
was divided into three Macroregions: Wei-Fen Basin, Upper Huang Basin and
Gansu Corridor (Skinner et al., 2007). These sub-divisions capture the natural barrier
within the Macroregions, which are also included into my geographic variable. As a
consequence, there are 17 regions divided by the Skinner distribution, of which 15
regions cover my grain price data.
Figure 3.8 Physiographic Macroregions in China
GIS Data Source: “GHGIS, Version 4” (Harvard Yenching Institue, 2007)
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3.4 Preliminary Data Analysis
Few topics have attracted as much attention and controversy in International
Economics as the topic of the Law of One Price (LOOP). In the empirical literature,
price convergence is used as a standard measure for market efficiency. In this section,
the concepts of LOOP, market integration and market efficiency will be developed. I
also provide some basic empirical analysis adopting descriptive measures which
confirms the standard finding in the literature that South China’s market was more
integrated than that of the North China and further highlights that both regions
experienced a process of market disintegration over time.
3.4.1 Theoretical Framework: the Law of One Price
The Law of One Price
The Law of One Price holds that, in a frictionless undistorted world, regional
markets that are linked by trade and arbitrage will have a common, unique price for a
homogenous commodity:
Pi=Pj =…=P (i, j denote locations) (3.4)
A wide economic literature has studied the relationship between price, either
spatial or vertical through the framework of LOOP. Although most of the empirical
evidence is against the LOOP in this simple form, supportive evidence exists for its
modified versions. One of the modified versions is the above standard framework
adapted with the band of arbitrage. This framework assumes a two-stage adjustment
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process: in the first stage, producers and consumers in a given area clear the market
at autarky prices (Ai) in location i. In the second stage, agents are informed about the
autarky prices (Aj) in location j. The agents can compare the absolute value of the
autarky prices differential (Ai – Aj) with the total costs (Tij) of moving the good from
the low-price market to the high-price market. Whenever the autarky price
differential exceeds the trade cost, it is profitable to arbitrage. Arbitrage would cause
the gap between market prices (Pi and Pj) to shrink until it equals the trade costs (Tij).
In this framework, trade can be transitory if the gap between autarky prices exceeds
trade costs temporarily, or permanently if the gap reflects a structure imbalance
(Federico, 2011).
In this basic framework, trade cost is assumed to be constant across time.
Briefly, the actions of spatial traders to arbitrage will ensure that the prices of a
homogeneous good at any two locations will differ by, at most, the cost of moving
the good from the region with the lower price to the region with the higher price
(Fackler and Goodwin, 2001).
Pi – PjTij (3.5)
where Tij is the trade cost of moving the good from i to j. Here the trade cost includes
all relevant cost of arranging transactions between spatially separate locations. The
price differential between two locations measures trade costs only if the two markets
trade (Coleman, 2007). The inequality function (3.5) is referred to as the spatial
arbitrage condition, which is an equilibrium concept. In a well-functioning market,
arbitrage actions will tend to move the price differential toward the trade cost. This
insight has been formalized in the literature on non-linear deviations from the law of
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one price including Obstfeld and Taylor (1997), Taylor (2001) and O’Connell and
Wei (2002).
Federico (2011) argues this standard framework relies on four key
assumptions. The first is that there are only two locations. Adding one more location
would change the basic equilibrium condition. Second, the trade costs Tij are
independent from the quantity traded, which questions the existence of bulk trade.
Third, the agents know only the price information in these two locations, which
seems unreasonable. Fourth, the price adjustment after an exogenous shock is
instantaneous, which is never true even in the most efficient markets. Violating any
of these assumptions creates bias in interpretation for the empirical results of testing
the LOOP. In this thesis, my empirical concern is to estimate the strength of grain
price convergence over the long–run, filtering out short-run deviations in the course
of the analysis. It is then the homogeneity of the staple commodities studied (i.e. rice
or wheat) which allows me to compare the price-movements across regions and time,
and to draw conclusions for market integration during the mid-Qing period.
Spatial Market Integration
Market integration and market efficiency are two distinct concepts, although they are
closely related. Market integration is a practical and empirical concept, referring to a
measure of degree rather than a specific relationship. If the trade cost is assumed to
be zero, a perfectly integrated market should exhibit the strong form of the LOOP
(i.e. function (3.4)). In some literature, market integration is used to refer to the weak
form of the LOOP (i.e. function (3.5)). In macroeconomics and international
84
economics, a common conceptualization of market integration is ‘tradability’, which
signals the transfer of excess demand from one market to another, captured as price
convergence or trade flows. In the existing literature, market integration is defined
either as the degree of co-movement of prices in different location or the bilateral
trade volume under the gravity model.
Market efficiency is a theoretical concept somewhat less clearly defined than
market integration. In some studies, it is considered as synonymous with the spatial
arbitrage condition. Notions of market efficiency are usually treated as a motivation
for the empirical analysis of market integration. The important and practical
challenge of defining market efficiency is then how to test whether markets are
efficient in allocating scarce goods and services (Barrett, 2001). In general,
efficiency is used to imply that the allocation of resources is such that aggregate
welfare cannot be improved through a reallocation of resources. In terms of arbitrage,
market efficiency implies that no arbitrage profits are left to exploit for the traders.
Market efficiency is a broader concept than market integration. Precisely,
market efficiency implies market integration but not necessary the reverse. Price co-
movement for a given commodity (e.g. rice) can arise, however, for a number of
alternative reasons (e.g. similar climate condition or similar external shocks) rather
than the existence of an integrated trading network (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001).
Consequently, using price convergence to measure market efficiency, the empirical
challenge is to identify non-market links underlying the price co-movement.
Federico (2012) argues that market integration involves two different
processes: the increase in the speed of return to equilibrium levels after a shock in
85
the short-run and the convergence of prices in the long run. Following the framework
of spatial market integration, the data analysed in this thesis allow me to test the
degree of price convergence in the long run as one indicator of China’s market
integration, which points to China’s market efficiency. In Chapter 4, I still maintain
the empirical assumption of statistical independence across trading pairs which has
characterised virtually all studies in the literature; in Chapter 5, I relax this
assumption through the introduction of common factors.
3.4.2 Coefficient of Variation
The coefficient of variation provides a sound first descriptive indicator to measure
price variability for market integration as it is “simple to compute, intuitive and, as a
single dimensionless figure, easy to compare across time and space for the same
good” (Federico, 2011). In the simple version of LOOP (i.e. function (3.1)), the price
of homogenous commodity across prefecture should be the same and the CV
therefore should be (nominally) zero. The lower the CV more integrated the market.
Table 3.3 reports the coefficient of variation by province for the whole
sample period, which highlights that provincial price covariance in Southern China is
smaller than in Northern China. However, the pattern among provinces within
regions is the exact opposite to that expected: for instance in South China, the highly
commercialized province of Jiangsu has the highest CV while the isolated and poor
provinces Guizhou and Guangxi have the lowest CV. This unexpected pattern may
be due to the distortion caused by time-varying heterogeneity across provinces.
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In Figure 3.9, all the pairs are categorized by their bilateral postal distance,
the CV of price ratio between any two prefectures (Pi,t / Pj,t, for Pi,t >Pj,t by
construction) are given by postal route distance group, both for rice (South) and
wheat (North). A smaller CV for the pairwise price ratio indicates lower price
differentials in a given distance group. As can be seen, the CV of price ratio
increases with distance both for South China and North China, which implies that
trade costs (proxied by the price ratio) increase with distance. On the other hand,
spatial price variability is always smaller in Southern China than Northern China,
especially for the distance up to 1,200km. North’s spatial CV increases to about 0.33
in the distance group of 600-800km while South China arrive at this level until in the
distance group of 1600-1800km. This pattern suggests that markets in Southern
China were more integrated than those in the North.
To avoid distortion of these results by time-varying heterogeneity, the annual
CV at the regional level (i.e. South and North China) are plotted in Figure 3.10(a).
The figure shows price dispersion for rice was typically lower than for wheat in most
years. An upward trending of price variability is more notable for rice prices and
wheat prices. This result again implies that markets in Southern China were more
integrated than in the North but the extent of market integration was not stable over
time and arguable declined in both regions. Since this price dataset is unbalanced, it
is difficult to determine whether the implication from annual CV still holds if the
strong assumption maintained here that observations are missing randomly is relaxed.
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Table 3.3 CV by Province (1740-1820)
South China (rice) North China (wheat)
Province
Coefficient
of Variation
Province
Coefficient
of Variation
Anhui 0.271 Gansu 0.342
Jiangsu 0.295 Henan 0.246
Jiangxi 0.146 Shannxi 0.454
Fujian 0.215 Shandong 0.348
Guangdong 0.211 Shanxi 0.243
Guizhou 0.195 Zhili 0.296
Guangxi 0.166
Hubei 0.330
Hunan 0.256
Sichuan 0.333
Zhejiang 0.218
Figure 3.9 Spatial CV of Price Ratio
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Figure 3.10 Annual CV and DLOP
3.4.3 Deviation from the Law of One Price (DLOP)
The measurement of deviations from the law of one price (DLOP) is another widely
used empirical index to quantify the strength of price convergence, indicating the
extent of market integration (Parsley and Wei, 2003; Fan and Wei, 2006; Young,
2000). CV measures the deviation of prices while DLOP measures the deviation of
price differentials. The measure of DLOP is theoretically motivated by the spatial
arbitrage condition (in function (3.2)) that the existence of positive costs of arbitrage
imposes an inequality constraint on the price difference of an identical good in two
different locations. There are two thresholds that define a band of no arbitrage, and
arbitrage would bring the price difference back to the edge of the band if the realized
price difference is outside the threshold (Parsley and Wei, 2003).
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In Parsley and Wei (2003), Fan and Wei (2006) and Young (2000), their
price data involve three dimensions: m products across i cities varied over time t.
However, my grain price data only has two dimensions: the same product across
prefectures varied over time. The definition of standard deviation in the existing
literature can be modified for my data-set. First, define log rice (or wheat) price
differentials at time t between any city pair i and j as
Qij, t = lnPi, t – lnPj, t , (for Pi,t > Pj, t) (3.3)
where Pi,, t denotes the raw rice (or wheat) price in prefecture i at time t
Then, define
qij, t = Qij, t – Q* t , (3.4)
where Q*t is the mean of Qij, t over all pairs at time t. Then, St is denoted as the
standard deviation of qij, t at each point of time, which is used as a measure of the
deviation from the law of one price. Intuitively, once the price differential, Qij,, t =
lnPi, t – lnPj, t, goes out of a certain band, arbitrage activity becomes profitable and is
likely to take place to bring the price differential back inside the band. St describes
the deviation in price differentials rather than in price, and a smaller St is associated
with more integrated markets. The annual St for South China and North China are
presented in Figure 3.10(b), indicating a similar pattern to the annual CV in Figure
3.10(a). Thus, both deviation in price and price differential provide the same
conclusions, namely that on balance Southern China was more integrated than the
North, and that there is some evidence for a secular decline in market integration in
both regions.
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3.4.5 Seasonality
Grain production is sensitive to both weather conditions and harvest time. A
characteristic of grain commodities is that a surplus exists at harvest time which is
consumed throughout the whole year (Wilson, 1981). Consequently, grain prices
tend to follow seasonal patterns. In an autarkic economy, the grain price is predict to
plummet to the bottom during harvest time (i.e. local supply glut) and increase after
the harvest time in a fashion which approximately covers the costs incurred in
storing grain. Rice and wheat have different planting and harvest times, which are
presented in Table 3.4. However, even within the same rice or wheat region, the
exact times for the harvest and planting patterns can still considerably vary. The
solid lines in Figure 3.11 give the seasonal variation both for rice and wheat, which
show that they each have significant but different seasonal variation. Seasonal
variation (i.e. SVm) is defined here as the mean of the ratio between the monthly
price and its yearly average price for each calendar month m, i.e.
)/()]/([ ,,, TNPPSV yimyim u ¦ (3.5)
Pi,y,m is the price of prefecture i in month m of year y;
yiP , is the annual average price of prefecture i in year y;
N is the number of prefectures, T is the number of years.
Rice and wheat regions show some similar patterns of seasonal variation. For
example, in January, the average rice price across prefectures was 98% of the annual
average price, while for wheat it was 99.5% of the annual average price. Both of
them are lower than the annual mean. Both of their monthly variations are in the
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range between 98% and 103% of the annual average price, which implies that, in
general, the monthly price moved around the trend with comparatively small
deviation. For rice prices, the seasonal peak appears during the first harvest time
(June and July), while the wheat’s peak also comes at the first harvest time (May and
June). Both of their low price floors arrive around the second harvest time, i.e. in
October and November for rice, and July and August for wheat. This temporal
distinction between the two harvest periods implies that consumers may increase
their storage before the first harvest time to prepare for food shortage between the
two harvest seasons. Typically with grain commodities, we would expect that twin
annual harvests imply twin peak in the annual price movements. The fact that I
observe only one peak suggests that consumers anticipate grain shortages between
two harvest seasons and adopt intertemporal storage to smoothen their consumption,
which acts as a smoother to seasonal price variation. Note however that the seasonal
indeces in Figure 3.11 with respect to the whole period across the whole sample, the
observed patterns therefore may hide significant heterogeneity in terms of either time
or space. Nevertheless the apparent seasonal variation detected confirms that grain
price seasonality cannot be ignored in the later econometric analysis.
Table 3.4 Planting and Harvest Time
Rice Wheat
Single-crop Double-crop
(early)
Double-crop
(late)
Spring
Wheat
Winter
Wheat
Planting Mar to Jun Feb to Apr Aug Mar to Apr Sep to Oct
Harvest Oct and Nov June and July Oct and Nov July to Aug May and June
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Figure 3.11 Index of Seasonal Variation
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter introduces the details of the grain price data and the geographic data I
constructed and collated. This grain data covers the monthly rice and wheat price
data across 211 prefectures between 1740 and 1820. Data quality was of high
concern to the Qing emperors and their high ranking officials for food security such
that its reliability and comparability was an explicit target of the bureaucratic system.
In later chapters, the postal distance measure will be used as a proxy for trade route
distance, which provides a better measure of trade cost than direct distance. The
network of grain waterways and the Skinner macroregions enable me to identify the
role of geography on the market performance. From 1740 to 1820, China
experienced an era of politically stability, and absence of large scale natural disasters,
which in combination with de-facto autarky, and limited or no technological
.
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innovation in the transport system imply that market evolution observed in this
period was mainly driven by the market determinants rather than the external
political, technological or climatic shocks. The large scale of this price data allows
me to recognize the process of market evolution in terms of both the spatial and time
dimension. Preliminary descriptive analysis confirms previous findings in the
literature that markets were more integrated in Southern China than in the North
while there is also some evidence of market disintegration over time in both regions.
These aspects will be further investigated with more advanced econometric
techniques in later chapters of the thesis.
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Chapter 4
Geography, Institutions and Market
Integration
4.1 Introduction and Motivation
This chapter examines the determinants of grain market integration within China
during the middle period of the Qing Dynasty (1740-1820), with a spatial
comparison between rice markets in Southern China and wheat markets in Northern
China. Applying Engle-Granger cointegration and conventional cross-section
method I provide robust evidence to identify that Southern markets were more
integrated than Northern markets, and quantify the role of river transport in the
extent of market integration for the subtle differences between China’s Southern and
Northern regions. My empirical results suggest that geographical determinants were
important but dominated by the political structure on the market evolution.
This chapter contributes to the classic recent argument contrasting
institutions and geography on the long-run development. Advocates of “geography
hypothesis” emphasize the persistent effects of fixed geographic variables on human
actions and productivity, and therefore the economic development in the long-run
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000; Nuun, 2009; Sachs, 2000, 2001). On the other strand,
the seminal works written by North and Thomas (1973), North and Weingast (1989)
and North (1981, 1990) strength the importance of institutions, especially of private
property institutions, on economic development, which is supported empirically by
96
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2004, 2005), Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Dell (2008)
and Fang and Zhao (2011). This Chapter’s results support the “institutions
hypothesis” as they indicate that Qing China’s provincial border produced larger
impact than waterway network and physiographic distribution on shaping the market
integration. Despite the past “institutions hypothesis” literature quantifies the
statistical correlation between history and current development, the greatest
shortcomings lie in the inability to identify the exact channels through geography or
institutions on the long-term economic growth. This chapter concerns that how the
past geography or institutions affect the historical market integration, which may fit
the gap for the channel how past institutions affect today’s income through the
market integration.
This chapter also contributes to the trade and political border effect literature.
Despite technological advances and negotiated reductions in formal trade tariff,
market segmentation continues to exist. Political and administrative borders have
long been considered as a major source of trade costs to explain that international
markets have been more fragmented than intra-national markets (Engle and Rogers,
1996; McCallum, 1995; Parsley and Wei, 2001; Wei, 1996).The border effects can
be caused by political intervention (e.g. tariffs or quotas) or policy differentials (e.g.
exchange rate) accompanied directly by borders or deeper structures behind the
borders which have existed prior to the borders and may persist when the political
border is gone (e.g. geography or linguistic)( Heinemeyer et al., 2008; Wolf, 2005).
Qing China’s provincial hierarchy provides a good environment to capture the real
“political” border effects on trade since: first, under the unified political system like
Imperial China the nation’s currencies, weights, measures, languages and policies
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were more standardized than in politically fragmented regions; second, Qing
provincial boundary was interlocked rather than coincided with the physiographic
boundary, which avoid the possibility that the observed political barrier is just a
reflection of natural barrier. Food security, instead of grain market revenue, was the
primary concern of the Qing State. Qing’s provincial governorship enables and
encourages its provincial officials to intervene the grain trade to maximize local
storage as “grain protectionism”, which will be reflected by the impact of provincial
border on the grain trade.
This Chapter also shed new light on the role of transport costs on market
efficiency and further economic growth. In the United States, the introduction of
railroads, steamboats and canals contributed to the transformation between inland
backwoods and agricultural centres and the formation of a national labour market,
while, in Europe, the transportation innovation promoted the ability of trade over a
wide area (Shiue, 2002). The rise of the West implies the importance of transport
cost reduction for the market performance and economic growth. However, the
revolutionary decline in transport cost is always associated with institutional changes
and technological innovations (Bogart, 2011). It is difficult to identify the impact of
isolated transport cost. In the pre-modern period, without substantial technological
revolution in transportation, geographical factors were definitely the main sources of
transport cost. The grain market of 18th century in China was an environment that
allows us to isolate and quantify the impact of transport cost through geographical
factors since there was no substantial change affecting technology or domestic
policies.
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This Chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses how geographical
determinants and integrated provincial bureaucratic hierarchy affected Qing China’s
grade. Section 4.3 introduces a simple theoretical model of grain price behaviour
linked to the framework of the Law of One Price, which gives the theoretical
foundation to use Engle-Granger cointegration method for market integration
estimation. Section 4.4 begins by confirming the negative relationship between
market integration and distance, and South China was more integrated than North
China. The results indicate that the river network affected the market efficiency
heterogeneously by distance, which only plays a significant role on pairwise price
cointegration of Southern China, but a significant role on pairwise price comovement
in both South China and North China for the cointegrated pairs. In both regions,
instead of geographic determinants, provincial borders represent the most significant
barriers to market integration. One robustness check is given by comparing Southern
rice and wheat market integration to make sure the differential observed between
Southern rice and Northern wheat markets was not driven by the rice-wheat
differentials. One conclusion is given finally.
4.2 Trade Cost Determinants: Geography or Institutions?
Following the framework of the Law of One Price, trade cost affects the strength of
arbitrage, which eventually determines the extent of market integration. This section
discusses how geography and institutions affect the trade cost in Qing China’s grain
market.
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4.2.1 Geography and Transport Cost
Estimates of transport cost vary depending on source and method used, though all
studies agree that the main division in transport costs was between land and water
transportation (Shiue, 2002). In Pre-modern China, with limited transportation
technology, water transport was far more economical and convenient than by land.
China’s developed waterways network connected numerous prefectures, and was
essential for long-distance grain trade and commercial prosperity (See Section 2.5.4
and Section 3.3.2).
The navigability of waterways in Southern China was superior to those in the
North during the Qing Dynasty: between the 13th and 19th century, the frequency of
extreme flooding and breach of the Yellow River, the largest river system in
Northern China, was five times larger than that of Yangtze River, the largest river
system in the South (Chen, 2001; Liu, 2000). In the 18th century, the Yangtze was
navigable by sizable watercraft for at least 1000km upstream from its mouth near the
city of Shanghai (Worcester, 1971, cited in Keller and Shiue, 2007a). Yan and Liu
(2011) attribute the higher level of market integration in South China to the region’s
more developed water transport network vis-à-vis the North. The spatial
autocorrelation pattern of rice prices in Southern China in the 18th century vary
systematically with access to water transport as well as other geographical
determinants (Keller and Shiue, 2007a). In the Hunan Province, the rice commerce
in the 18th century largely followed the province’s river systems which are the main
branches of upstream Yangtze River (Wong and Perdue, 1992). Easy access to
waterways not only advantaged the transporting of heavy commodities, but also
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represents the lowered market information cost for merchant. On the production side,
these waterways supplied irrigation water for high-yield rice agriculture (Elvin,
1977).
According to Skinner (1977a, b), the physical macroregion barrier was a
more representative marker than the provincial barrier of the trading system.
Skinner (1977a) divides China into nine ‘physiographic macroregions’ defined by
the drainage basins of major rivers and other travel-constraining geomorphological
features (see Section 3.3.3). For Skinner transport costs in the pre-modern period
were determined by the geographical endowments. He concludes (Skinner, 1977b)
that China’s trading structure followed its natural geographical structure rather than
administration structure since 1) commercial centres, which possessed geographical
advantages were logical sites for public institutions such as communal temples,
schools, benevolent institutions as well as the headquarters of the nonofficial
institutions; 2) it was easier to extract the economic surplus the political institutions
were centred in commercial centres. Skinner’s model has been challenged: Wang
(1989), using grain prices, shows significant prices correlation between key
macroregions in the 18th century; Sands and Myers (1986) present historical
evidence to show that the macroregions were not independent trade systems.
The geographical comparison between pairs of prefectures in South China
and North China is given in Table 4.1 using geographical data introduced in Section
3.3. Disij is the postal route distance between prefecture i and j; Riverij equals to 1 if
two prefectures access to the same grain river; Proij equals to 1 if two prefectures are
in the same province; Skiij equals to 1 if two prefectures are in the same macroregion.
Most of the prefectures in North China were located on the plains while many
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prefectures in South China were in hilly areas. There are 15 Skinner regions
(including macroregions and sub-macroregions) over which my grain price data are
distributed, of which 11 regions are Southern provinces (11 provinces) while four
regions cover Northern provinces (six provinces). North China’s prefectures located
closer to each other (lower average and standard deviation of distance) and they
possessed fewer natural barrier (the likelihood of being in the same macroregioin
was higher), which is a geographical advantage for market evolution. Since Southern
China possessed more developed waterway transport network, 31.1% of pairs in
South accessed the same grain-trade river whilst the corresponding rate in North
China was 24.3%.
Table 4.1 Geographic Comparisons
South (17030 pairs) North (6320 pairs)
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Disij 1062.23 506.403 783.369 466.565
Riverij 0.311 0.463 0.243 0.429
Proij 0.085 0.279 0.162 0.368
Skiij 0.121 0.326 0.437 0.496
4.2.2 Qing Provincial System
In China, the creation of provincial administration under the unified regime can be
traced back to its Yuan Dynasty (CE 1721-1368), developed in Ming Dynasty (CE
1369-1644), and became stable, comprehensive and effective in the Qing Dynasty
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(CE 1644-1911). The Qing’s integrated provincial bureaucratic hierarchy was
initially created by Shunzhi Emperor (CE 1638-1661) and Kangxi Emperor (CE
1662-1722), which was transitioned and partitioned from five main military regions
into eighteen provinces. It took place in North China in the 1650s, the Lower
Yangtze in the 1660s and 1670s, the southeast coast in the 1680s, the Middle
Yangtze and Lingnan by 1700, and finally Guizhou and Yunnan in the 1740s and the
northwest in the 1750s (Duan, 2009; Fu, 2008, 2009; Guy, 2010). This transition
process was almost completed before the data period I investigated.
The Qing State delegated power at the provincial level to provincial
governors. These governors were appointed by the emperors. They were the pivotal
middlemen between the central state and a provincial administrative organization
that reached down to the prefecture and county. On the one hand, the governors
served as a central agent who was bound to the central court interest and agenda. On
the other hand, they served as the head of provincial hierarchy, and bore overall local
responsibility including fiscal accounting, official evaluation and promotion, judicial
review, grain storage and relief, and military policing (Guy, 2010). Qing’s
administrative territory boundary seldom coincided but interlocked with natural
boundaries. The purpose of this system was to sustain a high level of centralized
governmental power, which would prevent the military independence based on the
natural barriers (Zhou, 1996). From Figure 4.1 we see that most of the provincial
boundaries did not coincide with the Skinner macroregional boundary.
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Figure 4.1 Boundaries of Macroregions and Provinces
GIS Data Source: “GHGIS, Version 4” (Harvard Yenching Institue, 2007)
4.2.3 Bureaucratic System and Provincial Border Effect
Innovations in provincial governorship in the Qing period enabled the Qing state to
rule effectively a territorially, culturally and economically diverse empire (Guy,
2010). The comparative autonomy of the provincial governors, who bore the
responsibility of grain storage, allowed them to intervene in the grain trade to
maximize local storage as a form of “grain protectionism”.
104
Food Security and Grain Protectionism
Although the central state had a formal policy of non-intervention in markets from
the mid-18th century, the state nevertheless sought to maintain stockpiles of grain to
sell, lend, or give to poor consumers in the event of grain shortages. Confucian-
trained officials conventionally perceived the profit-mindedness of merchants
threatened the subsistence of the poor. However, the low fiscal revenue constrained
the local official ability to import grain if local storage targets were unmet or the
local area suffered the risk of widespread famine. The absolutist regime like imperial
China could achieve a relatively stable path of low fiscal extraction co-evolving to
prevent over-exploitation that could foment civil unrest (Ma, 2011, 2012).
Consequently, Qing emperors kept taxation light and limited locally available fiscal
resources, which squeezed the size of official bureaucracy at a time when population
grew three fold (Sng, 2014). During the first half of 19th century before the Opium
War, the Qing state’s total central revenue amounted to 24% of that of Britain, while
per capita tax revenue was strikingly only 1% (Ma, 2011, pp.20). After the 1740s,
the high storage-level target of imperial policy put huge fiscal pressure on provincial
official who needed to purchase sufficient grain as a reserve (Dunstan, 2006). In the
18th century, ever-normal granaries were expected to sell 30% of the reserves each
spring, which means the local officials needed to purchase the grain every year to re-
fill the granaries.
During the 18th century, a balance between local and state interests was
achieved because trading taxes at the local level were very low, and the central
government cared little if local magistrates appropriated these funds as revenue
(Mann, 1987). According to data for 1753 in Wang (1973), taxes on internal and
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foreign trade accounted for only 7.3% of total tax revenue, dwarfed by the 73.5%
from the taxation of privately-owned land. Food security is closely related to local
peace and stability, which in turn represented the primary criterion for assessing the
political achievement of local bureaucrats. Provincial level officials especially were
not willing to give up grain-supply protectionism as a means to guarantee their
political career in return for meagre trade tax revenue. Each year after the harvest
time, the local officials at the county level would purchase the local grain with low
price as much as possible. Merchant buying did not start until official purchasing
was over (Dunstan, 2006). If a granary’s stocks were badly depleted, arrangement
should be made to buy in an adjacent province where prices were low, with a
provincial subsidy if necessary. “…[a]n ambitious state stockpiling policy would
have brought trading interests unaccustomed and unwelcome levels of officials
competition, especially in those markets that attracted the most buyers” (Dunstan,
2006, p163). In addition, there were no imperial guidelines based on economic
principles to guide officials’ action against grain trade: these officials trained in
Confucianism would tie local grain storage
Archives of officials’ reports show that the high storage target encouraged
provincial governors to compete for grain purchase outside of their provinces. These
historical archives show that the provincial governors favoured maximizing local
storage rather than selling the grain out of their administrative area.
Bureaucracy and Local Merchants’ Monopoly
The resulting local protectionism and intervention in the grain trade was not only the
outcome of political coercive power constraining merchants, but also resulted from
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a combination of merchants’ pursuit of security and officials’ search for personal
enrichment. Although in China’s traditional official doctrine merchants were at the
bottom of the social ladder, the Qing government policy had evolved to rewarded
with high social ranks and official titles for market regulation (Hung, 2008). Many
Qing government officials not only understood commerce, but were deeply involved
in it through the merchant network.
In the absence of formal commercial and civil codes the foundation of
property rights in imperial China rested on politics rather than the law (Brandt et al.,
2014). The weak fiscal position and limited bureaucratic control of local
governments increased their dependence of local officials on elites such as the local
gentry and wealthy merchants as well as the informal taxation from local merchants.
Merchants thus became key members of the informal “liturgical” structures of local
governance and won the right to raise taxes (Mann, 1987). Officials expected these
merchant leaders to deliver tax revenues and to control the actions of all merchants
in the region/prefecture. In return, local merchants would exploit their ready access
to Qing officials to guarantee the status of officially-established monopolies. Mann
(1987, p62) finds that “marketers and traders unprotected by patronage or family
connections were vulnerable to harassment and extortion”.
Since the provincial governors served as the head of tightly organized
provincial bureaucracy, it was easy for them to use the political power to intervene in
grain exports (to the other provinces) through the merchant leaders who relied on
their patronage. Since the primary concern of the Qing state was market regulation
rather than market revenue, the unified political system tied merchants closely to its
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hierarchical structure, which determined that merchants’ primary concern is their
official status.
4.2.4 Trading Network: Geography or Bureaucratic Structure?
There are two hierarchies of China’s spatial structure: bureaucratic structure of
“official” China (i.e. a formal hierarchy of graded administrative posts) and natural
structure of China (i.e. mountain and river network). The boundaries of
administrative units seldom coincided with the boundaries of physiographic. Skinner
suggests that the network of trading followed the geography while Qing officials
imposed their grain trade intervention within boundaries shaped by the bureaucratic
structure.
The validity of Skinner’s hypotheses depends on that whether transport cost
was as important for commercial development as he describes. Many literatures
suggest that the role of transport cost on market integration has been over-estimated.
Based on yearly grain price from 100 European cities between 1620 and 1913,
Chilosi et al. (2013) found evidence that the integration of the European market was
primarily due to liberal policies rather than transport technology. Jacks and Pendakur
(2008)’s estimates of the impact of bilateral freight rates on bilateral trade from 1870
to 1913 suggests that income growth and convergence were the primary drivers of
the global trade boom in the 19th century rather than the revolution in maritime
transport. Federico and Persson (2007) argue in their study of the process of wheat
market integration between the United States and the United Kingdom from the early
19th century to present that changes in trade policies rather than international
108
transport cost reductions were the single most important factor explaining
convergence and divergence of prices in the long run. Although British India
witnessed sharp price convergence in wheat and rice markets, the vast railway
system established during the same period 1861 to 1920 explains only about 20% of
the decline in grain price dispersion, which implies that the effect of railways cannot
be separated from the other institutional forces pushing towards more market
integration (Andrabi and Kuehlwein, 2010).
Since South China possesses a more developed waterway network than North
China, it is expected that the South China market was more integrated since river
transport is central to the grain trade. If the role of transport cost has been over-
estimated, the importance of geographical endowments for commercial development
in the pre-modern period would have been over-stated as well. In the latter empirical
section, I will compare the different impacts from provincial barriers, macroregional
barriers, and the river network and the other geographical determinants for market
integration, which would help us to re-consider and identify the dominated driving
force behind the market performance in pre-modern China.
4.3 Methodologies
The Law of One Price (LOOP) implies that prices for the same product sold in
different markets converge to a stable differential (representing trade costs) due to
arbitrage and market forces. The convergence to the LOOP in my case of grain
markets implies that within integrated markets the time series of the grain price ratio
between any two locations is stationary, with transportation and transaction cost in
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trade providing reasons for a permanent (fixed) price wedge between specific
locations. In the following I set out my theoretical motivation and discuss the Engle-
Granger cointegration methodology employed to investigate the nature and
determinants of grain price convergence in Qing Dynasty China.
4.3.1 Theoretical Framework
This chapter focuses on the spatial grain market integration in Qing China based on
the analysis of Southern rice markets and Northern wheat markets. The empirical
work in this study is based on a theoretical framework developed in Deaton (1999)
and Deaton and Laroque (1996) which I sketch in the following paragraphs.
I begin with a price model for an agricultural commodity within a single
market. In each time period t, t=1,…, T, there is an inelastically supplied harvest
output ht, which follows a stochastic process characterized by the cumulative
distribution function )h, H).
)h, H) = Pr (ht+1+t | ht=h) (4.1)
Shocks to harvest output are exogenous, determined by the conditions in agricultural
production, which ultimately drive the behaviour of price.
As there is assumed to be no storage, all of the harvest output ht will be
consumed within each period. The local price at time t can then be written as a
function of output:
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Pt = a +bht (4.2)
where a(>0) and b(<0) are parameters. Because consumers are assumed to be the
only buyers in the market (no speculation), price behavior is driven by production
behavior and harvests. It is assumed that harvest output follows a simple AR(1)
process
ht+1 = Uht + Ht+1 (4.3)
where -1 < U, and the error term Ht is i.i.d with mean . In equation (4.3), in the
case of U=1, weather shocks or other unexpected events will have a permanent effect
on ht and thus through equation (4.2) on the grain price. Following Shiue and Keller
(2005, 2007) I maintain this assumption in the present study and provide further
motivation below. Given this assumption, both harvest output and grain prices
follow a random walk process,
Pt+1 = Pt + ut+1 (4.4)
where ut+1 = bHt+1. I adopt the equation (4.4) here as the point of departure for the
latter cointegration analysis. Until now there is no consensus yet on a model of
agricultural price behavour which both account short-term and long-term dynamics.
I now move away from a single location and adopt the LOOP framework to
link prices to trade cost. Consider an economy with many locations, n=1,…, N,
where consumers in all locations have the same preferences and all producers have
the same technology for grain production. There is no grain storage facility in any of
the locations or at any period in time. Geographical separation (remoteness, distance,
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accessibility) is one main reason why prices across regions may not equalize across
markets.
Iceberg transport costs are widely used in the trade literature to describe this
feature theoretically, for example: exporters in location i have to send z>1 units for
each unit of good to arrive at the destination market j. Price arbitrage in grain
markets will drive the price ratio between locations i and j within the following band:
]Pit / Pjt]
Tij is defined as the trade cost for each unit of grain to be shifted from i to j.
Tij = z – 1 (4.6)
Following the standard literature Tij is defined as a function of bilateral distance
given that the transport cost between neighboring locations can be assumed to be
smaller than that between distant location pairs. Because transport costs differ by
mode of transport (e.g. overland grain transport is more costly than grain transport
on water), transport cost also reflects an area’s topography (e.g. waterways and
mountains) as well as the quality of the trade route (e.g. road maintenance). Trade
cost is however a broader concept than transport cost. In addition to distance there
are other factors that determine the degree of price arbitrage and thus price
equalization between locations, such as differential taxation and property rights, risks
associated with bandits on specific trading routes as well as the monopoly power of
local guilds (i.e. local protectionism) (Wong, 2004; Shiue and Keller, 2005).
Tij = T (Distance, Other Factors)ij (4.7)
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Market integration can be measured using Tij. The smaller Tij the smaller is the band
of arbitrage for the price ratio between locations i and j in the long-run equilibrium.
4.3.2 Engle-Granger Cointegration Method
In econometric terms, if there is a linear combination between nonstationary price
series which turns out to be stationary, these price series are said to be cointegrated
(Granger, 1981; Engle and Granger, 1987). Pair-wise cointegration then implies that
market integration induces price arbitrage between these two locations, such that
while prices may deviate for short time periods the difference between the two price
series cannot become arbitrarily large over the long time horizon. A priori, I would
hypothesise that it is more likely that the price series between two locations
cointegrate if their bilateral trade cost Tij is smaller.
I begin my analysis by investigating the time-series properties of grain price
data in pairs of prefectures for the South (rice) and North (wheat) of China,
respectively. In this part of the analysis I assume cross-section independence
between prefectural pairs and investigate the long-run price behavior over the entire
time horizon from 1740 to 1820. Having established that all price series represent
non-stationary processes, I investigate whether pairs of prefectures nevertheless
display co-movement over the long-run, which is taken to be a test for market
integration between the two locations (Goldberg and Verboven, 2005; Fan and Wei,
2006). Prices do not need to equalise in order to be cointegrated, given that a host of
trade cost factors as mentioned above can continue to sustain differential pricing. As
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indicated above my analysis here uses the entire time-series dimension of the data
and for each prefecture pair I arrive at a single (cointegration) statistic.
In line with the existing literature on market integration in China (Shiue and
Keller, 2005, 2007), the canonical Engle and Granger (1987) method to investigate
cointegration is implemented as follows. All of the price series enter the regressions
below transformed using logarithms. I estimate the candidate cointegration
regression for each prefectures pair ij
ln(Pit)=Dij+Eijln(Pjt)+Hij,t

where Pit and Pjt denote the price series in locations i and j respectively. The constant
Dij captures long-run differences in the price levels. 32 If ln(Pit) and ln(Pjt) are
cointegrated, the linear combination Hij,t = ln(Pit) – (Dij+Eijln(Pjt)) will be stationary,
with the coefficient Eijcapturing the long-run relationship between the two prices.
The practical econometric test for cointegration is to establish whether Hij,t is
stationary, which in this first part of my study is implemented in line with Shiue and
Keller (2005, 2007) by use of augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) tests for the N(N-
1) residual series Hij,t for rice and wheat respectively:
32 Although Qing China nominally had unified currency, the exchange rate between silver and copper
varied between areas. Local officials converted local prices into the standard treasury tael for
reporting grain prices.
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where the sum on the right hand side of equation (4.9) represents lagged differences
of the residual series to capture short-run variation in the data. Pit and Pjt are not
cointegrated if the null hypothesis of unit root (i.e. Mij=0) cannot be rejected. The
rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root behavior is determined by the t-ratio of
the Mij parameter (critical values follow non-standard distributions).33 The stronger is
the evidence that Mij<0, the more evidence favors the market integration between
locations i and j. In an integrated market, the non-stationarity of the error term Hij,t in
equation (4.8) can also be driven by the non-stationary transport cost even though
two prices cointegrate (Goodwin, 1992;Granger, 1986; Hsu and Goodwin, 1993). To
maintain that my cointegration results are interpretable, it is necessary to assume that
transportation technology in the period I investigated does not change, which has
been strongly suggested in the historical literature (Eastman, 1988; Fan, 1993).
In practice I will estimate a variant of the candidate cointegration relationship
in equation (4.8) by adding monthly indicator variables (i.e. Pm)34 to the model to
avoid seasonal effects:
33 The critical values of the ADF t-statistics are a function of time series length T. It is easier to reject
the null hypothesis as T increases. In practice, I will drop out the missing observation for each pair-
wise such that T is varied across pair-wises. I use the response surface results in MacKinnon (1991) to
adjust the critical values and then ensure that the significance levels stay constant while T changes.
34 I set the monthly dummy equal to 1 for the months in the harvest seasons during which the grain
prices are expected to be lower than the normal months. According to Buck (1937) and seasonality
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ln(Pit)= Dij+Eijln(Pjt)+PmHij,t (4.8’)
The magnitude of the t-ratios on the Įij parameters in my Augmented Dickey Fuller
regressions, which were subject to further empirical analysis in Shiue and Keller
(2005, 2007), merely provide evidence for the likelihood of cointegration between
two prefectures’ price series: cointegration is not a continuous concept, but a binary
one, in that variable series are either cointegrated or not. Higher t-ratios beyond
specific critical values provide strong evidence for cointegration and thus market
integration, while lower t-ratios provide weak evidence of market integration. My
analysis will thus result in a set of cointegrating (Cij=1 at the 5% level) and a
separate set of non-cointegrating (Cij=0) bilateral price series corresponding to
prefecture pairs with integrated markets and prefecture pairs whose markets are not
integrated. My subsequent analysis outlined below differs from the approach taken in
Shiue and Keller (2005, 2007) by investigating presence or absence of cointegration
rather than the magnitude of the t-ratios.
Note that in practical terms I cannot employ the simple cross-section average
augmentation as developed in the next Chapter (Chapter 5) to the cointegration
equation setup in equations (4.8) or (4.8’): whether Pit and Pjt cointegrate or not, the
cross-section averages would account for any non-stationary elements in the
unobservables so that the remaining residuals from the augmented regressions will
be I(0) by construction.
analysis in Chapter 3.4.5, both for rice and wheat, the months of May, June, July, August and
September and October are selected as harvest months. I have experimented with alternative
selections, all of which yield the same qualitative conclusions in the cointegration approach.
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4.4 Results
Following the methodology discussed above, I first present Engle-Granger
cointegration tests based on the comparison between South China and North China,
and then employ cross-section regression to identify the role of water-way network
on the South-North differential. Then, focusing on the rice markets in South China, I
run cross-section regressions to determine whether and to what extent price
convergence was affected by physiographic or political structure.
4.4.1 Southern and Northern Market Integration
Following methodology in Shiue and Keller (2005, 2007), Figure 4.2 presents the
average ADF t-statistics (lag augmentation determined by AIC differs by prefecture-
pair) for the rice price series of 131 prefectures in South China (17,030 prefecture
pairs) and the wheat price series of 80 prefectures in North China (6,320 prefecture
pairs) as a function of bilateral distance. Both for rice and wheat the highest average
t-statistics in absolute terms (strongest evidence for cointegration) are in the distance
category of less than 200 kilometers, and the average t-statistics decrease in absolute
value (weaker evidence for cointegration) with bilateral distance. This evidence
supports the expectation in the trade literature that it is more likely for relatively
nearby markets to be integrated due to the comparatively smaller bilateral trade cost.
Figure 4.2 also features the comparison between rice markets in South China and
wheat markets in North China, which suggests that there is more robust evidence for
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market integration in South China than in North China for any bilateral distance
category.
As argued above the t-statistics given from ADF regressions merely indicate
the likelihood of two prefecture price series being cointegrated, but are not indicative
of the extent of market integration or strength of price arbitrage. This aside, the
average t-statistics in Figure 4.2 may be driven by extreme t values in each distance
group. In Figure 4.3, I therefore present the share of cointegrated prefecture pairs
both for rice and wheat markets as another indication for the degree of market
integration in each region. In both cases the highest share of cointegrated price series
appears in the smallest distance category. For the pairs in the distance category
between 0 and 200km, 80% of pairs in South China but only about 60% of pairs in
North China were cointegrated. The shares monotonically decline with bilateral
distance but South China possessed larger shares for any distance group. Figures 4.2
and 4.3 imply that in the period between 1740 and 1820 grain markets in South
China were more integrated a finding which is consistent with qualitative evidence
on the relative degree of commercialization and development in South China,
especially in the Yangtze River Delta (Fan, 1993; Li, 1998; Shiue, 2002; Wu, 1985).
To avoid the bias driven by the possible trend stationary time series, I replicate the
methodology in Figure 4.3 for the sub-sample excluding the series with possible
trend stationarity, which is shown in Figure B.4 in Appendix B.4 and gives the same
quantitative conclusion.
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Figure 4.2 Average Cointegrated Test Statistic in Distance
Figure 4.3 Share of Cointegrated Prefecture Pairs by Distance
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4.4.2 Determinants of Market Integration
I now turn to the analysis of the patterns and determinants underlying the observed
market integration results. It is hypothesized that market evolution in pre-modern
China were dominated by the impact of the transport network, which was mainly
composed of the navigable waterway system (Skinner, 1964; 1977a, 1977b). The
importance of water transport for the grain trade during the Qing has received
substantial attention in the economic history literature (Evens, 1984; Fan, 1993;
Wang, 1992; Wong and Perdue, 1992; Yan and Liu, 2011). Yan and Liu (2011)
attribute the higher level of market integration in South China to the region’s more
developed water transport network vis-à-vis the North. In a first step to investigate
the patterns and geographical determinants of market integration, I use the following
linear probability regressions to analyze the N(N-1) prefecture pairs:
(4.10)
where Cij is the binary dummy for cointegration from the pairwise Engle-Granger
tests; Disij is the postal route distance in kilometers between prefectures i and j; Proij
is a dummy variable indicating whether both prefectures are locate within the same
province; Riverij is a dummy variable indicating whether one of the main grain trade
rivers passes through both prefectures i and j; Ti and Tj are fixed effects for
prefectures i and j; and Ti*j* captures the seasonality across different cropping
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patterns. Based on Figure 2.4(b) in Section 2.5.6, i* denotes the crop area for
prefecture i while j* denotes this for prefecture j. Ti*j* represents a group of dummies
for any combination of crop area between i* and j*, which will capture the price co-
movement driven by the similar climate and harvest time in the long run35 . To
capture potential heterogeneity of river impact across different distance, Dis_Gij,k is
defined as a set of categorical dummies36 for each distance group as below:
=1 if (k-1)×200km < Disijk×200km (k=1,2,…9) (4.11)
=0 if otherwise
The linear probability models are employed for regression (4.10) results of
which are reported in Table 4.2. Results from separate regressions of equation (4.10)
for rice (South) and wheat (North) will provide insights into the determinants of
market integration, distinguishing markets that do from those that do not integrate. In
my discussion I focus on the sign and statistical significance of covariates in the
linear probability model results. Although the dependent variable is binary in nature,
I prefer to employ this approach over a nonlinear estimator (e.g. Probit Model) since
this make interpretation, especially of interaction effects, much easier to handle. 37
In all columns reported in Table 4.2, except column 4 for Northern China, the
distance variables are negative significant, which implies that the probability of
market integration is higher for markets which are closer to each other. This result
supports our findings in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. In column 1 and 2, the magnitudes of
35 It is possible that the agricultural price co-movement was driven by the common factor (e.g.
weather) rather than market link. In this chapter, I am interested in the market determinents in the
long run rather than short run such that the fixed effects of agricultural areas (discussed in Section
2.5.6) are suffiecnt to capture the climate common factors in the long run.
36 The omitted category is the group dummy for the distance between 1800km and 2000km.
37 Probit results for (4.11) also strongly support our conclusions based on the OLS results, see
Appendix B.1.
^kijGDis ,_
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ln(Disij) for Southern China are smaller, which implies that in the South distance is
associated with lower trade costs since a decrease in distance between two markets
ceteris paribus induces a higher likelihood of price integration. In column 4, the
insignificance of the distance variable has two possible interpretations: 1) the
regional market was highly integrated such that there was no association between
trade and distance; 2) the regional market was highly disintegrated such that the
trade costs associated with distance became infinitely large. The empirical results
provided below suggest that the second explanation is a better fit to the extent of
North China’s market integration.
In columns 1 and 2, both prefectures being on the same grain river
significantly increases the probability of integrated markets in Southern China, but
not in Northern China. This feature suggests that the network of waterways
strengthen price arbitrage only in South China, a finding which is consistent with
previous suggestions that waterway navigability in South China was considerably
better than in the North of the country. The results for the common province dummy
in the first two columns of Table 4.2 suggest that it is more likely for prefecture pairs
to have integrated markets if they are located within the same province. The
coefficients on the common province dummies are considerably larger than those for
the common grain river dummies, which indicate that provincial borders represent
comparatively stronger barriers even in a political unified economy, where
currencies, weights, measures and languages were more standardized than in
comparable politically fragmented regions of the world (e.g. Western Europe). 38
38
It is possible that the significant province dummies are driven by the distinction between short and long
distance trade rather than province border barrier since bilateral distance is much smaller within the same
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This evidence of provincial barriers on grain trade implies that the water transport
network on its own cannot fully explain the differences in market performance
between South China and North China. It also suggests that provincial officials
significantly intervened in the grain trade.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.2, I add a series of interaction terms to test the
additional ‘distance penalty’ on the common province and grain river dummies. In
both columns, Proij is still significant to confirm the trade barrier nature of provincial
borders while the interaction term Proij × ln(Disij) reflects that the distance penalty
only applies to the provincial border in Northern China. These findings support the
hypothesis that China’s market was fragmented along provincial borders, and that
the extent of fragmentation was more substantial in Northern China.
In terms of water transport, the combinations between Riverij and its
interaction terms with the set of distance dummies - Riverij×Dis_Gij,k (k=1,2…,9)
capture the heterogeneous impact of waterway network across different distance
group. In Table 4.3, I test the joint significance of Riverij dummy and its interaction
terms in each distance group. If I can reject the null hypothesis that their joint impact
in one specific distance group (e.g. 200<xч400km) is zero (e.g. H0: S + Qij,2= 0,
where Sand Qij,2 are the coefficients of Riverij and Riverij×Dis_Gij,2 in regression
(4.10)), this can provide support for the significant net impact of waterways network
on the market integration in this distance group.
province. As robust checks, we compare the pair cointegration percentage of within and without the same
province, which yields the same qualitative conclusions. These results are in Table B.2 and B.3 in Appendix B.2.
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Table 4.2 Market Integration, Geography and Institutions (OLS)
South Rice North Wheat South Rice North Wheat
Dependent Variable: Cij = {0,1}
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Disij) -0.0314 -0.0587 -0.0336 -0.0223
(0.0076)*** (0.0127)*** (0.0091)*** (0.0147)
Riverij 0.043 0.0086 -0.065 0.0794
(0.0105)*** (0.0169) (0.027)** (0.091)
Proij 0.222 0.264 0.343 0.833
(0.0139)*** (0.0176)*** (0.124)*** (0.146)***
Proij × ln(Disij) -0.0183 -0.096
(0.0207) (0.024)***
Riverij×Dis_Gij,1(xч200km) -0.0127 -0.0153
(0.0428) (0.0998)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,2(200<xч400km) 0.1033 -0.0472
(0.0327)*** (0.0948)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,3(400<xч600km) 0.1347 -0.0777
(0.031)*** (0.0928)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,4(600<xчϴ00km) 0.1607 -0.092
(0.0296)*** (0.0918)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,5(800<x1000km) 0.1403 -0.112
(0.0285)*** (0.093)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,6[NP 0.101 -0.0492
(0.0287)*** (0.0953)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,7[NP 0.068 -0.117
(0.029)** (0.0945)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,8[NP 0.0425 -0.127
(0.0303) (0.0941)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,9[NP 0.0399 -0.1723
(0.0298) (0.0937)*
Ti Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tj Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ti*j* Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 17,030 6320 17,030 6,320
R2 0.4819 0.3865 0.4542 0.3898
Note: We omit reporting fixed effects, seasonality and the constant. Robust standard errors provided in
parentheses; ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively
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The results in Table 4.3 confirm that the ‘grain rivers’ had statistically
significant impact on Southern market integration for distances below 1200km. The
significant net coefficients between Riverij and Riverij×Dis_Gij,k in each distance
group (e.g. in 200<xч400km, -0.065+0.1033>0) suggest that Riverij in this distance
group is associated with higher probability of market integration. For South China
in column 3, although the Riverij dummy enters negatively significant, its interaction
terms with distance dummies are positive significant and larger than the absolute
value for the 400km to 1400km. However, for the distance group between 1200 and
1400km, the net impact from river is considered to be insignificant since the sum of
coefficients is tiny (i.e.  += 0.003). These results imply that water
transport does not have expected positive impact for the closest pairs (NP) and
the most distant pairs (>1200km) in South China. One possible explanation for this
finding for proximate prefectures is that the distance-unrelated cost of water
Table 4.3 Heterogeneity of Water Impact on Cointegration
Distance Group Null Hypothesis p-value
South Rice North Wheat
(0, 200km] H0: S + Qij,1= 0 0.0226 0.1218
(200, 400km] H0: S + Qij,2= 0 0.0527 0.2813
(400, 600km] H0: S + Qij,3= 0 0.0000 0.9390
(600, 800km] H0: S + Qij,4= 0 0.0000 0.5948
(800, 1000km] H0: S + Qij,5= 0 0.0000 0.2565
(1000, 1200km] H0: S + Qij,6= 0 0.0286 0.4191
(1200, 1400km] H0: S + Qij,7= 0 0.8637 0.3264
(1400, 1600km] H0: S + Qij,8= 0 0.2918 0.2724
(1600, 1800km] H0: S + Qij,9= 0 0.2652 0.0381
Note: S2 and Qij,k are the coefficients of Riverij and Riverij×Dis_Gij,k in OLS regression (11); p-
value below 0.05 means reject the H0 with 5% significance.
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transport (e.g. cost of loading and uploading) is large relative to benefit of water
transport, such that short-distance water transport was not profitable. On the other
hand, the insignificant impact of river transport observed for distances larger than
1200km suggests grain river over the very long distance did not shape market
integration and its evolution in Southern China. In stark contrast, for North China,
both the river and most of its interaction terms with distance dummies are
insignificant. In column 4 the pattern of results for the role of river transport in
northern China’s market integration strongly supports the previous conclusion that
river transport has no impact on market performance in North China.
In the probit results for regression (4.10), presented in Table B.1 in Appendix
B.1, I calculated the magnitude and statistical significance of the interaction effect
for all interaction terms, following the re-derived formulas in Ai and Norton (2003)
and Norton et.al. (2004) (see results in Appendix B.1). All results are consistent with
the result pattern in Table 4.2. The Table B.4 in Appendix B.4 gives the regression
of (4.10) for sub-sample excluding the possible trend stationary series, which gives
the similar quantitative conclusions compared with Table 4.2. The only difference is
that the river dummy for South rice is insignificant in column 1 of Table B.4, which
is due to that most of possible trend stationary prefectures (have been excluded)
locate in the Jiangxi Province along the largest transportable river Yangtze River.
4.4.3 Physiographic or Political Boundaries?
In the previous section I have shown that the impact of river transportation was one
crucial determinant of greater market integration in Southern China, but that this
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effect was dominated by the province dummy. It is still possible that the provincial
border effect observed was driven by the physiographic environment, rather than
political boundaries. In Section 4.2.2, I noted that Qing China’s provincial
boundaries did not coincide with the physiographic boundaries of Skinner’s
macroregions, a distinction which offers a suitable experiment to investigate the
influence of the latter (and thus that of geography) on grain market integration.
Focusing on Southern rice markets 39 I analyse the relationship between Skinner
macroregions and market integration by adding a dummy variable into equation
(4.10) :
(4.12)
where Skiij is equal to 1 if two prefectures located into the same Skinner
macroregion.
The results for regression (4.12) are presented in Table 4.4. In column (2),
the coefficient of Skiij enters statistically significantly with positive sign, its
magnitude slightly larger than that of the river dummy but still substantially smaller
than that of the province dummy. This result suggests that macro-regional frontiers
do act as barriers to trade since they reduce the likelihood of cointegration for any
pair of prefectures in different Skinner regions. Compared with column (1), adding
Skiij in column (2) reduces the magnitude of all the other variables, which confirms
that the impact from river transport and political structure is overestimated if we
omit including geographical/natural barriers to trade. However, in terms of
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In Northern China there were fewer physiographic barriers with most prefectures in the sample
located in the plains such that 60% belong to the same Skinner macroregion (‘North China’).
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magnitudes of these effects, provincial boundaries still dominate geographical
boundaries. In column (3) and (4), after adding interaction terms with distance for
Riverij and Proij, the pattern of the result is still consistent with the results in column
(1) and (2).
In this section, combined with the two earlier ones, I have provided further
evidence to conclude that the role of transport cost in determining market
performance in pre-modern China has been overestimated:. river transport and
physiographic boundaries affected the market integration significantly, but were
dominated by the influence of provincial frontiers. I would argue that under the
Qing’s centralized polity, provincial governors were given a political monopoly in
their localities and were further incentivised to limit grain exports (i.e. “grain
protectionism”) in order to maximize local food security. At the same time
merchants were incentivised to submit to this political intervention on the grain trade
in exchange for security for their assets and properties. While there is no direct
evidence to link the political barriers to trade I observe to this grain protectionism
discussed, I would argue that the magnitude of provincial barriers to trade at the very
least highlight that in terms of market evolution institutional barriers dominated
geography during this period of the Qing Dynasty.
128
Table 4.4 Market Integration, Geography and Institutions
(OLS, South only)
Dependent Variable: Cij = {0,1}
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Disij) -0.0314 -0.023 -0.0336 -0.029
(0.0076)*** (0.0077)*** (0.0091)*** (0.0091)***
Riverij 0.043 0.034 -0.065 -0.069
(0.0105)*** (0.0106)*** (0.027)** (0.028)**
Proij 0.222 0.187 0.343 0.278
(0.0139)*** (0.0157)*** (0.124)*** (0.1237)**
Skiij 0.07 0.072
(0.0125)*** (0.0127)***
ln(Proij) × ln(Disij) -0.0183 -0.013
(0.0207) (0.0207)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,1(xч200km) -0.0127 -0.027
(0.0428) (0.0426)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,2(200<xч400km) 0.1033 0.089
(0.0327)*** (0.033)***
Riverij×Dis_Gij,3(400<xч600km) 0.1347 0.12
(0.031)*** (0.031)***
Riverij×Dis_Gij,4(600<xчϴ00km) 0.1607 0.155
(0.0296)*** (0.03)***
Riverij×Dis_Gij,5(800<xч1000km) 0.1403 0.14
(0.0285)*** (0.0286)***
Riverij×Dis_Gij,6(1000<xч1200km) 0.101 0.101
(0.0287)*** (0.0286)***
Riverij×Dis_Gij,7(1200<xч1400km) 0.068 0.068
(0.029)** (0.0291)**
Riverij×Dis_Gij,8(1400<xчϭϲϬϬkm) 0.0425 0.041
(0.0303) (0.03)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,9(1600<xчϭϴϬϬkm) 0.0399 0.04
(0.0298) (0.03)
Ti Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tj Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ti*j* Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 17,030 17030 17,030 17,030
R2 0.4819 0.483 0.4542 0.4854
Note: We omit reporting fixed effects, seasonality and the constant. Robust standard errors provided in
parentheses; ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively
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4.4.4 Determinants of Price Comovement
Instead of a binary dependent variable (presence or absence of price cointegration) in
regression (4.10), I now consider a continuous measure for the strength of arbitrage
between prefectures whose markets (price series) are (co)integrated. In regression
(4.8) and (4.8’), two cointegrated price series are linear in their relationship such that
captures their long-run co-movement. The larger the ijEÖ the stronger is the arbitrage
to bind the prices to move together. There is a negative relationship between the
extent of price co-movement ijEÖ and trade cost Tij. In equation (4.13), I adopt the
same set of independent variable as in equation (4.10) and adopt ijEÖ from the subset
of cointegrated prefecture pairs as the dependent variable.
(4.13)
The identification in regression (4.10) allows me to quantify the determinants
of market integration. By contrast, regression (4.13) identifies the impact of
geography and polity on the extent of price co-movement conditional on
cointegration. Since some pairs have negative ijEÖ , I do not use the logarithmic
transformation for the dependent variable.
The results of regression (4.13) are reported in Table 4.5, which provides a
similar pattern as the results in Table 4.3. In my discussion I focus on the sign and
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statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. In column 1 to 4, all distance
variables enter significantly with negative signs. Since ijEÖ is negatively correlated
with trade cost Tij, the negative sign of these distance variables suggests that,
unsurprisingly, trade cost is smaller for more proximate cointegrated prefecture pairs
resulting in more pronounced long-run price co-movement. The second feature is
that the absolute values of coefficients for distance are larger for Southern China,
which implies that per unit of distance trade in South China was associated with less
trade costs than trade in the North.
In column 1 and 2 of Table 4.5, the river and province dummies are positive
significant. This suggests that water transport reduced bilateral trade cost in both
regions, while provincial borders acted as barriers to trade. However, with respect to
coefficient magnitudes, conditional on market integration grain rivers had a larger
impact on price co-movement in Northern than in Southern China, while provincial
borders impeded price co-movement more substantially in the South. In column 3,
for Southern China, the river dummy is negative significant but this was mitigated
by the distance-river interaction in all distance categories, albeit with declining
significance. By contrast, in column 4 for North China, river transportation afforded
significant impact on price co-movement but did not vary by distance. The test of the
joint significance for river dummy and its interaction terms with distance groups are
given in Table 4.6, which suggests that in South China the positive impact of river
transport on price co-movement covered the distance categories from 200km to
800km (thus not extending to as many categories as the analysis for the
presence/absence of price cointegration above), while in the North the impact of
grain rivers is limited to the shortest distance categories (e.g. 0-400km). In column 3
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and 4, the interaction term for Proij × ln(Disij) reflects that the ‘distance penalty’ only
applies to provincial borders in northern China, which supports the hypothesis that
the extent of fragmentation was more substantial in that region, since even within the
same province price co-movement for prefecture pairs decreased with distance. In
general, the results in Table 4.5 suggest that, in line with the cointegration analysis in
Table 4.3, the waterway network reduced trade costs and fostered greater price co-
movement, while provincial borders acted as impediments. Although the Northern
waterway network afforded no additional probability of cointegration, it did increase
the strength of price co-movement conditional on markets being integrated.
In column 2 and 4 of Table 4.7, I add the Skinner macroregion dummy into
the regression (4.13) to discuss whether the observed provincial border effect on the
price co-movement is really driven by physiogeographic factors. The result pattern is
highly consistent with the previous finding, and the inclusion of the Skinner dummy
only marginally changes the original results in column 1 and 3: geography.acted as a
barrier to trade and thus the extent of price co-movement, but its influence was
dominated by that of provincial/political borders. Across Tables 4.5 to 4.7 all results
suggest that instead of geography political boundaries were the dominated force in
driving grain price co-movement.
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Table 4.5 Price Comovement, Geography and Institutions
South Rice North Wheat South Rice North Wheat
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Disi, j) -0.057 -0.09 -0.0546 -0.1033
(0.0043)*** (0.009)*** (0.0055)*** (0.0126)***
Riverij 0.0114 0.0418 -0.242 0.063
(0.0063)* (0.0125)*** (0.085)*** (0.0377)*
Proij 0.16 0.0523 0.128 -0.3016
(0.0068)*** (0.0112)*** (0.062)** (0.098)***
ln(Proij) × ln(Disij) 0.0054 0.0595
(0.0105) (0.0164)***
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,1(xч200km) 0.228 0.042
(0.087)*** (0.0437)
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,2(200<xч400km) 0.284 -0.176
(0.086)*** (0.041)
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,3(400<xч600km) 0.277 -0.0448
(0.086)*** (0.039)
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,4(600<xчϴ00km) 0.266 -0.0257
(0.085)*** (0.038)
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,5(800<xч1000km) 0.238 -0.048
(0.086)*** (0.038)
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,6(1000<xч1200km) 0.247 -0.006
(0.0852)*** (0.041)
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,7(1200<xч1400km) 0.242 -0.06
(0.086)*** (0.05)
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,8(1400<xчϭϲϬϬkm) 0.205 0.0707
(0.087)** (0.04)*
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,9(1600<xчϭϴϬϬkm) 0.104 -0.017
(0.088) (0.0303)
Ti Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tj Yes Yes Yes Yes
TI*J* Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of Obs. 8176 1681 8176 1681
R2 0.795 0.887 0.7984 0.889
Note: We omit reporting fixed effects, seasonality and the constant. Robust standard errors provided in
parentheses, ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance.
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Table 4.6 Heterogeneity of Water Impact on Price Co-movement
Distance Group Null Hypothesis p-value
South Rice North Wheat
(0, 200km] H0: S + Qij,1= 0 0.3895 0.0001
(200, 400km] H0: S + Qij,2= 0 0.0001 0.007
(400, 600km] H0: S + Qij,3= 0 0.0001 0.2694
(600, 800km] H0: S + Qij,4= 0 0.0056 0.0355
(800, 1000km] H0: S + Qij,5= 0 0.7139 0.5056
(1000, 1200km] H0: S + Qij,6= 0 0.5435 0.0741
(1200, 1400km] H0: S + Qij,7= 0 0.9818 0.9344
(1400, 1600km] H0: S + Qij,8= 0 0.0969 0.0001
(1600, 1800km] H0: S + Qij,9= 0 0.0007 0.211
Note: S2 and Qij,k are the coefficients of Riverij and Riverij×Dis_Gij,k in OLS regression (4.13); p-
value below 0.05 means reject the H0 with 5% significance
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Table 4.7 Price Comovement, Geography and Institutions (South only)
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Disij) -0.057 -0.054 -0.0546 -0.054
(0.0043)*** (0.0044)*** (0.0055)*** (0.005)***
Riverij 0.0114 0.008 -0.242 -0.243
(0.0063)* (0.006) (0.085)*** (0.085)***
Proij 0.16 0.149 0.128 0.106
(0.0068)*** (0.007)*** (0.062)** (0.063)*
Skiij 0.021 0.018
(0.006)*** (0.006)***
ln(Proij) × ln(Disij) 0.0054 0.008
(0.0105) (0.011)
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,1(xч200km) 0.228 0.224
(0.087)*** (0.087)***
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,2(200<xч400km) 0.284 0.28
(0.086)*** (0.086)***
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,3(400<xч600km) 0.277 0.273
(0.086)*** (0.086)***
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,4(600<xчϴ00km) 0.266 0.264
(0.085)*** (0.085)***
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,5(800<xч1000km) 0.238 0.239
(0.086)*** (0.086)***
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,6(1000<xч1200km) 0.247 0.249
(0.0852)*** (0.086)***
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,7(1200<xч1400km) 0.242 0.243
(0.086)*** (0.086)***
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,8(1400<xчϭϲϬϬkm) 0.205 0.206
(0.087)** (0.087)**
ln(Riverij)×Dis_Gij,9(1600<xчϭϴϬϬkm) 0.104 0.104
(0.088) (0.089)
Ti Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tj Yes Yes Yes Yes
TI*J* Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of Obs. 8176 1681 8176 1681
R2 0.795 0.887 0.7984 0.889
Note: We omit reporting fixed effects, seasonality and the constant.Robust standard errors provided in parentheses,
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance.
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4.4.5 Robustness Test
Wheat and rice are two different agricultural commodities, which have different
production cost, storage cost and transport cost. It is therefore possible that my
comparison between Southern and Northern grain markets in Figures 4.2 and 4.3
was driven by the differences in the price behaviour of rice and wheat instead of
differential market performance between the regions. As a robustness check, I select
a sub-sample of prefectures (77 prefectures out of 131 prefectures)40 in Southern
China for which I have both sets of prices for rice and wheat, and then compare price
cointegration for each commodity within the same geographic region. As Figure 4.4
suggests, the price cointegration differential between rice and wheat in the South is
significantly smaller than that between rice in the South and wheat in the North,
suggesting that my analysis in Figure 4.2 and 4.3 captures market integration rather
than idiosyncrasies of the commodities analysed. In this sub-sample, most market
pairs had direct access to a grain river such that the extent of price integration was
more substantial than in the full sample of Southern China. We can argue that the
higher share of market integration for rice as opposed to wheat in the South is due to
the fact that rice is the staple crop in this region.
40 The name of these prefectures can be checked in Appendix A.6.
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Figure 4.4 Cointegration of Rice and Wheat within South China
4.5 Conclusions
This Chapter analyses the extent and determinants of spatial grain market integration
in China during the prime of the Qing Dynasty, using monthly rice and wheat price
data across 211 prefectures between 1740 and 1820. Following the LOOP theoretical
framework, I applied pair-wise Engle-Granger cointegration test to examine the
strengths of grain price cointegration and co-movement. I examine the role of river
transport on market evolution in this pre-modern period, using GIS data on the
national-wide postal route and waterways network following the historical
geography literature.
My results comparing the Southern rice and Northern wheat markets strongly
indicate that the extent of market integration in Southern China was larger than in the
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North. The role of waterways transport and physiographic distribution in
heterogeneously shaping the pattern of China’s market performance has also been
quantified. Geographical determinants played an important role albeit dominated by
provincial boundary in market integration. One interesting question is triggered by
my results: under a unified political regime like Qing China, what was the driving
force behind the provincial border that seemed to have served to fragment the market?
Political “grain protectionism” at the provincial level can be one explanation. Qing
China’s integrated province hierarchy authorized the monopoly political power and
responsibility for grains storage to its provincial generals, which enabled and
encourage them to embargo the grain export for grain storage maximization. On the
other hand, without formal property right institutions, grain merchants would not
refuse to obey the imposed restriction since they need to cater the bureaucratic
organization to secure their property.
The Chapter sheds new light on the important question of how geography
and institutions shape the evolution of interregional trade in a pre-modern economy
that did not experience substantial technological progress. My results suggest that
the importance of transport cost has been exaggerated in its impact on historical
market evolution, and institutions overwhelmed geography on market integration.
However, this chapter’s results are not sufficient to conclude that China’s market
was fragmented although the strong provincial barrier has been identified. In this
Chapter, the pairwise cointegration methodology allows me to investigate the cross
section determinants of market integration in the long run. However, the time varied
size of missing value limited its extension on the time dimension since the power of
Enger-Granger cointegration test is changeable with respective to the ratio of
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missing value. Using the more advance panel cointegration methodology, next
chapter will allow analyzing the pattern of China’s market integration on the time
dimension.
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Chapter 5
Geography, Institutions and Market
Decline
5.1 Introduction and Motivation
This chapter examines the changes in grain market integration within China during
the middle period of the Qing Dynasty (1740-1820). In contrast to results in Chapter
4, which provide spatial comparison of market integration determinants, this chapter
provides a dynamic comparison between rice markets in Southern China and wheat
markets in Northern China. Applying novel panel time series methods and
conventional cross-section method, I provide robust evidence for continuous market
disintegration and fragmentation during the sample time period for markets in both
Southern and Northern China. The analysis shows the provincial borders rather than
the physiographic determinants shaped these patterns and drove market
fragmentation. My results suggest that China’s markets were not fully integrated in
spite of the unified political system during the Qing’s so-called economic golden era.
This chapter contributes to both the literatures on market integration and
economic history. One seminal question in world and Chinese economic history is
why China, in contrast to Western Europe, failed to industrialize. This is a question
about the origins of the ‘Great Divergence’, which has spawned a large and growing
literature (Brenner and Isett, 2002; Clark, 2008; Diamond, 1997; Elvin, 1973;
Huang, 2002; Hung, 2008; Landes, 2006; Lin, 1995; Pomeranz, 2000). As
introduced in Chapter 1, one candidate condition for industrialization has been the
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degree of market integration of an agricultural economy, providing sufficient
incentives to invest into industrialization. Shiue and Keller’s (2007) empirical
finding suggests that the performance of markets in China was comparable to
Western Europe’s on the eve of the Industrial Revolution, which supports
Pomeranz’s (2000) conjectures that both China and Europe’s institutional
frameworks and demographic patterns were equally favorable to growth in their
most advanced areas. However, my discussion in Section 2.4.2 argues that “well-
functioning” markets could not take root in Qing China, which is supported by my
empirical results in this chapter.
My previous results in Chapter 4 which suggest that provincial border played
a more dominant role as trade barrier than physiographic determinants on the market
evolution are not sufficient to conclude that China’s markets were fragmented by the
provincial boundaries. However, the combination of results in Chapters 4 and 5
provides a convincing argument that Qing China’s grain market was disintegrated
and fragmented along its provincial boundaries, which indicates that grain markets
had been shaped by bureaucratic intervention. This observation is not surprising. As
discussed in Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 4.2, the Qing state emphasized and maintained its
role in grain storage and re-distribution across the empire because its primary
concerns were food security and social stability.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on spatial analysis and regional
integration. I motivate my empirics with a simple theoretical model with a common
factor framework for a panel of grain price behavior, building on Deaton (1999). My
contribution here is to add a structure to the unobserved heterogeneity in the harvest
output equation, which allows us to relax the assumption that output and thus price
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behavior was not subject to global shocks or local spillover effects (‘cross-section
dependence’). Next I employ the Pesaran (2006, 2007) common correlated effects
methodology to investigate heterogeneous price convergence to the provincial and
regional mean, respectively. Here I make the most of the substantial time series
dimension of my data by estimating price convergence regressions using a 20-year
rolling window. My method allows me to quantify the statistical correlations
between heterogeneous price convergence and geographic proximity, which provides
a new and unique method to identify market fragmentation. In addition, my findings
suggest that the empirical extent of price convergence in one market is not sufficient
to judge whether this market constitutes a unified integrated market or not.
My results trigger a further question: Why did China’s market decline? The
answer to this question could help us to explore deeper why industrialization could
not take root in China. In my further analysis population growth is identified as
playing a minor role in the observed market disintegration: I adopt a cross-section
regression approach to disentangle trade cost determinants, which reveals that even
the dominant provincial border effect was only able to explain around 30% of total
trade cost. Since most of the potential geographical determinants have been
accounted for in the regression models, it is possible that the unexplained trade cost
gap is due to the impact of institutions.
This Chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the theoretical
framework for my panel analysis of price integration. The empirical results and
interpretation are provided in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 discusses and tests the possible
driving forces behind the process of market disintegration and fragmentation, which
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5.2 Methodologies
In the following section I set out the theoretical motivation and discuss the empirical
methodologies employed to investigate the dynamic nature and determinants of grain
price convergence in Qing China.
5.2.1 Theoretical Framework
This chapter focuses on the dynamic grain market performance in China. The
empirical work in this chapter is based on a framework developed in Chapter 4. I
start by replicating the functions and assumptions in Chapter 4. I begin with a price
model for an agricultural commodity within a single market with an inelastically
supplied harvest output ht, which follows a stochastic process characterized by the
cumulative distribution function )h, H).
)h, H) = Pr (ht+1+t | ht=h) (5.1)
I assume that shocks to harvest output are exogenous, determined by the
conditions in agricultural production, which in the absence of technological change
ultimately drive price behaviors. Here I maintain the assumption that there is no
grain storage, which will be relaxed in later analysis. All of the harvest output ht will
be consumed within each period. The local price at time t can then be written as a
function of output:
Pt = a +bht (5.2)
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where a(>0) and b(<0) are parameters. Because consumers are assumed to be the
only buyers in the market (no speculation), price behavior is only driven by
production behavior and harvests. It is assumed that harvest output follows a simple
AR(1) process as below:
ht+1 = Uht + Ht+1 (5.3)
where -1 < U, and the error term Ht is i.i.d with mean .
In equation (5.3), similar to Chapter 4, I maintain the assumption that U=1
following Shiue and Keller (2005, 2007) such that both harvest output and grain
prices follow a random walk process,
Pt+1 = Pt + ut+1 (5.4)
where ut+1 = bHt+1. From equations (5.3) and (5.4), price movements are entirely
determined by the random shock Ht+1 rather than technological progress in
agriculture. Consider an economy with many locations, n=1,…, N, where consumers
in all locations have the same preferences and all producers have the same
technology for grain production.
Thus far I have assumed that any shock to harvest output Ht+1 is location-
specific and I assumed that within locations these shocks are i.i.d. When moving
from the single price series in a single location to a panel of price series in N
locations, typically this i.i.d. assumption in the time dimension is extended to the
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panel dimension: Hi,t+1 ~ i.i.d. (µ i ı2). This distribution of shocks across locations
recognizes that some prefectures will be prone to negative shocks (e.g. locations
close to a river’s flood plain) whereas others will be prone to positive shocks (e.g.
locations within a safe basin secure from flooding), while on average across all
locations the impact of these shocks is zero: E[µ i] = 0. The econometric expression
for the independence of shocks across locations is ‘cross-section independence’. In
this chapter I relax this assumption of cross-section independence and allow shocks
to be correlated across locations. There are (at least) two sources for this type of
correlation: first, I allow for the presence of global shocks which affect all locations
within the economy, but to a different extent. For instance, the silver inflow from the
coastal areas affects the grain price in the economy but to different extent across
locations (Chen and Liu, 2009; Li, 2009; Shiue, 2004). Second, I allow for the
presence of local shocks and spillover effects which affect a small number of
locations which are perhaps geographically very close to each other or along the
same trade route. For example, between 1470 and 1900, there were a total of 249
officially recorded localized civil conflicts in China. Peasant revolts in particular
were closely related to agricultural harvest, and such revolts have typically been
suppressed swiftly by the central state (Jia, 2012). I model this cross-section
dependence property of harvest output by adopting a common factor framework
hi,t+1 = hi,t + Hi,t+1 (5.5)
where ft is a set of common factors representing global shocks (strong factors) and
ORFDOVKRFNVVSLOORYHUVZHDNIDFWRUVZLWKȜi the corresponding ‘factor loadings’ in
titiiti uf ,
'
,  OPH
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each location i; ui,t is white noise. This form of empirical framework has been very
popular in the recent panel time series literature (Bai and Ng, 2002, 2004; Bai, 2009;
Eberhardt et al., 2013; Eberhardt and Teal, 2013; Pesaran, 2006) and in line with the
analysis in Chudik et al. (2011). I can assume a finite number of global factors and
an infinite number of local factors for the empirical setup.
The common factor framework also allows me to relax the assumption of no
storage. The agricultural price function with storage would be complicated since it is
difficult to gauge the interaction between expected price and current storage. Instead
I model grain storage as an unobserved common shock in a future period involves in
factors ft. In the current period, storage is part of current consumption, but in the
future it will become a shock to the price in the local market or the other markets
through grain trade if the stored grain is traded. In period t for prefecture i, the local
price is already determined by local supply and demand in the market, factoring in
the presence of storage. In this period i’s grain supply can be increased by sale of
stored grain in i or in its trading partner prefecture j, which will lead to a reduction in
the local price in i. In the next section, I will link this common factor framework
with my panel unit root econometric methodology.
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5.2.2 Panel Price Convergence
In this chapter I make use of novel methods developed in the recent panel time series
literature which allow studying the price behavior in diverse sets of prefectures in a
very flexible way which furthermore accounts for the heterogeneous impact of
global price shocks such as droughts, rebellions or locust plagues. In addition the
long time series dimension of the data allows me to study the evolution of price
convergence or divergence over time.
My starting point is a simple convergence regression model familiar from the
study of per capita income convergence across countries in the empirical growth
literature (Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Bernard and Jones, 1996; Lee, Pesaran
and Smith, 1997; Rodrik, forthcoming). A pooled convergence regression model
imposes the assumption that all countries converge to the same long-run growth path,
which is implicitly given by construction. The equivalent interpretation in a pooled
price convergence regression model for our data would be that all prefectures
converge toward the same long-run equilibrium price level. An example of this
approach is the analysis of the LOOP in the European car market by Goldberg and
Verboven (2005) who apply a pooled panel unit root test (Levin and Lin, 1992). In
the following I allow for heterogeneous price convergence by prefectures to the same
long-run price level at the (provincial) regional level (North for wheat, South for
rice). Econometrically, my Mean Group estimates of price convergence (see below)
are unbiased if our assumption of heterogeneity is false, but they are inefficient.
I begin with my analysis of heterogeneous convergence to the provincial
price level:
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(5.6)
where the relative log price level is defined as and തܲPt is the
respective provincial average for prefecture i in time t (on average I have 15 and 12
prefectures per province in our Northern and Southern regions, respectively). The
dependent variable in the so-called ‘Dickey-Fuller regression’ equation (5.6) is the
first difference of this relative log-price level and the sum on the right-hand side
represents lags of this difference included to capture the short-run behavior. If an
individual price series in location i converges to its provincial average, then LPP
iE
will be negative significant. Under the null of no convergence, LPP
iE is equal to zero.
In (5.6), Di captures prefecture-level time-invariant heterogeneity which will help
explain price differentials across diverse locations within the Southern and Northern
regions of China. The above empirical equation yields a total of N heterogeneous
convergence coefficients and I follow the standard in the panel time series literature
(Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Pesaran, 2006) to report the Mean Group estimate of this
set of coefficients:
(5.7)
where wi represents a set of prefecture-specific weights applied in the computation of
the average to reduce the impact of outliers.41
41 In practice I employ robust regression models to estimate these weights (Hamilton, 1992).
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Alternatively, if all individual markets were jointly integrated in a single
unified market within Chinese regions (South and North), prefectural price series
would converge to the regional average price:
(5.8)
where the relative log price level is defined as LPRit = ln (Pit / തܲRt ) and തܲRt is the
regional average price at time t; the dependent variable is the first difference of this
relative log price level, and the lagged differences once again capture the short-run
behavior. If the individual price series in prefecture i converges to the regional
average, then LPR
iE would be negative significant. The Mean Group estimate can be
constructed in analogy to equation (5.7):
(5.9)
My empirical implementation thus far resembles a standard first generation
panel unit root test such as the Maddala and Wu (1999) or Im, Pesaran and Shin
(2002) tests which were used in previous studies of market integration (e.g. Fan and
Wei, 2006). Significant progress in this econometric literature has been made since
these methods were introduced, with a strong focus on dealing with the biasing
impact of unobserved time-varying heterogeneity in the panel, commonly referred to
as cross-section dependence (Bai and Ng, 2002; Pesaran, 2007), arising from global
shocks and local spillover effects. To capture the impact of these shocks, we follow
the approach by Pesaran (2007) and augment the prefecture-level regression with
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cross-section averages of the dependent and independent variables. These averages
are constructed using province-level data and regional level data in the two
implementations for province-level price convergence and regional price
convergence, respectively. Specifically, and are the provincial
average of LPPi,t-1DQG¨LPPi,t-l respectively while and are the
regional average of LPRi,t-1 DQG¨LPRi,t-l respectively. This aside I include centered
seasonal dummies (i.e. Mc)
42 to capture the effect of heterogeneous harvest seasons
across China’s different climatic areas. Estimation equations (5.6) and (5.8) are thus
altered to
captures ti f
'O (5.6’)
captures ti f
'O (5.8’)
In equations (5.6) and (5.8) as well as their cross-section average augmented
versions, the number of lags pi are determined by the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) in each regression. In equation (5.6’) and (5.8’), the introduction of cross-
section average variables allow me to relax the assumption of cross-section
42 The construction of centered (orthogonalized) seasonal dummy variables follows Juselius (2006),
which shift the mean of price without contributing to the trend. I construct centred seasonal dummies
for each month. For example, for January, Mc=1= (11/12) if C is equal to 1, otherwise, Mc=1= (-1/12).
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independence by acting as de facto placeholders for the unobserved common factors
with heterogeneous factor loadings ti f
'O introduced in the theoretical discussion
above. As the time dimension of my data is very long (monthly data for up to 81
years), instead of analyzing price convergence over the entire time horizon in a
single regression model I investigate a 20-year rolling window (a maximum of 240
monthly observations) so as to capture any structural change in the convergence
process over time. My main results are then presented in graphical form.
5.3 Results
Following the methodology discussed above, I present the Mean Group price
convergence results. I also run cross-section regressions to determine the extent of
any price convergence and the effects of geography and institutions over the entire
time period.
5.3.1 Market Disintegration
In this section I present the results from heterogeneous convergence regressions,
which allow me to observe the dynamics of price convergence in Qing Dynasty
China.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 plot the (Common Correlated Effects) Mean Group
estimates of the 20-year rolling window for provincial convergence (based on
equation (5.7)) and regional convergence (based on equation (5.9)) in China’s two
regions, respectively – both results account for cross-section dependence in the price
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(convergence) evolution. Recall that the larger (in absolute value) the provincial
(regional) Mean Group estimate, the faster prefectural prices converge to the
provincial (regional) average price. My first observation is that provincial
convergence is faster than regional convergence in all periods investigated. The
interpretation of this result is that the force for price arbitrage was stronger for
nearby markets as bilateral trade costs were smaller. In Chapter 4, it has been
robustly shown that provincial borders seem to represent substantial trade barrier for
price convergence in Southern and Northern China. The second common feature of
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 is that both the provincial and regional convergence estimates
follow an upward trend over all periods, which implies both provincial and regional
markets became less integrated over time.
Accounting for observed and unobserved heterogeneity across prefectures,
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 suggest that the grain markets in Qing Dynasty China before the
19th century suffered a process of prolonged market disintegration. I estimate the
rolling robust Mean Group convergence coefficients for each province separately, in
both the South and North China samples. The findings, presented in in Appendix
B.3, confirm that the trends in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 are not driven by some extreme
outlier province(s). It is worth noting that the plots in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 do not per
se imply that there is no unified regional market within either South or North China.
Provincial convergence would be stronger than regional convergence even under the
unified integrated market as trade cost is always a positive function of bilateral
distance.
In Figure 5.3, I rearrange the plots in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 to compare market
integration between South and North China. The left graph (a) shows that provincial
152
price convergence is more pronounced for rice than wheat, while the right graph (b)
yields a similar conclusion for the comparison of regional convergence estimates.
These findings further confirm our conclusions in Chapter 3 that market integration
in South China was superior to that of the North in our period of analysis. These
disintegration findings during the economic golden era may be driven by the dynasty
decline, which can be associated with increasing population pressure, more local
revolt, more corruption in the political system and less bureaucracy efficiency.
Figure 5.1 Provincial/Regional Convergence (South Rice)
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Figure 5.2 Provincial/Regional Convergence (North Wheat)
Figure 5.3 Provincial/Regional Price Convergence (South vs North)
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5.3.2 Unified or Fragmented Market Integration
Despite the results in Section 5.3.1 strongly suggesting that Southern China’s grain
markets were more integrated than those of northern China, these results do not
suffice to show that Southern China, which comprised the most commercialized
areas in the country, had a single unified (integrated) market in the pre-modern era. It
is uncertain whether the extent of price co-movement within the entire region (either
Southern China or Northern China) was actually driven by one single unified
regional market mechanism. The results in this section shed some light on this issue,
which concerns whether the grain markers were fragmented at the provincial or
regional level.
Four geographic variables for trade network analysis are constructed
following Shimbel (1953) and Hansen (1959). The regional accessibility of
prefecture i, RAi, is defined as the sum of postal distances to all other prefectures
within the region (South China or North China), while the provincial accessibility of
prefecture i, PAi, is defined as the sum of the postal distances to all other prefectures
within the same province. To capture the potential demand for grain in prefecture i,
regional potential demand (RPDi) and provincial potential demand (PPDi) are
constructed as the sums of population-weighted postal distance to all other
prefectures within the region and province, respectively, using population density
data for 1776. Prefectural population density data for 1776 and 1820 are available in
Cao (2000), and as 1776 is around the median year of my sample I adopt the
population density for this year as a proxy for the prefectural average population
density over my data period.
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Regional accessibility: (5.10)
Provincial accessibility: (5.11)
Regional potential demand:
(5.12)
Provincial potential demand:
(5.13)
I use the following cross-section regressions to investigate whether provincial
convergence is significantly correlated with prefectural accessibility:
iii
PALPP
i PA HFZDE  )ln(Ö (5.14)
where the dependent variable is the provincial convergence estimate for each
prefecture from equation (5.6’) for the whole 81-year period; Fi denotes province
dummies, which account for unobserved heterogeneity across provinces. If PAZ is
positively significant, it favors the hypothesis that there was one unified integrated
provincial market to drive the observed provincial convergence. In analogy to
equation (5.14), equation (5.15) emphasizes the influence of geographical
distribution on regional convergence. If there exists one unified integrated regional
market, RAiZ is expected to be positively significant.
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iii
RALPR
i RA HFZDE  )ln(Ö (5.15)
As a robustness check, I use potential demand PPDi and RPDi to replace PAi
and RAi in equations (5.14) and (5.15), respectively. It is expected that, for each
prefecture, regional (provincial) price convergence should be negatively correlated
with its regional (provincial) grain potential demand if a single unified regional
(provincial) market drives the price co-movement. To observe the dynamic changes
of PAZ and RAZ , I again use a 20-year rolling window for equations (5.14) and (5.15)
and present results graphically.
First, however, I provide the results for the entire time period. The results for
the provincial convergence analysis in equation (5.14) are reported in Table 5.1, in
which the dependent variable is the estimate LPPiEÖ from regression (5.6’). The
results in columns 1 and 3 confirm that an individual location’s geographical
accessibility within the provincial network contributes to its provincial-level price
convergence in both Northern China and Southern China. The results for regional
convergence analysis in equation (5.15) are reported in Table 5.2, in which the
dependent variable is the estimate LPRiEÖ from equation (5.8’). The regional
accessibility variable (i.e. ln(RAi)) is uncorrelated with the regional convergence
speed both for rice markets (South) in column 1 and wheat markets (North) in
column 3. These results indicate that rice markets (wheat markets) in South (North)
China were not integrated as a whole as there is no evidence that one individual
market’s geographical accessibility within the region contributes to its regional price
convergence. In columns 2 and 4 of Tables 5.1 and 5.2, I use the provincial
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(regional) potential demand for grain instead of provincial (regional) accessibility,
but conclusions remain qualitatively identical.
Table 5.1 Provincial Integration or Fragmentation
(1740-1820)
Dependent Variable:
Rice Wheat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(PAi) 0.027 0.027
(0.0114)** (0.0073)***
ln(PPDi) -0.0169 -0.012
(0.004)*** (0.006)*
Fi yes yes yes yes
Obs. 131 131 80 80
R
2 0.2383 0.2815 0.3651 0.3119
Note: I omit reporting fixed effects, the constant. Robust standard errors
provided in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10%
significance level respectively
Table 5.2 Regional Integration or Fragmentation
(1740-1820)
Dependent Variable:
Rice Wheat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(RAi) -0.016 0.0066
(0.0155) (0.0053)
ln(RPDi) 0.004 -0.0018
(0.0077) (0.0038)
Fi yes yes yes yes
Obs. 131 131 80 80
R
2 0.4029 0.3972 0.2123 0.2027
Note: I omit reporting fixed effects and the constant. Robust standard
errors provided in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10%
significance level respectively
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The estimated change of PATZ and RATZ over time, based on equations (5.14)
and (5.15) but using a 20-year rolling window, is reported in Figures 5.4 and 5.5 for
South and North China, respectively. In both figures, solid circles (squares) represent
statistical significance for PATZÖ ( RATZÖ ) at the 5 percent level while hollow circles
(squares) indicate statistically insignificant estimates. In Figure 5.4 for rice markets,
provincial accessibility (in circle) only appears to statistically significantly correlate
with provincial convergence around 1780 while regional accessibility (in square) is
insignificant in virtually all periods. Since every point represents a 20-year window,
these plots suggest that rice markets were only integrated within their respective
provinces in Southern region during a 30-year period between 1755 and 1786 and
there is no evidence to support a view that all the prefecture markets have been
integrated as one unified market in South China. 43 From the 1790s onwards the
correlation between provincial accessibility and price convergence disappears
entirely, which coincides with the period of advanced market disintegration
identified in our analysis in Section 5.3.1. The negative correlation around 1800 can
be explained by the large-scale uprising the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804),
which damaged the agricultural production in the grain surplus provinces (i.e.
Sichuan and Hubei Province). Consequently, more long-distance grain transfer has
been arranged by the state to recover the disaster area, which strengthens the price
co-movement among the long distance rather than the short distance.
Figure 5.5 features the plots for wheat markets in North China, where
similarly the correlation between provincial geographical determinants and
43 Although there is one significant (i.e. solid) point for the regional level in Figure 5.4, it is negative,
which still cannot support the existence of single unified market as the expected sign is positive to
capture the positive relationship between trade cost and trade distance.
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provincial price convergence (in circle) disappears at the end of the 18th century
while there is only highly episodic evidence to support the existence of unified
integrated market at the regional level (series in square). The provincial correlation
was significant at the beginning but was insignificant the mid of 18th century. The
disappearance of provincial integrated markets between 1760s and 1780s may be
explained by the frequent military action during the mid-18th century. The impact of
the military was much greater in Gansu of North China than in Coastal, Central,
South, and Southwest China, because of Gansu's strategic location on the supply
route to the garrisons occupying Central Asia. Continual military demands placed
great stress on a fragile agrarian regime (Perdue, 1992).
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Figure 5.4 Geographical Determinants and Convergence (South)
Figure 5.5 Geographical Determinants and Convergence (North)
Combining these results I would argue that there is strong evidence in favour
of fragmented markets in both Southern and Northern China. There are two wider
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between the economic concept of market integration and the empirical cointegration
test. Even though the results in Chapter 3 and Section 5.3.1 conclude that South
China was more integrated, this does in no way imply that South China had a unified
integrated market. It is possible that the high level of integration in Southern rice
markets was mainly driven by short-distance within-province trade rather than long-
distance inter-provincial trade. Figure 3.9 in Chapter 3, and Figures 4.2 and 4.3 in
Chapter 4, confirmed that Southern market integration was apparently superior to
that of the North for short-distance pairs. From this insight I can conclude more
generally that the extent of integration in one market is not sufficient to judge
whether this constitutes a unified integrated market or not. Secondly, my finding that
South China’s market was fragmented also sheds new light on the arguments
regarding China’s economic system on the eve of the Industrial Revolution. Many
economic historians argue that China’s unified stable political structure, in
comparison to Europe’s substantial and prolonged political fragmentation, should
signify a distinct advantage in developing a unified integrated market. My results
however suggest that China’s market performance in its pre-modern period may
have been significantly over-stated.
5.3.3 Physiographic or Political Boundaries?
In the previous section, my findings suggest that both Southern and Northern
markets were integrated at the provincial level (for some sub-periods) but
fragmented at the regional level. It is still possible that the inter-provincial
fragmentation (or intra-provincial integration) observed was driven by physiographic
boundaries. Qing China’s provincial boundaries did not coincide but interlocked
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with the Skinner’s physiographic boundaries, which allows me to conduct a natural
experiment to identify the role of physiographic boundaries on the process of market
disintegration and fragmentation. This section only focuses on the South rice
markets.
I begin with analysis of heterogeneous price convergence to the
macroregional level by modifying the regression (5.6’) as follows:
(5.16)
where the relative log price level is defined as and ܵ ҧSt is the
respective macroregional average for prefecture i in time t (on average I have 13
prefectures per macroregion in Southern regions) adopting the Skinner classification.
The dependent variable in equation (5.16) is the first difference of this relative log-
price level and the sum on the right-hand side represents lags of this difference
included to capture the short-run behavior. If an individual price series in location i
converges to its macroregional average, then LPS
iE will be negative significant. Under
the null of no convergence, LPS
iE is equal to zero.
In (5.16), Di captures prefecture-level time-invariant heterogeneity which will
help explain price differentials across diverse locations within Southern China.
iS
tLPS 1 and i
S
tLPS 1' are the macroregional averages of LPSi,t-1 DQG ¨LPSi,t-l
respectively, which capture the unobserved common factors driving price
convergence. I include centered seasonal dummies Mc to capture the effect of
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heterogeneous harvest seasons across China’s different climatic areas. The above
empirical equation yields a total of N heterogeneous convergence coefficients and I
report the Mean Group estimate of this set of coefficients:
(5.17)
where wi represents a set of prefecture-specific weights applied in the computation of
the average to reduce the impact of outliers.
Figure 5.6 plot the (Common Correlated Effects) Mean Group estimates of
the 20-year rolling window for provincial convergence and macroregional
convergence in South China respectively – both results account for cross-section
dependence. The first observation is that both the provincial and macroregional
convergence estimates follow an upward and similar trend over all time periods,
which implies within-macroregional markets became less integrated over the entire
period. This finding confirms that South China experienced a process of market
disintegration. Although provincial boundaries did not follow the Skinner’s
physiographic boundaries, there was a large proportion of overlap between these two
spatial distributions (see Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4). The second feature of Figure 5.6 is
that, in the time dimension, the extent of price convergence at the macroregional
level was similar but somewhat less than that at the provincial level, which could be
driven by the spatial overlap between these two classifications. Until now, it is
unclear whether provincial or physiographic borders contributed most to the
fragmentation of Southern markets.
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Figure 5.6 Macroregional/Provincial Convergence (South Rice)
In analogy to the network analysis conducted in Section 5.3.2, I construct a
geographical variable for macroregional accessibility of prefecture i, SAi, defined as
the sum of postal route distances to all other prefectures within the same
macroregion. I use the following cross-section regressions to investigate whether
macroregional convergence is significantly correlated with macroregional
accessibility:
iii
SALPS
i SA HNZDE  )ln(Ö (5.18)
where the dependent variable is the macroregional convergence estimate for each
prefecture from equation (5.16) for the entire 81-year period; Ni denotes macroregion
dummies, which account for unobserved heterogeneity across macroregions. If SAZ
is positive significant, it favours the hypothesis that there was a single unified
integrated macroregional market to drive the observed macroregional convergence.
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First, I am interested in the results for the entire time period, compared with
those for provincial convergence. The results for the provincial convergence analysis
are reported of columns 1 and 2 in Table 5.3, while the results for the macroregional
convergence are in columns 3 and 4. Based on Figure 2.4(b) in Section 2.5.6, Agri
denotes crop area dummies for prefecture i to capture the impact of heterogeneous
climate and harvest time, which is added in each model. In columns 1 and 2,
controlling for provincial fixed effects, macroregional fixed effects and cropping
pattern fixed effects, provincial accessibility ln(PA)i is still significant at the 10%
level, which confirms that an individual location’s geographical accessibility within
the provincial network contributes to its provincial-level price convergence in
Southern China. However, LPSiEÖ is insignificant in columns 3 and 4. Although in
Figure 5.6, the average macroregional convergence was comparable with the average
provincial convergence, the individual macroregional convergence was not
determined by geographical accessibility within the macroregional network. The
contradiction implies that the similarity between provincial and macroregional
convergence was driven by their spatial overlap, and that (political) provincial
borders rather than physiographic borders were the dominant factor in market
fragmentation of Southern China. The change of SATZ over time, based on equations
(5.18) but using a 20-year rolling window, is reported in Figures 5.7. The consistent
statistical insignificance of SATZ suggests that Southern prefectures were not
integrated as a unified market at the macroregion level.
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Table 5.3 Fragmentation: Geography or Institutions
(only South, 1740-1820)
Dependent
Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(PAi) 0.023 0.021
(0.012)* (0.0125)*
ln(SAi) 0.012 0.015
(0.011) (0.014)
Pro. yes yes No yes
Ski. No yes yes yes
Agr. yes yes yes yes
Obs. 131 131 131 131
R
2 0.283 0.315 0.242 0.295
Note: I omit reporting fixed effects and the constant. Robust standard
errors provided in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10%
significance level respectively
Figure 5.7 Macroregional Determinants and Convergence (South)
SA
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5.3.4 Robustness Check
In this section, I carried out two robust checks to lend support to the quantitative
conclusion that China’s markets were undergoing disintegration during the given
time period.
Number of Prefectures with Significant Convergence
First, in Figure 5.8, I report the number of statistically significant (at the 5% level)
prefectural convergence coefficients (i.e. LPPiEÖ or LPRiEÖ ) with a 20-year rolling
window for regression (5.6’) and (5.8’). It is expected that prices in fewer prefectures
would significantly converge to the provincial (or regional) average price if markets
became more and more disintegrated at the provincial (or regional) level. Since there
are more prefectures in the sample for South China, the number of prefectures
required for significant convergence is larger for the South than the North. There are
two common features across both regions in Figure 5.8. First, the number of
significant prefectures for provincial and regional convergence decreased over time,
which convincingly supports the view that China’s markets after the 1740s witnessed
a process of disintegration. Second, more prefectures statistically significantly
converged to the provincial rather than the regional mean price. This finding
confirms that China’s markets were more integrated at the provincial level.
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Figure 5.8 Number of Prefecture with Significant Convergence
Additional Common Factor
Following Pesaran et al.(2013), in addition to the cross-section averages for the rice
price in levels and first differences, I add the mean provincial and regional wheat
price (in lagged levels and first differences according to the lag structure of the
variable of interest) in the models for rice prices in (5.6’) and (5.8’) to further
capture the unobserved common factors:
additional unobserved common factors (constructed using wheat prices)
(5.19)
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(5.20)
The basic idea in regressions (5.19) and (5.20) is to exploit additional
information across the same prefectures over the same time series (i.e. wheat price)
in order to capture the unobserved common factors. The common shocks driving rice
prices are also affecting wheat prices in the South, and the methodology applied here
exploits this commonality. This method requires prefectural data for rice as well as
wheat prices in the same period. This additional data set was already used in Section
4.4.5 and comprises 77 prefectures in Southern China. The Mean Group estimate
based on the estimator of regression (5.19) and (5.20) is reported graphically with a
20-year rolling window in Figure 5.9. These findings further confirm that, in South
China, provincial convergence is faster than regional convergence in all periods
investigated while both provincial and regional markets became less integrated over
time.
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Figure 5.9 Provincial/Regional Convergence with Additional Common
Factor (only South)
5.4 Why Did Markets Decline?
To the best of my knowledge this study is the first to identify and quantify the
disintegration process of Chinese grain markets during the 18th century. There is
however a small literature that qualitatively or quantitatively analyses the decline of
market efficiency in Qing Dynasty China during this period. Huang (2002) argues
that the seemingly advanced market conditions in the Yangtze Delta during the pre-
modern era were driven by a deterioration of the land-labor ratio, accompanied by
lower capital intensity per unit of labor and lower returns per workday, which is
described as ‘involutionary growth’. During the 18th century, the cultivation of sweet
potatoes sustained population growth in China as a cheap substitute for grain among
the poor who did not possess land for crop cultivation (Chen, 2003; Jia, 2012). The
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popularity of sweet potato can on one hand be considered as a signal of dramatic
demographic pressure on the Qing China.
On the other hand, to supply sufficient food for a fast-growing population,
overuse of irrigation and excessive land reclamation had led to serious soil erosion
and environmental degradation, which affected the grain output as well as river
transportability (Chen, 2003; Gong, 1993; Zhang and Hui, 2006; Zhou, 2006). The
popularity of sweet potato in the valleys and hillsides was another main contributor
of soil erosion. Although sweet potato is extremely drought-resistant and grows quite
easily, its roots dry up the soil and cause serious soil erosion and river siltation
(Zhang and Hui, 2006).
It is quite likely that the unprecedented population growth as well as the
deterioration of river transportability drove down the volumes of grains traded,
which affected the grain market performance. In the following I consider a number
of alternative hypotheses which have been advanced in this literature and submit
them to some empirical testing.
5.4.1 Population Growth?
This section tests the statistic correlation between population growth and the change
of provincial price convergence, and attempts to identify whether population growth
was the driving force behind market disintegration. Rising local grain demand from
an increasing population would substantially reduce the exportable grain volumes
available from grain-surplus prefectures such that trade grain volumes would shrink
over time. If this hypothesis were correct, we would expect a negative correlation
between prefectural population growth and the provincial or regional grain price
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convergence term, especially for surplus prefectures (i.e. grain export prefectures).
To test this hypothesis in the case of provincial convergence I adopt the following
regression model:
(5.21)
where and are provincial convergence estimates from the
regression (5.6’) in Section 5.2.2, and PoPDi,1820 and PoPDi,1776 is the prefectural
population density in year 1820 and 1776, where the former are selected so as to
match the available data for the latter. All results are reported in Table 5.4. There is
no statistically significant evidence that population growth was positively correlated
with a shift in price convergence over time. For Northern China, the signs are even
negative. In Columns 3 and 6, the coefficients for the sample of grain surplus
prefectures are still insignificant. In general, I cannot find support for the hypothesis
that population growth drove down the extent of market integration.
Table 5.4 Population Density Growth and Market Disintegration
Dependent Variable:
South Rice North Wheat
all deficit surplus all deficit surplus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PoPDi, 1820 - PoPDi, 1776 0.0004 0.0002 0.0012 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Fi Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 117 38 60 70 23 35
R
2
0.2143 0.3906 0.1565 0.3981 0.1816 0.1699
Note:We omit reporting fixed effects and the constant. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses; ***,
** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively
iiii
LPP
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5.4.2 Trade Cost Determinants
The finding of market disintegration implies that trade costs experienced an upward
trend. The following analysis focuses on the determinants of trade costs and how this
relationship varied over time. Trade cost (T) between markets i and j can be divided
into two parts: variable cost (i.e. distance-related cost) and fixed cost (i.e. distance-
unrelated cost). Distance-related costs (V) are related to the distance travelled (e.g.
transport cost, information cost) and distance-unrelated cost (F) are other costs not
related to distance, including storage cost, loading cost or costs related to a border
effect.
Tij = Vij + Fij (5.22)
If there exists a long-run trade link between two prefectures i and j
(integrated market pair), according to the law of one price, total trade cost Tij
between two prefectures for a homogeneous commodity in period t equals their price
differential:
Tij, t= Pi(h)t – Pj(l)t, where Pi(h)t > Pj(l)t (5.23)
where subscript h (or l) in the parentheses identifies the market with the higher
(lower) price in each pair. In equation (5.22) above, distance-related costs Vij equal
cost per kilometre (C) multiplied by distance in kilometres (Disij) between i and j,
i.e.,
Vij = C× Disij (5.24)
Combining (5.22) and (5.24) results in
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Tij = C× Disij + Fij (5.25)
In equation (5.25), C is the parameter representing the relationship that
describes how trade cost Tij increases with changes in the distance Disij between
PDUNHWSDLUVLH& ¨7ij¨'LVij. In regression (5.26) below, the dependent variable
Tij,t is defined as the price differential of the same grain commodity in the same
period, i.e. Tij, t= Pi(h)t – Pj(l)t, where I impose that convention that Pi(h)t> Pj(l)t in each
pair ij to assure positive T Regression (5.26) empirically examines the determinants
of trade cost only for the cointegrated prefecture pairs determined in Chapter 4 since
cointegration indicates a long-run trade link between the two markets. Thus
tijjik
k
ktljtljthithi
m
mtlj
m
mthiijijijtij
uMPPPP
PPDisRiverDisT
,
12
2
1),(1),(61),(1),(5
11
1
),(4
11
1
),(3210,
**)/()/(
)11/ln()11/ln()ln()ln()ln(
''
u 
¦
¦¦
 

 

 

TTEE
EEEEE
(5.26)
Similar to regression in Section 4.4.2, Disij is the postal route distance
between i and j ; Riverij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if two prefectures have access
to the same grain river; the aim of the interaction term Riverij × Disij is to provide
insights into the relative distance-related cost of land versus river transport; Mk
captures monthly seasonality while ** jiT captures the seasonality across different
cropping patterns. The 11/
11
1
),(¦
 

m
mthiP and 11/
11
1
),(¦
 

m
mtljP terms are the moving
average price of the past 11 months44, which capture the past price level for the high
and low price prefectures, respectively so as to allow me to focus on the trade cost
determinants in the current time period; to avoid endogeneity bias, the lag of price
44 To deal with the missing value issue, I set the moving average as the missing value if there are
more than 4 missing values in the past 11 months.
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change ratios )/( 1),(1),( ' thithi PP and )/( 1),(1),( ' tljtlj PP are included to capture short
run local shocks on the high- and low-price prefecture, respectively. To avoid bias
from heterogeneity in the relationship over time, the regression is run separately for
each year. For the short run analysis, the moving average of past price and the lag of
price change ratio capture the unobserved heterogeneity across prefectures such that
I do not add prefecture fixed effects in regression (5.26).
Regression (5.26) can be rearranged as follows:
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(5.27)
where (
1
ÖE + 2ÖE ×Riverij ) represents the elasticity of trade cost Tij,t on the distance
Disij, i.e.,
1
ÖE  2ÖE ×Riverij  ¨7ij /Tij¨'LVij/Disij ¨7ij¨'LVij) × ( Disij / Tij) (5.28)
Substitute C ¨7ij¨'LVij into equation (5.28) to yield
1
ÖE  2ÖE ×Riverij = C×( Disij / Tij) = (C× Disij) / Tij = (Tij – Fij) / Tij (5.29)
Equation (5.29) implies that the sum of the coefficients
1
ÖE  2ÖE ×Riverij
indicate the proportion of total trade cost which accrues to distance-related cost. The
larger
1
ÖE  2ÖE ×Riverij the larger is the share of distance-related cost in the total
trade cost. If
1
ÖE  2ÖE ×Riverij =0, there are at least two alternative but opposite
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interpretations: 1) C=0 such that the distance-related cost is equal to 0, which implies
that the transport system is highly developed; 2) C>0 but the denominator Tij
approaches infinity, which implies that markets are highly disintegrated.
Figure 5.10 reports the annual coefficients for
1
ÖE and 2ÖE where solid circles
represent significant
2
ÖE (for ln(Dis)ij× Riverij) at the 5% level. Although most 2ÖE are
significant, the magnitudes are small compared with the
1
ÖE (for ln(Dis)ij). This
result suggests that river transport played a significant but small role in reducing
trade cost. The small impact of river on the trade cost implies that the deterioration
of river transportability during the sample period cannot be the main driving force of
market decline. Since the magnitudes of
2
ÖE are small, the share of distance-related
cost (i.e. (C× Disij) / Tij) is mainly determined by 1ÖE . From 1741 to 1820, most of
1
ÖE estimates deviate around 0.1 between 0 and 0.2 except for occasional spikes.
This implies that 10% of total trade cost is accounted for by distance (i.e. distance-
related cost) in any given period. The results in Section 5.3.1 indicate that Southern
China experienced market disintegration over time, which implies that the average
Tij increased over time. Thus, the stable ratio of variable to total trade cost suggests
that distance-related cost (C× Disij) increased proportionally with Tij.
If distance-related cost is only able to explain 10% of total trade cost, this
implies that around 90% of trade cost was attributed to the distance-unrelated costs.
In equation (5.30), distance-unrelated cost is defined as being made up three
components: distance-unrelated cost related to provincial borders (i.e. institutional
barriers), distance-unrelated cost related to the Skinner macroregion borders (i.e.
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natural barrier) and an unknown distance-unrelated cost component which may relate
to bureaucratic (in)efficiency or some other factors which cannot be observed.
Tij = C× Disij+ Fij,pro+ Fij,ski + Fij,unknow (5.30)
Figure 5.10 Distance-related Cost Determinants
I re-define my regression model in (5.26) and add dummy variables to
capture the fixed border effects and analyse their relative proportion in total trade
cost. Proij =1 if there is a provincial border on the postal route between a pair of
prefectures; Skiij =1 if there is a Skinner macroregion border between the same two
prefectures. To capture potential heterogeneity in distance-related cost, the distance
terms ln(Dis)ij and its interaction term Riverij× ln(Dis)ij are further interacted with a
series of distance group dummies. This yields
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(5.31)
1 if (k-1)×200km < Disijk×200km (k=1,2,…9)
0 if otherwise
In regression (5.31), pEÖ and sEÖ are the elasticites of trade cost with respect to
the border dummies, i.e.,
pEÖ  ¨7ij / Tij¨3URij ¨7ij¨3URij) / Tij (5.32)
sEÖ  ¨7ij / Tij¨6NLij ¨7ij¨6NLij) / Tij (5.33)
In equation (5.30) above, Fij,pro is the parameter representing how trade cost
FKDQJHVE\WKHDSSHDUDQFHRIDSURYLQFLDOERUGHU LH¨7ij ¨3URij, while, similarly,
Fij,skiLVGHILQHGDV¨7ij¨6NLij such that pEÖ ( sEÖ ) in equation (5.34) ((5.35)) express
the cost share of a provincial (physiographic) border:
pEÖ = Fij,pro / Tij (5.34)
sEÖ = Fij,ski / Tij (5.35)
Figure 5.11 reports the annual estimates of Ep and Es from 1741 to 1820. The
solid triangle points indicate a statistically significant pEÖ at the 5% level. The pEÖ
generally fall between 0.1 and 0.3 following a concave trend (fractional-polynomial
prediction). This range implies that provincial borders explain 10-30% of total trade
^ kijGDis ,_
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cost for inter-provincial trade. Since Tij is assumed to increase over the whole period
(due to the empirical finding of market disintegration), the increasing trend of pEÖ
(i.e. Fij,pro / Tij) before 1780 suggests that Fij,pro grew even faster than Tij, while the
decreasing trend after 1780 indicates that Fij,pro grew slower than Tij. The provincial
border effect thus played a significant role in the observed market disintegration until
1780. However, after 1780, its impact is ambiguous.
In terms of the physiographic border effect, sEÖ shows a marginally
decreasing trend and its magnitudes are always smaller than pEÖ . It appears that the
trade cost impact of geographic barriers is significantly lower than the influence of
(political) provincial borders. Before 1780, the proportion of trade cost explained by
physiographic borders moved steadily between 0 and 20%. However, after 1780, the
significance of sEÖ vanishes, which indicates that only a tiny share of trade cost was
related to physiographic barriers. In the final 10 years this parameter became
significant again but negative, which is difficult to explain and may be driven by the
presence of highly fragmented markets.
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Figure 5.11 Distance-unrelated Cost Determinants
Adding up the estimated annual coefficients in Figures 5.10 and 5.11, even
the sum of the maximum estimates for distance-related cost, capturing both
provincial and physiographic border effects, would only explain about 50% of total
trade cost Tij. This means that on average at least 50% of trade cost comes from
unobserved distance-unrelated costs. Over the entire sample period, the stable ratio
of distance-related cost to total trade cost (i.e. Riveru 21 ÖÖ EE ) suggests that
distance-related cost was increasing until 1820, which is one plausible cause of
market fragmentation. However, the importance of distance-related cost (including
transport cost) has been overestimated in previous work since it was only able to
explain around 10% of the price differentials. The impact of river transport on trade
cost is statistically significant but not dominant. The provincial border effect played
a significant role on market disintegration until 1780. However, after 1780, the
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decreasing trend of
pEÖ and the insignificant sEÖ unambiguously suggest that unknown
distance-unrelated cost were the main driving force behind the increasing trade cost
Tij. What constituted these unknown distance-unrelated costs? What happened in
1780 to trigger this pattern observed in the results? Most historians suggest that 1780
was the end of the most prosperous period of the Qianlong regime. It is possible that
increasing bureaucratic inefficiency and a decrease of central power held at the
imperial court in Beijing constitute the unknown distance-unrelated cost on grain
trade. In order to be able to investigate this hypothesis it is necessary to create a link
between China’s grain market efficiency and the bureaucratic efficiency and power
of the Qing State, which is beyond the scope of the present thesis. All of the above
questions however deserve more attention in future research.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter analyses the extent of dynamic market integration and patterns of
market fragmentation during the prime of the Qing China, using monthly rice and
wheat price data across 211 prefectures between 1740 and 1820. Applying novel
panel time series and conventional cross-section methods, this chapter provides a
dynamic comparison between rice markets in Southern China and wheat markets in
Northern China. The empirics of this chapter were motivated through a simple
theoretical model extended with a common factor structure, which allows me to
capture the distorting impact of regional or local shocks on the analysis of market
integration by relaxing the assumption of ‘cross-section independence’ in price series
across prefectures. Combined with the theoretical model, panel cointegration
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methods building on Pesaran (2006, 2007) are exploited to investigate heterogeneous
convergence to a provincial or regional average. This approach also allows me to
quantify the statistical correlations between heterogeneous price convergence and
geographic proximity, which provides a new and unique method to characterise the
observed patterns of market fragmentation. The substantial time series dimension of
my data further allows me to analyse price convergence in models with a 20-year
rolling window to provide a dynamic observation of market evolution and safeguard
against the biasing impact of structural breaks.
My results suggest that both Southern and Northern China experienced
continuous market disintegration and fragmentation over the sample period, and that
the pattern of market fragmentation was along political provincial rather than
physiographic borders. These findings provide a convincing argument that Qing
Dynasty markets were not fully integrated as a single unified market even during its
economic golden era, which challenge the recent suggestions that China possessed a
well-functioning market on the eve of western industrialization. Given this
conclusion, we may need to reconsider the role of the market and market support
institutions in the process of industrialization. The failure of pre-modern China to
initiate industrialization may be due to its lack of well-functioning markets. My
results further imply that the role of transport cost in determining market efficiency
has been overstated in previous research and that we need to re-consider the
widespread claims for causality between transport cost reduction and economic
growth. In addition, my findings suggest that the extent of price convergence in a
collection of locations (e.g. a region like Southern China) is insufficient to conclude
whether the market constituted a unified integrated market or not.
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This chapter identifies and quantifies China’s market decline but also triggers
another important question: how to explain China’s market decline during its
prosperous period. Using some simple regressions, I do not find any evidence to
support that demographic pressure or the deterioration of river transport were the
main driving forces behind the observed market decline. The combination of results
in Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that Qing China’s grain market was fragmented along
provincial borders, which reflects the influential intervention by the Qing
bureaucracy. In the analysis of short-run trade cost determinants, however, the
provincial border effect was only able to explain 30% of trade cost while at least 50%
of total trade is attributed to unknown distance-unrelated cost. Since the regression
models arguable capture most of the geographical determinants, it is possible that the
unexplained trade cost share still accrues to the impact of institutions. All the
empirical results support, however indirectly, my hypothesis stated in Section 2.4.2
that “well-functioning” markets could not take root under the highly centralized
polity of Qing Dynasty China since market regulation and food security rather than
revenue creation were the primary concerns of the emperors.
184
185
Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Summaries of Findings
This thesis is the first attempt to challenges the conventional wisdom that China
possessed unified integrated market on the eve of western industralization, which
uses archival data on grain prices covering the most prosperous episode (1740-1820)
to identify the determinants of market evolution as well as the true extent of China’s
unified market in this pre-modern period.
By the late 18th century, the industrial revolution began to shake England,
and then eventually transform the Europe. Because of Industrialization, for the first
time, humanity would be sprung from the Malthusian trap and experience sustained
growth in prosperity. Most of literature discussing the origin of the Great Divergence
narrows down to the specific question of why the industrialization first emerged in
Europe. The debate over China’s failure to industrialize during the 19th century has
been centred on the question of ‘integrated markets’ (whether prices co-move across
localities reflecting marketization driven by demand and supply) as a necessary
precondition for industrialisation. The unified politico-bureaucratic system and
relative ethno-linguistic homogeneity of Qing Dynasty China vis-à-vis Western
Europe are frequently cited as environmental factors conducive to the development
of an integrated market network in Imperial China. Both the recent historical and
economic literatures on this question agree that China was characterised by
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integrated markets on the eve of industrialisation in Europe (Pomeranz, 2000; Shiue
and Keller, 2007).
Using unique historical grain price data combined with data for the postal
route network, grain waterway network and physiographical distribution, this thesis
seeks to provide evidence for the view that integration across prefectures and regions
of Qing China was characterized by considerable heterogeneity My empirical
analysis first confirms the close relationship between market integration (price
cointegration) and geographic proximity. However, I show that political borders
played a more important role for market integration than physical geography, which
adds support to literature arguing for the supremacy of institutions over geography in
the deep determinants of development. I then employ novel panel time series
methods to investigate the evolving process of market integration over time in an
empirical framework which further allows for common shocks (e.g., widespread
drought) and local spillover effects (e.g., localised flooding). My findings again
question the prevailing consensus in the literature by indicating a lengthy process of
market disintegration with fragmentation determined by political structure during the
18th century: by 1820 China’s markets were fragmented and the unified market
hypothesis is thus seriously in doubt. China’s market efficiency on the eve of
Western industrialisation has been grossly overstated, and was heavily influenced by
its bureaucratic system rather than the geographical determinants.
My results suggest that we may re-consider the role of market efficiency on
industrialization. However, my empirical results trigger and discuss another question:
why were markets not integrated in Qing China even though its political institutions
were unified and integrated? The answer to this question may not just help us to
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understand pre-modern China’s economic mode, but also provide insight into
China’s fall in economic status during the Great Divergence. In this research, my
empirical results cannot support the hypothesis that demographic pressure or river
transportability deterioration led to market decline. It is quite possible that
institutions produced the main driving force. Without direct evidence, this thesis
suggests the absence of formal property right institutions blocked the development of
the modern market mechanism under the unified political regime present in China,
and the grain market performance was thus mainly driven by the state engagement
and intervention.
6.2 Limitation of this Thesis
The first limitation of this thesis is the unbalance missing value in the grain price
data, although its reliability and comparability have been discussed in Chapter 3. It is
always possible that my results are driven by the missing values. The good side is
that my quantitative conclusions of market decline are still robust during the most
prosperous period (i.e. 1750-1770) with the lowest proportion of missing value. It is
still convincing to claim that China’s grain market started to decline during its
“golden” era of the mid-Qing. In Chapter 4, I used the cointegration estimator of
each pair to construct the cross-section model identifying the determinants of market
integration, with which I have to impost the assumption of independence across pairs.
Obviously, this assumption is not reasonable since the real markets always possess
complicated spatial link with each other. On the other hand, I do not observe direct
empirical link between “grain protectionism” and provincial border barrier.
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In Chapter 5, despite the panel cointegration method that allow me to relax
the assumption of “cross-section independence” with a common factor framework
including global shocks and local spill-over effects, it is not able to distinguish
between global shocks and the local spatial dependence of grain prices. The panel
cointegration method I used only allows me to test the panel price convergence with
imposed structure (e.g. province or macroregion). It is unclear which forces drove
market decline behind the provincial borders during this stable and prosperous
period in a politically unified economy. It is possible that the identified political
border effects were driven by the official or merchants’ network.
6.3 Implications for Further Research
The rich data used in this thesis is not only able to shed new light on history, but also
identify links between the past and today, which would give us more insights into the
unified framework including China’s historical decline and contemporary rise.
In terms of spatial analysis, adopting advanced spatial econometric method
(Bailey et al., 2013) I am able to distinguish between global shocks (e.g. a
nationwide drought) and the local spatial dependence using the grain price data, a
distinction thus far ignored in the empirical analysis of market integration. The
pattern revealed by the data can then be tested against more hypotheses for the
determinants of market integration, e.g. China’s institutional development and/or
external weather shocks (enabled by detailed information already digitised). This
investigation will allow me to identify which factors limited China’s market
performance in the 18th century.
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Most literature agreed that the reduction of transport cost played a
progressive role to drive the economic growth in United States and Europe.
“Reduction in the cost of carriage has enabled specialization and division of labour
on a national inter-national basis to replace the relatively self-sufficient economics
that predominated in the Western world two centuries ago” (North, 1958, p.537,
cited from Shiue (2002)). In the early 1990s, China embarked on an ambitious
initiative to build and upgrade its transportation infrastructure, particularly its
highway system. From a low base, spending on transportation infrastructure has
grown at 15% a year since 1990 to about $200 billion in 2007 (Baum-Snow et al.,
2012). This huge investment has created renewed debate over how much
infrastructure contributes to economic growth. On the one hand, the empirical
analysis of this important question faces serious difficulties in identifying a causal
link and its magnitude in the face of ‘reverse causality’ (richer regions/countries
build more roads; road construction projects first target locations with the greatest
potential for development). In this thesis, I digitized archival maps of the national
postal network to provide a more accurate representation of trading routes during the
Qing Dynasty period. Information on these trading routes can now act as an
‘instrumental variable’ for today’s transport infrastructure in the empirical analysis
of the infrastructure-growth nexus in modern-day China. On the other hand, this
thesis provides convincing argument that the role of transport cost on the market
evolution in pre-modern China has been overstated. Thus, it behoves us to go back to
the history to identify which factors limit the impact of transport costs, which could
supply valuable information for policy makers for their decisions to invest in
transportation infrastructure.
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During the process of globalization with technological advances and formal
trade tariff reductions, market segmentation continues to exist. Political and
administrative borders have long been considered as a major source of trade costs in
most of trade literature. China’s contemporary domestic market was fragmented by
provincial borders. Chinese provinces’ greater involvement in international trade
went hand in hand with a decrease in inter-provincial trade flow intensity between
1987 and 1997 (Poncet, 2001, 2003, and 2005). Zhu et al. (2005) suggest that
China’s rapid export expansion is produced by its severe market segmentations
which produce higher trade cost for private firms to explore home market than
oversea market. Young (2000) argues that China’s gradual reform allow local
officials’ rent-seeking through the protection of local industries, which consequently
led to the market fragmentation. It is ambiguous whether the empirically identified
“provincial border” is a temporary or permanent product of China’s decentralization
reform. China’s bureaucratic framework remained comparatively stable over the past
40 years. With the basic political structures and social arrangements displaying
substantial continuity since the Qing Dynasty, it is possible to connect these
historical institutional formations to “protectionism” observed in today’s China.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) explain the entire humankind history by
dividing the world into “inclusive” and “extractive” institutions. Nations gain
prosperity when institutions are “inclusive” and pluralistic, encompassing property
rights and creating incentives for investment. Nations fail when institutions are
“extractive”, protecting the interests of the elite against new entry from competitors.
Before the 19th century, while Europe’s intensive inter-state competition
predetermined the evolution of inclusive institutions, China’s imperial political
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structure was a centralized and isolated unitary state consisted of extractive
institutions. Although without direct empirical evidence, my results support the
hypothesis that China’s “extractive” institutions limited the evolution of modern
market mechanism, which further implies the importance of “institutional change”
for triggering modern economic growth. The identification of link between
institution and economic performance in history would tell us more about how
history affects today and what we need to do in the future.
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Appendix A Data Information
A.1 Unit Root Test Results
Table A.1.1 ADF Unit Root Test Results (South China)
Prefecture p-value Prefecture p-value
With Drift No Drift With Drift No Drift
Anqing 0.4463 0.7753 Pingyue 0.0005 0.5204
Chizhou 0.6420 0.7991 Shiqian 0.0000 0.6292
Chuzhou 0.2256 0.6186 Sinan 0.3864 0.8326
Fengyang 0.7049 0.6662 Sizhou 0.0060 0.5793
Guangde 0.3875 0.7208 Dading 0.1964 0.3703
Hezhou 0.1058 0.3935 Tongren 0.0000 0.5035
Huizhou 0.0616 0.6165 Xingyi 0.3720 0.1830
Liu'an 0.8168 0.5990 Zhenyuan 0.0000 0.8848
Luzhou 0.5093 0.7305 Zunyi 0.0000 0.3572
Ningguo 0.3879 0.7663 Guilin 0.0021 0.8551
Sizhou 0.5075 0.7300 Liuzhou 0.0013 0.7738
Taiping 0.1348 0.5773 Nanning 0.0010 0.8344
Yingzhou 0.7536 0.6894 Pingle 0.0034 0.8350
Changzhou 0.0705 0.8056 Qingyuan 0.1217 0.8878
Haizhou 0.5030 0.8107 Sicheng 0.1752 0.7055
Huai'an 0.1273 0.7418 Si'en 0.3092 0.5088
Jiangning 0.1869 0.8602 Taipingfu 0.0011 0.7808
Songjiang 0.0750 0.8647 Wuzhou 0.0013 0.6607
Suzhou 0.0267 0.7476 Xunzhou 0.0025 0.8457
Taicang 0.0498 0.8878 Yulin 0.0010 0.8424
Tongzhou 0.1224 0.7657 Zhen'an 0.0013 0.8301
Yangzhou 0.0195 0.7583 Anlu 0.4823 0.7612
Zhenjiang 0.0437 0.7132 De'an 0.5106 0.7968
Fuzhou 0.0000 0.6383 Hanyang 0.5570 0.8516
Ganzhou 0.0001 0.5746 Huangzhou 0.5475 0.7043
Guangxin 0.0000 0.5959 Jingzhoufu 0.1488 0.5866
Ji'an 0.0410 0.7412 Shinan 0.4569 0.6628
Jianchang 0.0001 0.7668 Wuchang 0.4451 0.8473
Jiujiang 0.0011 0.5372 Xiangyang 0.4647 0.9196
Linjiang 0.1116 0.8865 Yichang 0.5636 0.7468
Nan'an 0.0001 0.6222 Yunyang 0.6185 0.8154
Nanchang 0.0177 0.8618 Baoqing 0.0030 0.7892
Nankang 0.0000 0.7402 Changde 0.6978 0.9528
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Table A.1.2 ADF Unit Root Test Results (South China)
Prefecture p-value Prefecture p-value
With Drift No Drift With Drift No Drift
Ningdu 0.0418 0.8133 Changsha 0.3282 0.8445
Raozhou 0.0000 0.6628 Chenzhou 0.7939 0.8779
Ruizhou 0.0023 0.7540 Chenzhoufu 0.3367 0.8004
Yuanzhou 0.0193 0.8503 Guiyang 0.0480 0.7048
Fuzhou 0.0007 0.8512 Hengzhou 0.8821 0.8590
Funing 0.0767 0.8645 Jingzhou 0.5618 0.9042
Jianning 0.0073 0.7562 Lizhou 0.4304 0.9163
Longyan 0.0096 0.9588 Yongshun 0.0953 0.7754
Quanzhou 0.0040 0.8121 Yongzhou 0.0005 0.9016
Shaowu 0.4609 0.5598 Yuezhou 0.0277 0.9455
Tingzhou 0.0004 0.9135 Yuanzhou 0.0131 0.7860
Xinghua 0.0008 0.9345 Baoning 0.4817 0.9322
Yanping 0.0822 0.6153 Chengdu 0.0709 0.7849
Yongchun 0.0025 0.7615 Zhongqing 0.4141 0.6666
Zhangzhou 0.0211 0.9287 Jiading 0.3170 0.6971
Taiwan 0.0000 0.5921 Kuizhou 0.2492 0.9122
Chaozhou 0.0001 0.8257 Long'an 0.3204 0.7443
Gaozhou 0.0188 0.7102 Ningyuan 0.2639 0.9536
Guangzhou 0.0317 0.8315 Shunqing 0.2946 0.8569
Huizhou 0.0020 0.8878 Tongchuan 0.5787 0.7770
Jiayingzhou 0.0022 0.8816 Xuzhou 0.0948 0.8820
Leizhou 0.0469 0.6517 Yazhou 0.5847 0.7159
Lianzhou 0.0014 0.7784 Hangzhou 0.0033 0.6685
Lianzhoufu 0.0211 0.7946 Huzhou 0.0090 0.6222
Luoding 0.0033 0.8217 Jiaxing 0.0036 0.6470
Nanxiong 0.0439 0.8532 Jinhua 0.0014 0.5592
Qiongzhou 0.0009 0.8030 Quzhou 0.0002 0.5929
Shaozhou 0.0000 0.7819 Ningbo 0.0001 0.6659
Zhaoqing 0.0072 0.8506 Shaoxing 0.0129 0.7736
Anshun 0.2270 0.5285 Taizhou 0.0009 0.6448
Duyun 0.0000 0.5690 Wenzhou 0.0001 0.6506
Guiyang 0.3179 0.4819 Yanzhou 0.0011 0.6227
Liping 0.2547 0.7732
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Table A.1.3 ADF Unit Root Test Results (North China)
Prefecture p-value Prefecture p-value
With Drift No Drift With Drift No Drift
An'xi 0.1853 0.5450 Jinan 0.5308 0.7621
Ganzhou 0.0728 0.6882 Laizhou 0.0655 0.7029
Gongchang 0.0481 0.5045 Qingzhou 0.1170 0.8012
Jiezhou 0.0168 0.6808 Tai'an 0.1296 0.6702
Lanzhou 0.0373 0.7115 Wuding 0.3332 0.8540
Liangzhou 0.0522 0.5711 Yanzhou 0.7189 0.7090
Ningxia 0.0577 0.5167 Yizhou 0.6412 0.5265
Pingliang 0.0095 0.6499 Baode 0.5454 0.7622
Qinzhou 0.1510 0.6310 Daizhou 0.4008 0.8569
Qingyang 0.0516 0.7167 Datong 0.1886 0.9101
Suzhou 0.0006 0.5558 Fenzhou 0.0342 0.7734
Xi'ning 0.1222 0.6469 Jiangzhou 0.0000 0.7457
Chenzhou 0.0000 0.2174 Jiezhou 0.0012 0.6727
Guangzhou 0.0002 0.2076 Liaozhou 0.0057 0.8861
Guide 0.0001 0.5177 Lu'an 0.0007 0.8632
Henanfu 0.0028 0.1589 Ningwu 0.6055 0.8002
Huaiqing 0.0003 0.4062 Pingding 0.1968 0.9599
Kaifeng 0.0041 0.4575 Pingyang 0.0007 0.7825
Nanyang 0.0002 0.3665 Puzhou 0.0006 0.7587
Ruzhou 0.0042 0.5457 Qinzhou 0.0039 0.8257
Runing 0.0001 0.1011 Shuoping 0.5531 0.9687
Shanzhou 0.0000 0.2857 Taiyuan 0.1414 0.9305
Weihui 0.0186 0.3733 Xizhou 0.0049 0.6593
Xuzhou 0.0000 0.2868 Xinzhou 0.0645 0.8496
Zhangde 0.1968 0.3434 Zezhou 0.0259 0.8073
Binzhou 0.1363 0.7329 Baoding 0.7968 0.4827
Fengxiang 0.4397 0.7205 Daming 0.2132 0.8139
Fuzhou 0.0721 0.6571 Dingzhou 0.0068 0.6217
Hanzhong 0.1910 0.7385 Hejian 0.0961 0.4756
Qianzhou 0.1956 0.8169 Jizhou 0.6011 0.4675
Shangzhou 0.2525 0.7170 Guangpingfu 0.2974 0.6729
Suide 0.1552 0.7101 Shenzhou 0.0593 0.4679
Tongzhou 0.2192 0.6934 Shunde 0.4160 0.6406
Xi'an 0.1339 0.5497 Tianjin 0.2687 0.4636
Xing'an 0.4926 0.7211 Xuanhua 0.0017 0.5394
Yan'an 0.5773 0.8354 Yizhou 0.0735 0.7693
Yulin 0.6489 0.8230 Yongping 0.5433 0.7746
Caozhou 0.6539 0.6541 Zhaozhou 0.8686 0.7181
Dengzhou 0.2787 0.8248 Zhengding 0.3515 0.5254
Dongchang 0.5045 0.7358 Zunhuazhou 0.8103 0.4095
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Table A.1.4 KPSS Unit Root Test Results (South China)
LM-
Stat.
LM-
Stat.
LM-
Stat.
LM-
Stat.
Anqing 0.0762 Ningdu 0.1902 Pingyue 0.2114 Changsha 0.4175
Chizhou 0.1552 Raozhou 0.0978 Shiqian 0.0486 Chenzhou 0.6441
Chuzhou 0.1467 Ruizhou 0.0677 Sinan 0.2275 Chenzhoufu 0.7109
Fengyang 0.1784 Yuanzhou 0.1449 Sizhou 0.0583 Guiyang 0.2651
Guangde 0.1712 Fuzhou 0.2355 Dading 0.3603 Hengzhou 0.4704
Hezhou 0.1927 Funing 0.0969 Tongren 0.1902 Jingzhou 0.6162
Huizhou 0.2257 Jianning 0.2078 Xingyi 0.1682 Lizhou 0.6700
Liu'an 0.3334 Longyan 0.2870 Zhenyuan 0.2051 Yongshun 0.5793
Luzhou 0.0972 Quanzhou 0.0963 Zunyi 0.3175 Yongzhou 0.1563
Ningguo 0.3026 Shaowu 0.1243 Guilin 0.2079 Yuezhou 0.5490
Sizhou 0.1660 Tingzhou 0.3231 Liuzhou 0.1547 Yuanzhou 0.4349
Taiping 0.1325 Xinghua 0.0904 Nanning 0.2039 Baoning 0.3786
Yingzhou 0.1967 Yanping 0.2145 Pingle 0.2578 Chengdu 0.4572
Changzhou 0.2013 Yongchun 0.3899 Qingyuan 0.1858 Zhongqing 0.3951
Haizhou 0.5103 Zhangzhou 0.1027 Sicheng 0.5618 Jiading 0.4595
Huai'an 0.2412 Taiwan 0.0937 Si'en 0.4049 Kuizhou 0.4324
Jiangning 0.1846 Chaozhou 0.5204 Taipingfu 0.1414 Long'an 0.4681
Songjiang 0.2718 Gaozhou 0.3227 Wuzhou 0.1482 Ningyuan 0.4996
Suzhou 0.2409 Guangzhou 0.1634 Xunzhou 0.1738 Shunqing 0.3828
Taicang 0.2622 Huizhou 0.1755 Yulin 0.2254 Tongchuan 0.3606
Tongzhou 0.1641 Jiayingzhou 0.3453 Zhen'an 0.0680 Xuzhou 0.7395
Yangzhou 0.1799 Leizhou 0.3367 Anlu 0.1812 Yazhou 0.4566
Zhenjiang 0.2696 Lianzhou 0.3308 De'an 0.1050 Hangzhou 0.3041
Fuzhou 0.0496 Lianzhoufu 0.1460 Hanyang 0.1529 Huzhou 0.2218
Ganzhou 0.0675 Luoding 0.2660 Huangzhou 0.1532 Jiaxing 0.2251
Guangxin 0.0841 Nanxiong 0.1802 Jingzhoufu 0.2467 Jinhua 0.3091
Ji'an 0.1245 Qiongzhou 0.1845 Shinan 0.4039 Quzhou 0.1563
Jianchang 0.1015 Shaozhou 0.1811 Wuchang 0.1961 Ningbo 0.1914
Jiujiang 0.0981 Zhaoqing 0.1810 Xiangyang 0.3814 Shaoxing 0.1253
Linjiang 0.1207 Anshun 0.1594 Yichang 0.2476 Taizhou 0.3802
Nan'an 0.2085 Duyun 0.3816 Yunyang 0.3176 Wenzhou 0.1638
Nanchang 0.0722 Guiyang 0.2517 Baoqing 0.4770 Yanzhou 0.3693
Nankang 0.0664 Liping 0.3735 Changde 0.6918
Note: The null hypothesis for KPSS test is that the series is stationary. Constant and linear trend
are inclueded in the KPSS test of this table. The asymptotic critical values for 1%, 5% and 10%
level are 0.216, 0.146 and 0.119 respectively.
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Table A.1.5 KPSS Unit Root Test Results (North
China)
LM-Stat. LM-Stat.
An'xi 0.3136 Jinan 0.3243
Ganzhou 0.2657 Laizhou 0.3147
Gongchang 0.1740 Qingzhou 0.1623
Jiezhou 0.1032 Tai'an 0.2122
Lanzhou 0.1856 Wuding 0.3904
Liangzhou 0.1979 Yanzhou 0.2343
Ningxia 0.1896 Yizhou 0.2902
Pingliang 0.2740 Baode 0.1259
Qinzhou 0.2355 Daizhou 0.1243
Qingyang 0.2368 Datong 0.1172
Suzhou 0.1635 Fenzhou 0.1569
Xi'ning 0.1957 Jiangzhou 0.1327
Chenzhou 0.0920 Jiezhou 0.1159
Guangzhou 0.2352 Liaozhou 0.1918
Guide 0.2594 Lu'an 0.1667
Henanfu 0.1226 Ningwu 0.2476
Huaiqing 0.1100 Pingding 0.4683
Kaifeng 0.1304 Pingyang 0.1733
Nanyang 0.1183 Puzhou 0.1946
Ruzhou 0.1159 Qinzhou 0.3324
Runing 0.1537 Shuoping 0.1576
Shanzhou 0.0783 Taiyuan 0.1688
Weihui 0.0956 Xizhou 0.2729
Xuzhou 0.1446 Xinzhou 0.2034
Zhangde 0.1915 Zezhou 0.1326
Binzhou 0.1184 Baoding 0.2644
Fengxiang 0.1034 Daming 0.0986
Fuzhou 0.2176 Dingzhou 0.0965
Hanzhong 0.1313 Hejian 0.2927
Qianzhou 0.1294 Jizhou 0.3667
Shangzhou 0.4255 Guangpingfu 0.1051
Suide 0.4043 Shenzhou 0.0989
Tongzhou 0.2873 Shunde 0.1382
Xi'an 0.2161 Tianjin 0.1089
Xing'an 0.3373 Xuanhua 0.1133
Yan'an 0.2639 Yizhou 0.4156
Yulin 0.2099 Yongping 0.1546
Caozhou 0.2484 Zhaozhou 0.1562
Dengzhou 0.3799 Zhengding 0.5049
Dongchang 0.4103 Zunhuazhou 0.4083
Note: The null hypothesis for KPSS test is that the series is stationary.
Constant and linear trend are inclueded in the KPSS test of this table. The
asymptotic critical values for 1%, 5% and 10% level are 0.216, 0.146 and 0.119
respectively.
218
A.2 Name of Prefectures in the Grain Price Data
South China (rice, 131 prefectures)
Anhui Province:
Anqing, Chizhou, Chuzhou, Fengyang, Guangde, Hezhou, Huizhou, Liu’an, Luzhou,
Ningguo, Sizhou, Taiping, Yingzhou;
Jiangsu Province:
Changzhou, Haizhou, Huai’an, Jiangning, Songjiang, Suzhou, Taicang, Tongzhou,
Yangzhou, Zhenjiang;
Jiangxi Province:
Ganzhou, Guangxin, Ji’an, Jianchang, Jiujiang, Linjiang, Nan’an, Nanchang,
Nankang, Ningdu, Raozhou, Ruizhou, Yuanzhou;
Fujian Province:
Fuzhou, Funing, Jianning, Longyan, Quanzhou, Shaowu, Tingzhou, Xinghua,
Yanping, Yongchun, Zhangzhou, Taiwan;
Guangdong Province:
Chaozhou, Gaozhou, Guangzhou, Huizhou, Jiayingzhou, Leizhou, Lianzhou,
Lianzhou Fu, Luoding, Nanxiong, Qiongzhou, Shaozhou, Zhaoqing;
Guizhou Province:
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Anshan, Duyun, Guiyang, Liping, Pingyue, Shiqian, Sinan, Sizhou, Dading, Tongren,
Xingyi, Zhenyuan, Zunyi;
Guangxi Province:
Guilin, Liuzhou, Nanning, Pingle, Qingyuan, Sicheng, Si’en, Taiping Fu, Wuzhou,
Xunzhou, Yulin, Zhen’an;
Hubei Province:
Anlu, De’an, Hanyang, Huangzhou, Jingzhou Fu, Shinan, Wuchang, Xiangyang,
Yichang, Yunyang;
Hunan Province:
Baoqing, Changde, Changsha, Chenzhou, Chenzhou Fu, Guiyang, Hengzhou,
Jingzhou, Lizhou, Yongshun, Yongzhou, Yuezhou, Yuanzhou
Sichuan Province:
Baoning, Chengdu, Chongqing, Jiading, Kuizhou, Long’an, Ningyuan, Shunqing,
Tongchuan, Xuzhou, Yazhou;
Zhejiang Province:
Hangzhou, Huzhou, Jiaxing, Jinhua, Quzhou, Ningbo, Shaoxing, Taizhou, Wenzhou,
Yanzhou.
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North China (wheat, 80 prefectures)
Gansu Province:
Anxi, Ganzhou, Gongchang, Jiezhou, Lanzhou, Liangzhou, Ningxia, Pingliang,
Qinzhou, Qingyang, Suzhou, Xi’ning;
Henan Province:
Chenzhou, Guangzhou, Guide, Henan Fu, Huaiqing, Kaifeng, Nanyang, Ruzhou,
Runing, Shanzhou, Weihui, Xuzhou, Zhangde;
Shann’xi Province:
Binzhou, Fengxiang, Fuzhou, Hanzhong, Qianzhou, Shangzhou, Suide, Tongzhou,
Xi’an, Xing’an, Yan’an, Yulin;
Shandong Province:
Caozhou, Dengzhou, Dongchang, Ji’nan, Laizhou, Qingzhou, Tai’an, Wuding,
Yanzhou, Yizhou;
Shanxi Province:
Baode, Daizhou, Datong, Fenzhou, Jiangzhou, Jiezhou, Liaozhou, Lu’an, Ningwu,
Pingding, Pingyang, Puzhou, Qinzhou, Shuoping, Taiyuan, Xizhou, Xinzhou,
Zezhou;
Zhili Province:
Baoding, Daming, Dingzhou, Hejian, Jizhou, Guangping Fu, Shenzhou, Shunde,
Tianjin, Xuanhua, Yizhou, Yongping, Zhaozhou, Zhengding, Zunhuazhou
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A.3 Monthly Price Change Frequency
To observe whether the grain price changed monthly, I construct a dummy variable
(i.e. the price change dummy) for each prefecture in each month. Let
(Price Change Dummy)i, t = 1 if Pi, t - Pi, t-1 
= 0 if Pi, t - Pi, t-1 =0
The mean of (Price Change Dummy)i,t indicates the percentage of prefectures that
experienced a price change in a given period. The mean of this Price Change
Dummy (i.e. MPCD) is given from Table A.2 to Table A.5 by time period and
province for each region respectively. Firstly, these tables show that quite a large
number of prefectures witnessed monthly price changes. Secondly, the MPCD is
related to the harvest time. In Southern rice regions, the largest MPCD occurs around
September while the largest MPCD for the North wheat always happened in July.
Third, evidence in Tables A.2 and A.5 shows that the frequency of price change
decreases over time, which may be due to a declining efficiency of the price report
system. Fourthly, in Tables A.2 and A.5, the frequency of price changes is similar
across provinces, which avoids the possibility that differential price report efficiency
across provinces drives the empirical results.
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Table A.2 Monthly Price Change Frequency (South)
1740-1820 1740-1759 1760-1779 1780-1799 1800-1820
Jan MPCD 0.5543 0.6624 0.5728 0.4882 0.4679
Obs. 7465 1973 2174 1743 1575
Fed MPCD 0.5456 0.688 0.5494 0.4717 0.4426
Obs. 7418 1955 2208 1660 1595
Mar MPCD 0.6475 0.76 0.6835 0.5478 0.5624
Obs. 7574 1998 2262 1641 1673
Apr MPCD 0.7406 0.822 0.7674 0.6704 0.6694
Obs. 7453 2015 2266 1499 1673
May MPCD 0.7541 0.8295 0.7696 0.7123 0.6817
Obs. 7375 1982 2222 1512 1659
Jun MPCD 0.7206 0.8107 0.7247 0.6254 0.6919
Obs. 7311 2013 2187 1527 1584
Jul MPCD 0.699 0.782 0.7231 0.5872 0.6585
Obs. 7263 2041 2207 1410 1605
Aug MPCD 0.7624 0.8422 0.8156 0.7246 0.6189
Obs. 7160 2028 2212 1322 1598
Sep MPCD 0.7937 0.8573 0.8362 0.7727 0.6761
Obs. 7226 1997 2180 1434 1615
Oct MPCD 0.7511 0.8308 0.7858 0.7095 0.6486
Obs. 7341 2045 2106 1494 1696
Nov MPCD 0.6844 0.7875 0.7342 0.5831 0.5906
Obs. 7479 2104 2088 1648 1639
Dec MPCD 0.6181 0.7321 0.6354 0.5237 0.5471
Obs. 7639 2128 2164 1810 1537
MPCD is defined as the mean of Price Change Dummy, which indicates the percentage of prefectures
that experienced a price change in a given period; Price Change Dummy =1 if Pi, t - Pi, t-1Į0;
otherwise, Price Change Dummy=0
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Table A.3 Monthly Price Change Frequency by Provinces (South, 1740-1820)
Anhui Jiangsu Jiangxi Fujian Guangdong Guizhou Guangxi Hubei Hunan Sichuan
Jan MPCD 0.657 0.7183 0.551 0.5846 0.6762 0.316 0.5037 0.5768 0.4670 0.5331
Obs. 846 639 646 792 803 810 818 612 895 604
Fed MPCD 0.636 0.6831 0.6087 0.5836 0.6589 0.3142 0.4432 0.55 0.4935 0.5152
Obs. 819 650 621 819 818 783 837 620 859 592
Mar MPCD 0.672 0.745 0.7768 0.6769 0.6809 0.5325 0.561 0.6592 0.6505 0.5431
Obs. 793 651 654 845 843 830 852 628 887 591
Apr MPCD 0.74 0.7523 0.7979 0.7071 0.7816 0.7953 0.7461 0.7171 0.7909 0.5279
Obs. 712 642 653 823 838 816 839 640 880 610
May MPCD 0.704 0.724 0.8365 0.7376 0.7533 0.8347 0.786 0.7297 0.8344 0.5438
Obs. 778 634 624 747 827 829 827 640 864 605
Jun MPCD 0.713 0.7415 0.7877 0.6865 0.7427 0.7291 0.7045 0.6629 0.7721 0.6396
Obs. 859 650 636 724 793 816 802 620 856 555
Jul MPCD 0.735 0.7463 0.8437 0.6867 0.7609 0.607 0.6297 0.6754 0.6800 0.6181
Obs. 857 670 646 750 824 748 786 610 822 550
Aug MPCD 0.763 0.804 0.9293 0.7975 0.7783 0.6395 0.7475 0.7561 0.7927 0.6045
Obs. 813 648 651 726 812 749 788 574 820 579
Sep MPCD 0.857 0.8316 0.855 0.7133 0.6865 0.8964 0.7146 0.8102 0.8859 0.6667
Obs. 848 677 600 729 820 753 792 569 859 579
Oct MPCD 0.867 0.8714 0.7048 0.6625 0.6727 0.8141 0.7403 0.779 0.7986 0.5454
Obs. 854 669 586 726 819 791 828 620 854 594
Nov MPCD 0.805 0.8519 0.648 0.681 0.7271 0.6214 0.7265 0.6476 0.6234 0.4485
Obs. 857 655 642 765 883 774 852 630 839 582
Dec MPCD 0.69 0.7843 0.6207 0.6564 0.7715 0.4315 0.6268 0.589 0.5243 0.4673
Obs. 896 640 667 783 871 825 852 640 883 582
MPCD is defined as the mean of Price Change Dummy, which indicates the percentage of prefectures that experienced a price change in a given period;
Price Change Dummy =1 if Pi, t - Pi, t-1Į0; otherwise, Price Change Dummy=0
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Table A.4 Monthly Price Change Frequency (North)
1740-1820 1740-1759 1760-1779 1780-1799 1800-1820
Jan MPCD 0.5972 0.7894 0.6704 0.445 0.4707
Obs. 4774 1111 1426 1218 939
Fed MPCD 0.6046 0.7656 0.6301 0.5387 0.4934
Obs. 4909 1122 1414 1227 1066
Mar MPCD 0.6714 0.8054 0.7144 0.5698 0.608
Obs. 4957 1141 1432 1225 1079
Apr MPCD 0.7037 0.815 0.7375 0.6257 0.6441
Obs. 5090 1211 1436 1197 1166
May MPCD 0.6947 0.829 0.7134 0.6245 0.6147
Obs. 5047 1187 1483 1124 1173
Jun MPCD 0.7723 0.886 0.8033 0.6867 0.7236
Obs. 4852 1123 1480 1098 1071
Jul MPCD 0.8061 0.9337 0.8681 0.7498 0.6691
Obs. 4750 1101 1456 1019 1094
Aug MPCD 0.7493 0.9048 0.8225 0.6103 0.6211
Obs. 4679 1145 1459 934 1061
Sep MPCD 0.6679 0.8118 0.7537 0.5143 0.5538
Obs. 4730 1148 1470 945 1087
Oct MPCD 0.6274 0.8301 0.7006 0.496 0.4692
Obs. 4826 1130 1436 1012 1168
Nov MPCD 0.612 0.789 0.6867 0.4335 0.5221
Obs. 4868 1123 1465 1068 1132
Dec MPCD 0.5953 0.7876 0.657 0.4438 0.4847
Obs. 4981 1191 1452 1183 1075
MPCD is defined as the mean of Price Change Dummy, which indicates the percentage of prefectures
that experienced a price change in a given period; Price Change Dummy =1 if Pi, t - Pi, t-1 
otherwise, Price Change Dummy=0
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MPCD is defined as the mean of Price Change Dummy, which indicates the percentage of
prefectures that experienced a price change in a given period; Price Change Dummy =1 if Pi, t - Pi, t-1
RWKHUZLVH3ULFH&KDQJH'XPP\ 
Table A.5 Monthly Price Change Frequency by Provinces (North,
1740-1820)
Gansu Henan Shann'xi Shandong Shanxi Zhili
Jan MPCD 0.6881 0.5069 0.7039 0.6601 0.466 0.641
Obs. 776 724 770 609 1193 702
Fed MPCD 0.6276 0.5489 0.7166 0.6899 0.467 0.6785
Obs. 768 756 794 587 1242 762
Mar MPCD 0.6975 0.5922 0.7256 0.7592 0.5639 0.7878
Obs. 767 797 820 598 1268 707
Apr MPCD 0.7202 0.594 0.7552 0.7815 0.6226 0.8317
Obs. 779 830 817 650 1301 713
May MPCD 0.7487 0.5978 0.7422 0.7678 0.584 0.8146
Obs. 752 803 803 633 1274 782
Jun MPCD 0.7568 0.7895 0.8058 0.8789 0.6398 0.8491
Obs. 728 803 762 644 1166 749
Jul MPCD 0.7804 0.7456 0.8438 0.8845 0.7635 0.8559
Obs. 756 794 762 632 1091 715
Aug MPCD 0.7799 0.6278 0.7874 0.7194 0.7594 0.8234
Obs. 804 763 762 613 1114 623
Sep MPCD 0.7782 0.4928 0.7114 0.7389 0.6174 0.7036
Obs. 816 763 731 628 1124 668
Oct MPCD 0.7491 0.5137 0.6618 0.7045 0.5234 0.6681
Obs. 821 765 748 660 1133 699
Nov MPCD 0.7465 0.5019 0.6723 0.7203 0.4983 0.6096
Obs. 785 777 772 622 1164 748
Dec MPCD 0.7628 0.4919 0.6713 0.6625 0.4583 0.6145
Obs. 780 799 785 646 1211 760
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A.4 River Network in Wien (1955)
Figure A.1 River Transportation Network
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A.5 List of Grain River
Lv Shui, Xun He, Baishui Jiang, Diao He, Yellow River, Gun He, Yangchang He,
Liu Jiang, Ba Jiang, Chishui He, Feng He, Daning He, Juan Shui, Xiong Xi, Xinan
Xi(Da Xi), Sha Xi, Xi Xi, Shimen Gang, Dong He, Luan He, Yongding He, Majia
He, Xinfeng Jiang, Liu Xi, Li Jiang, Gui Jiang, Lingqu, Ang Jiang, Hongshui Jiang,
Baisha He, Gan Jiang, Jialing Jiang, Jin Shui, Bai He, Dan Shui, Tu He, Bei Jiang,
Zhong Jiang, Dun Shui, Ju Shui, Qu Jiang, Fu Jiang, Nanliu Jiang, Mi Shui, Jin Shui,
Wu Shui, Lei Shui, Qi Jiang, Songkan He, Fuling Jiang, Wu Jiang, Qing Jiang, Hudu
He, Pen Shui, Baishigang, Bei Shui, Jin Jiang, Zhang Shui, Gong Shui, Mingde Shui,
Baotang Shui, Long'an Shui, Le'an Jiang, Chang Jiang, Qin jiang(Ting Shui), Mei Xi,
Qing Xi(Zheng Xi), Nanpu Xi, Xin'an Jiang, Hui He, Wo He, Qu He, Xi Shui, Hui
Shui, Luo He, Fen Shui, Wei He, Luo Shui, Qiantang Jiang, Sheyang He, Feng Jiang,
Ren He, Fuyi Shui, Shi He, Ying He, Rong Jiang, Yuan Jiang, Da Jiang, Zi Jiang,
Xiang Jiang, Zhong Jiang, Tanglang Chuan, Yu Jiang, Lian Jiang, Bei Jiang, Dong
Jiang, Xi Jiang, Han Jiang, Xiao Xi, Futun Xi, Jian Xi, Min Jiang, Anyang Jiang,
Fuchun Jiang, Er Jiang, Ru He, Po Jiang, Tong Jiang, Qingyi Jiang, Nicha He, Ying
He, Han Shui, Wei Shui, Ziya He, Huai He, Yun He, Yangtze River, Grand Canal
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A.6 Name of Prefectures with Both Rice and Wheat Price
South China( rice and wheat, 77 prefectures)
Anhui Province:
Anqing, Chizhou, Chuzhou, Fengyang, Guangde, Hezhou, Huizhou, Liu’an, Luzhou,
Ningguo, Sizhou, Taiping, Yingzhou;
Jiangsu Province:
Changzhou, Haizhou, Huai’an, Jiangning, Songjiang, Suzhou, Taicang, Tongzhou,
Yangzhou, Zhenjiang;
Jiangxi Province:
Ganzhou, Guangxin, Ji’an, Jianchang, Jiujiang, Linjiang, Nan’an, Nanchang,
Nankang, Ningdu, Raozhou, Ruizhou, Yuanzhou;
Fujian Province:
Fuzhou, Funing, Jianning, Longyan, Quanzhou, Shaowu, Tingzhou, Xinghua,
Yanping, Yongchun, Zhangzhou, Taiwan;
Guangdong Province:
Chaozhou, Gaozhou, Guangzhou, Huizhou, Jiayingzhou, Leizhou, Lianzhou,
Lianzhou Fu, Luoding, Nanxiong, Qiongzhou, Shaozhou, Zhaoqing;
Hubei Province:
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Anlu, De’an, Hanyang, Huangzhou, Jingzhou Fu, Shinan, Wuchang, Xiangyang,
Yichang, Yunyang;
Hunan Province:
Baoqing, Changde, Changsha, Chenzhou, Chenzhou Fu, Guiyang, Hengzhou,
Jingzhou, Lizhou, Yongshun, Yongzhou, Yuezhou, Yuanzhou
Sichuan Province:
Baoning, Chengdu, Chongqing, Jiading, Kuizhou, Long’an, Ningyuan, Shunqing,
Tongchuan, Xuzhou, Yazhou;
Zhejiang Province:
Hangzhou, Huzhou, Jiaxing, Jinhua, Quzhou, Ningbo, Shaoxing, Taizhou, Wenzhou,
Yanzhou
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Appendix B Robustness Checks
B.1 Probit Results for Market Determinants
The pattern of the results by probit model in Table B.1 is the same as the results in
Table 4.2. First, it confirms that the impact of river transport on price cointegration
in South China was heterogeneous by distance while it is insignificant in North
China. Second, provincial border dominated the water transport on the market
evolution.
In column 3, to confirm the significance of these interaction terms, I
calculated the re-corrected magnitude and statistical significance of the interaction
effect for all interaction terms, following the re-derived formulas in Ai and Norton
(2003) and Norton et.al. (2004). The re-corrected interaction effect for Probit model
are given in Figure B.1 and these Z-statistics of significance are given in the Figure
B.2, which confirm the Southern river transport affected the market integration
heterogeneously. In Figure B.2, if the absolute value of Z-statistic for the given
probability is below the critical value (i.e. the red line in the graph), it means the
interaction term for the given probability is insignificant. For example, In Figure B.2
(a), all the points are between two critical red lines, which mean for any probability
this interaction term is insignificant. Similarly, Figure B.2 (b) represents, for most of
the given probabilities, the interaction term for the distance between 200 and 400 km
is significant.
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Table B.1 Market Integration, Geography and Institutions (Probit)
South Rice North Wheat South Rice North Wheat
Dependent Variable: Cij = {0,1} (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Disi,j) -0.1694 -0.2586 -0.1292 -0.145
(0.0373)*** (0.0522)*** (0.439)*** (0.063)**
Riverij 0.1433 0.0194 -0.4126 0.2738
(0.0479)*** (0.0786) (0.1695)** (0.5044)
Proij 1.0744 1.014 3.128 2.3
(0.0747)*** (0.0689)*** (0.7273)*** (0.582)***
Proij × ln(Disij) -0.3396 -0.2149
(0.121)*** (0.097)**
Riverij×Dis_Gij,1(xч200km) -0.0061 0.029
(0.2525) (0.532)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,2(200<xч400km) 0.5376 -0.169
(0.1944)*** (0.511)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,3(400<xч600km) 0.7051 -0.335
(0.182)*** (0.511)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,4(600<xчϴ00km) 0.807 -0.361
(0.177)*** (0.508)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,5(800<xч1000km) 0.744 -0.377
(0.174)*** (0.511)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,6(1000<xч1200km) 0.539 -0.107
(0.175)*** (0.516)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,7(1200<xч1400km) 0.3004 -0.407
(0.176)* (0.532)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,8(1400<xчϭϲϬϬkm) 0.113 -0.461
(0.185) (0.551)
Riverij×Dis_Gij,9(1600<xчϭϴϬϬkm) 0.157 -0.888
(0.197) (0.603)
Marginal Effect
Riverij 0.0307 0.0039 -0.0877 0.0549
(0.0103)*** (0.0158) (0.036)** (0.101)
Proij 0.23 0.2043 0.665 0.4613
(0.0155)*** (0.0132)*** (0.154)*** (0.116)***
Ti, Tj and Ti*j* Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 16,770 6314 16,770 6,314
Pseudo-R2 0.4547 0.3734 0.4584 0.3757
Note: We omit reporting fixed effects, seasonality and the constant. Robust standard errors provided in parentheses;
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively
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Figure B.1 Re-corrected Interaction Effect for Probit Model (Rice)
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(b) Distance Group (200-400km)
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(c) Distance Group (400-600km)
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(d) Distance Group (600-800km)
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(e) Distance Group (800-1000km)
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Figure B.2 Z-statistics of Interaction Effects for Probit Model (Rice)
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(g) Gistance Group (1200-1400km)
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(h) Distance Group (1400-1600km)
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B.2 Distance and Province Border Effect
In Table B.2 for Southern rice, obviously, the ratio of cointegrated pairs is much
higher for the sample of pairs within the same province. For the distance group
between 200 and 400km, both categories (within the same province or within
different province) own the similar number of pairs, and the pairs within the same
province still own the larger likelihood of cointegration. In Table B.3 for Northern
wheat, the similar pattern was found. These results confirm that, controlling for
distance, provincial border still has an impact on reducing the cointegration
likelihood.
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Table B.2 The Ratio of Cointegrated Pairwise by Post Distance Group (South Rice, 1740-1820)
same province different provinces
Distance Group (km)
No. of Cointegrated
Pairwise
No. of Pair Ratio
No of Cointegrated
Pairwise
No. of Pair Ratio
(1) (2) (1) / (2) (3) (4) (3) / (4)
0-200 296 346 0.86 75 122 0.61
200-400 459 600 0.77 409 632 0.65
400-600 247 338 0.73 895 1428 0.63
600-800 86 124 0.69 1216 2076 0.59
800-1000 21 30 0.7 1231 2362 0.52
1000-1200 11 12 0.92 1043 2314 0.45
1200-1400 0 867 2158 0.4
1400-1600 0 609 1742 0.35
1600-1800 0 381 1280 0.3
>1800 0 330 1466 0.23
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Table B.3 The Ratio of Cointegrated Pairwise by Post Distance Group (North Wheat, 1740-1820)
same province different provinces
Distance Group
(km)
No of Cointegrated
Pairwise
No of Pairwise Ratio
No of Cointegrated
Pairwise
No of Pairwise Ratio
(1) (2) (1) / (2) (3) (4) (3) / (4)
0-200 161 242 0.67 19 82 0.23
200-400 272 432 0.63 132 524 0.25
400-600 108 234 0.46 272 1092 0.25
600-800 25 68 0.37 238 1132 0.21
800-1000 11 26 0.42 176 870 0.2
1000-1200 2 16 0.13 102 572 0.18
1200-1400 1 6 0.17 47 348 0.14
1400-1600 0 2 0 32 238 0.13
1600-1800 0 31 164 0.19
>1800 0 52 272 0.19
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B.3 Heterogeneous Provincial Convergence
I estimate the rolling robust Mean Group convergence coefficients for each province
separately using regression (5.6’), in both the South and North China samples. The
findings confirm that the trends in Figure B.3 are not driven by some extreme outlier
province(s).
Figure B.3 Provincial Convergence in Different Province
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Figure A1 Provincial Convergence in Different Province (South)
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241
B.4 Cointegration Results with Sub-sample
Figure B.4 Share of Cointegrated Prefecture Paris by Distance
(Full Sample and Sub Sample)
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Table B.4 Market Integration, Geography and Institutions (OLS, subsample)
Dependent Variable: Cij = {0,1}
South Rice North Wheat South Rice North Wheat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Disi,j) -0.0393 -0.0474 -0.0479 0.0027
(0.0084)*** (0.0156)*** (0.0104)*** (0.0177)
Riverij 0.014 0.0096 -0.091 -0.0677
(0.012) (0.0207) (0.029)** (0.0677)
Proij 0.27 0.236 0.146 0.8802
(0.0161)*** (0.0218)*** (0.138)*** (0.1718)***
ln( Proij) × ln(Disij) 0.0225 -0.1076
(0.023) (0.0284)***
Riverij×Dis_G1ij(xч200km) 0.0264 0.165
(0.0469) (0.087)*
Riverij×Dis_G2ij(200<xч400km) 0.1 0.188
(0.0349)*** (0.079)**
Riverij×Dis_G3ij(400<xч600km) 0.133 0.0655
(0.0337)*** (0.0723)
Riverij×Dis_G4ij(600<xчϴ00km) 0.14 0.0384
(0.033)*** (0.0704)
Riverij×Dis_G5ij(800<xч1000km) 0.126 0.0354
(0.0303)*** (0.0712)
Riverij×Dis_G6ij(1000<xч1200km) 0.111 0.0631
(0.0299)*** (0.08)
Riverij×Dis_G7ij(1200<xч1400km) 0.099 0.0181
(0.0307)** (0.0736)
Riverij×Dis_G8ij(1400<xчϭϲϬϬkm) 0.068 -0.0057
(0.033) (0.0711)
Riverij×Dis_G9ij(1600<xчϭϴϬϬkm) 0.053 -0.079
(0.0317) (0.059)
Ti Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tj Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ti*j* Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 12,656 4160 12,656 4,160
R2 0.474 0.3776 0.4756 0.3845
Note: We omit reporting fixed effects, seasonality and the constant. Robust standard errors provided in
parentheses; ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively
